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A NOTE ON SUICIDE

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The earliest analytical formulations concerning the problem of suicide and the fear of death dealt with the libidinal aspects of these ; attention was drawn to the sexual symbolic significance of death and dying, and death was regarded as a punishment for forbidden sexual impulses. Gradually the importance of aggression came to be emphasized more and more (Freud (1), Abraham (2), Glover (3)). As we know, in suicide, aggression had been turned against the self, both self and hated incorporated objects were annihilated, while death was the punishment for the wish to kill.

Suicide is often regarded not so much as punishment but as a means of preventing oneself from committing forbidden acts. In other cases the decision to kill himself enables the individual to commit forbidden acts, for which suicide is an atonement.[1] Suicide always aims at hurting directly some loved person. It achieves this by deserting them, by robbing them of their child, husband, etc. (i.e. oneself) unconsciously of a precious part of their body and by trying to lay on them the blame for the suicide, turning them into murderers, hoping that they will suffer from remorse and, if possible, be punished as well.

There is no doubt as to the importance of aggression as a deter-

[1] Walter Schmideberg pointed out in a paper read before the Vienna Society several years ago that the soldiers in the war were enabled to enjoy great instinctual freedom because the guilt they would have experienced under normal circumstances was abrogated by the knowledge that they were likely to die.

mining factor in suicide ; but I was impressed by the rôle the libidinal impulses play. A patient who had attempted to kill himself by inhaling gas said that the smell of gas reminded him of the hair of his friend ; another patient with strong suicidal tendencies had the idea of committing suicide by chronic constipation ; suicide is the one thing which the analyst tries to prevent and thus it becomes equated with masturbation. A patient's fears of being operated on and dying were the retaliation for aggression, but death also meant reunion with the dead father and the hospital was the place where babies came from.

These sexual factors aim largely at libidinizing and idealizing the aggression and anxiety connected with dying. A patient with fits of deep depression and suicidal tendencies regarded death as the most enviable thing. Both his brothers and his mother had died. By regarding death as something so enviable he dealt with his guilt over the death wishes, which in his case had come true. By turning death and the life after death into something good, anxiety of death is overcome.

Freud (4) takes the view that the fear of death is not genuine but only a substitute for castration anxiety, as the individual is unable to imagine complete annihilation. But it seems possible to experience anxiety without ideational content and it may be observed that from a very early age every interference with the instinct of self-preservation causes anxiety. Moreover as the individual can imagine the annihilation of the hated person, he must have some conception of death. And we see that the content of the most varied anxieties boils down to the fear of annihilation of the whole body or loss of bodily parts, to experiencing pain or being robbed of pleasure. This primary fear of annihilation, (5) arising from interference with the self-preserving instinct, is reinforced by anxiety due to the fear of retaliation for one's aggressive impulses and to repression of libido.

Is there a genuine wish for death ? What first appears to be a manifestation of the ' death instinct ', a wish to die, is found in analysis to be a way of dealing with the anxiety of dying, with guilt over death wishes. We see over and over again that it is not the ' death instinct ', which drives a person to suicide, but strong emotional disturbances—especially anxiety—which interfere with the self-preserving instinct.

Fear of death and fear of life seem to constitute the strongest incentives to suicide. Certain patients make life and death alternately the subject of their paranoid anxiety—they do much the same with

work and sleep, day and night. Suicide is an escape from the real and phantasied dangers of life to a greater happiness and safety—sleep and life after death. I do not believe that anyone kills himself who has not hope in a happier life after death (6). There are two ways of preventing suicide: by making life more attractive or by taking away the hope in a future life, increasing the anxiety of death and the guilt over suicide. This guilt is caused by the aggressive and sexual impulses expressed in suicide. The guilt over suicide and the fear of death itself however prove an incentive to suicide: one wants to prove that death and dying are not so bad, or do not exist at all; one wants to escape more fearful forms of death or by bringing it about oneself to avoid the unbearable tension of the fear of death, or shew that one does not feel guilty for the wish to kill and to commit suicide. At times it is a way of dealing with a painful feeling of unreality; it is a proof that one was alive, if one can die. Anxiety and guilt are not the only emotions responsible for suicide. To mention only one other factor, excessive feelings of disgust brought about, e.g. by deep disappointments in loved persons or by the breakdown of idealizations prove frequently an incentive towards suicide. If nothing good is left in this world, if everything and everybody and oneself is felt to be disgusting, life is not worth while living, just as originally food did not seem worth while eating when it was believed to be like excrements. The refusal to go on living is then a substitute for the child's refusal to eat what was thought to be disgusting; not wanting to live may be motivated by poison fears, by oral obstinacy, by disgust, etc.

I agree with Zilboorg (7) that suicides occur with every clinical type of patient. I believe that quite strong tendencies to suicide—or a substitute for these—become manifest in the analysis of every patient. But I think that as a rule suicidal tendencies are caused by an acute paranoid state which becomes manifest through external circumstances or through analysis. If suicide occurs with an obsessional patient it is because his obsessional mechanisms do not prove a strong enough defence against his paranoid anxieties. An attempt is apparently always made with the purpose of cure, to substitute paranoid anxieties by depression and depression by a paranoid state; to deal with dangerous introjected objects by externalization and with dangerous external objects by incorporation. An effort of this kind may, however, fail; in so far as the introjection and projection mechanisms aiming at cure both result only in increased anxiety, converting both the self and its contents (incorporated objects) and the external

world into a place of danger from which there is no escape but suicide. This shortcircuiting failure of projection and introjection mechanisms leads to a confusion of the self and the external world ; and suicide is due, as Dr. Glover suggested in conversation, to a sudden confusion of this kind. That implies that the obsessional mechanisms which constitute the boundaries of the ego have been temporarily given up. Thus suicide is a counterpart to two other phenomena : falling in love and murder. In both states there is a confusion between the self and the external world and the giving up of the obsessional limitations allows an overflow of sexual and aggressive impulses. This seems to me also to account for the amount of libidinal energy connected with suicide.

Alexander-Staub (8) pointed out that murder may be a substitute for suicide, in so far as condemned parts of the self are projected onto the murdered person. I believe that murder is mainly precipitated by paranoid anxieties and always shews the same mechanisms as suicide. It is never only a simple expression of unconscious impulses, but is complicated by manifold identifications and other mechanisms. The murdered person is felt to be a persecutor, on whom the super-ego is projected. He may also represent the good parts of the self which, by getting killed, get saved from the dangers of life as well as from one's own sadism and primitive love impulses. By identification with the killed person various anxieties concerning death are reassured. Murdering a loved person may be a substitute for sacrificing an important part of one's own body. Killing may be felt as a proof that the person has been alive. The strong libidinal components in murder are attempts at libidinizing the aggression and anxiety of death.

Falling in love is a ' normal cure ' for paranoid anxieties and depression mechanisms. The ' good objects ' and good parts of the self are projected on to the loved person who is a help against all dangers. By idealizing this person all feelings of disgust, sadism, etc., are counteracted. Often all feared objects are concentrated on to one person and the falling in love with this person is a successful attempt at libidinizing the feared object ; thus the paranoid anxieties are dealt with. This element of acute paranoid anxiety underlying the state of being in love explains why love so easily can turn into violent hatred. In those cases where the paranoid anxiety does not turn love into hatred, but is nevertheless not really cured—where a true libidinization of the feared object has not taken place—it finds its outlet in the jealousy accompanying love. Often this successful

libidinization in the love situation can take place only if the other person responds. Failing this the paranoid mechanisms are stimulated again, and this explains why frustrated love so often brings out tendencies to murder or suicide.

There are many substitutes for suicide. Mental and physical injuries to the self are an example (9). Aggression against persons or dead objects with whom one identifies oneself may have the same meaning. The fact that unconsciously death is conceived of as a departure (10) explains why every sort of departure may become a substitute for suicide. The anxiety of being deserted, and—as a revenge—the wish to desert are important factors in suicide. Playing truant or running away in the case of children is a very common substitute for suicide (6), stimulated very directly by paranoid fears. I think every action which implies giving up an old life and starting a new one, especially obsessional travelling, sexual promiscuity and prostitution, breaking off the analysis, going to prison, are unconsciously linked up with suicidal phantasies. The same is true of fainting, hysterical fits and various ways of denying reality. Sleep and physical illness may be substitutes for suicide. Suicidal tendencies are less common in childhood than in adult life. This seems to be largely due to these substitute mechanisms for suicide (11), but is also attributable to the greater measure of success with which reality is denied in childhood.

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PURPOSIVE ACCIDENTS AS AN EXPRESSION OF SELF-DESTRUCTIVE TENDENCIES

BY

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Further evidence as to the motives and devices of focal self-destruction accrues from the study of certain ' accidents ' which upon analysis prove to have been unconsciously purposive. The paradox of a *purposive accident* is more difficult for the scientific-minded person to accept than for the layman who in everyday speech frequently refers sardonically to an act as done ' accidentally on purpose '.

Indeed, it is probably upon the basis of an intuitive recognition of this paradox that superstitious fears have arisen with respect to certain ' accidents ', e.g. spilling salt, breaking mirrors, losing wedding rings, etc. These have become conventionalized and hence no longer capable of specific interpretation although they are sometimes taken seriously. The philosopher Zeno is said to have fallen down and broken his thumb at the age of ninety-eight, and to have been so impressed by the significance of this ' accident ' that he committed suicide (from which we might guess the unconscious meaning of the accidental fall and injury).

We must exclude from this category any conscious deception, i.e. *pretended* accidents. But quite aside from this there exists the phenomenon of *apparent* (i.e. consciously) absent intention in acts which gratify deeper hidden purposes. I recall that I was once seated at a formal dinner by a woman for whom I had some dislike, which, however, I resolved to blanket completely so as not to spoil the conviviality of the party. I believe I succeeded quite well until an unfortunate piece of clever clumsiness on my part resulted in upsetting a glass of water over her gown into her lap. My dismay was the greater because I knew that she knew that ' accidents (to quote from a recent insurance advertisement) don't happen ; they are caused '.

In many of these accidents the damage is inflicted not upon someone else but upon one's own self. The body then suffers damage as a result of circumstances which appear to be entirely fortuitous but which in certain illuminating instances can be shown to fulfil so specifically the unconscious tendencies of the victim that we are compelled to believe either that they represent the capitalization of some opportunity for self-destruction by the death instinct or else were in some obscure way brought about for this very purpose.

Such cases have been reported frequently. In one of his earliest case histories, Freud [1] cites an example of this. Herr K., a former lover of the patient Dora, and latterly the object of her accusations and hostilities, came one day face to face with her on a street where there was much traffic. Confronted with her who had caused him so much pain, mortification and disappointment, ' as though in bewilderment and in his abstraction, he . . . allowed himself to be knocked down by a car '. Freud comments in this paper of thirty years ago that this is ' an interesting contribution to the problem of indirect attempt at suicide '.[2]

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[1] Freud, Sigmund : *Collected Papers*, Vol. III, p. 145.

[2] *Collected Papers*, Vol. III, p. 145. Freud gives additional illustrations in his *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (Ernest Benn, Limited, 1914. London, pp. 198–209 and p. 216). Abraham, also, in his *Selected Papers on Psychoanalysis* (Hogarth Press, London, 1927, pp. 58–62) cites numerous examples. One of these is that of a girl who from childhood had an exceedingly strong affection for her brother. She grew to womanhood measuring every man by the standard of her brother, and had an unhappy love affair which left her depressed. Shortly after this she twice got into serious danger through her own carelessness on a climbing party much to the wonderment of her friends who knew her to be a good climber, not likely to fall twice in safe and easy places. It appeared later that at this time she was in a hospital where she was accustomed to go for walks about the grounds, there was a ditch being dug in the garden which she used to cross by a plank bridge, although she could quite easily have jumped over it. At that time her beloved brother was to be married and this was much on her mind. On the day before his wedding, as she was out walking she sprang over the ditch instead of crossing by the bridge as usual, and did it so clumsily that she sprained her ankle. ' Later on these self-injuries occurred so frequently that even the attendant began to suspect that there was something intentional in them. In these minor accidents her unconscious was obviously expressing the intention to commit suicide.'

Freud (*op. cit.*) describes an even more striking example from his professional experience. A young married woman gave an exhibition of dancing one evening for an intimate circle of relatives. Her jealous husband was greatly annoyed and reproached her by saying that she had behaved like a prostitute. After the incident she spent a restless night and the next morning decided to go driving. She chose the horses herself, refusing one team and demanding another. She refused vehemently to allow her sister's baby with its nurse to accompany her. During the drive she was very nervous and warned the coachman that the horses were

The significant and differential thing about purposive accidents is that the ego refuses to accept the responsibility for the self-destruction.[3] In some instances it can be seen how determined the ego is to make this evasion. This is sometimes ascribed by insurance companies and their attorneys to the understandable wish to obtain double indemnity for the beneficiaries as compared with non-accidental death, but there must be more than this philanthropic motive back of it, even when it is conscious, and here I repeat that it is only *unconscious* purpose that I now have in mind.

While accidents reported in the daily press are exceedingly unsatisfactory material from which to draw scientific conclusions, one cannot avoid seeing certain implications in the following circumstance: *In one year* I was able to collect without the aid of a clipping bureau four instances of the same remarkable phenomenon. A man plans a trap for another unknown man, usually a thief or burglar. He sets the trap to protect his home property, forgets that he has done so, returns after an interval, goes into the place he has so carefully protected and is himself killed or wounded. I submit the clippings.

DIES IN HIS OWN BURGLARY TRAP. TURKEY GROWER WHO RIGGED UP SHOTGUN IN CORRAL DOORWAY FORGETS

Compton, Calif., Dec. 8 (AP).—After repeated thefts of his turkeys by night-prowlers, E.M.M., 59, rigged up a shotgun in the doorway of his corral with a string to pull the trigger so the weapon would be discharged at the opening of the door.

Sunday morning M. hastened out to feed the fowls and forgot the trap. The gun charge struck him in the stomach and he died in a hospital.

Topeka State Journal, December 7, 1931.

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getting skittish and finally when the animals ' really produced a momentary difficulty she jumped from the carriage in fright and broke her leg, while those remaining in the carriage were uninjured '. As Freud points out, the accident prevented her from dancing for a long time.

[3] The way in which the individual may be obliged to carry out the dictates of the super-ego through the utilization of ' accident ' is graphically illustrated in the following news item:

THREE WISHES

In Detroit, Mich., Mrs. John Kulcznski said to John Kulcznski: ' I wish you'd go out and have an accident '. He was run over, lost part of a foot. Then Mrs. John Kulcznski said to John Kulcznski: ' I wish you'd lose the other foot '. He did. To stop Mrs. John Kulcznski from wishing a third wish, John Kulcznski is seeking a divorce.

Time, March 26, 1934.

DIES IN OWN THIEF TRAP. DR. B. H. B., NATURE WRITER, KILLED WHEN HE OPENS DOOR

Doylestown, Pa., June 1 (AP).—Dr. B.H.B., 62, nature writer, was found dead to-night in his home in the heart of the artists' colony at Centre Bridge, near here, a victim of one of his own burglar traps.

Dr. B. evidently had been dead since Friday. A gunshot wound had blown away part of the right side of his chest. He was killed when he opened the door of a closet in which a shotgun had been rigged as a burglar trap.

Topeka Daily Capital, June 2, 1931.

TRAP

At Midland Beach, Staten Island, N.Y., Capt. Peter L., 63, of the barge *Landlive*, rigged a double barrelled shotgun, pointing toward the front door of his bungalow, a string stretched from its trigger to the door-knob. Then he closed the bungalow, went a-voyaging in the *Landlive*. When he returned, he went to have a look at his bungalow. Forgetful, he went in by the front door, got his own leg blown off.

Time, January 1, 1931.

WALKS INTO HIS OWN THIEF TRAP—IS SHOT

Davenport, Ia., Dec. 21 (AP).—A.F., 71 years old, was getting tired of visits from chicken thieves. He arranged a gun inside his barn with a contrivance that would discharge it if the door was opened. He forgot about it and opened the door himself. He was wounded in the leg.

Detroit Free Press, December 21, 1931.

The following additional instance was sent to me :

H . . . MAN IS SHOT BY OWN BURGLAR TRAP

Ky., May 13—A burglar trap that really works is kept on guard in the . . . and . . . tire shop here. So well does it work that C.L., a member of the firm, is in the hospital for treatment of a wound in his hip which was inflicted this morning when the trap got into action as he was opening the shop for business. Upon opening the door, Mr. L. is reported to have forgotten to turn off the switch attached to the trap, containing a ·45-calibre pistol. As he turned on the light switch the pistol was discharged.

Owensboro, Kentucky Messenger, May 14, 1933.

One could scarcely imagine more convincing evidence as to the unconscious intention and necessity for such individuals to kill themselves on account of their murderous wishes and the fact that they do so in what appears to be an accident. From psycho-analytic studies

we know that such an unknown marauder usually represents a particular person in the unconscious fantasies of the murderer-victim.

I recently examined very carefully a man convicted of murder in which this fact was vividly although tacitly implied. The murder had been committed under the following circumstances: He and two companions were driving across country and had left their car at a garage for some repairs. They walked down the street late at night and saw a man asleep in an automobile parked by a curb. Without any provocation, without even seeing the face of the man whom he shot, one of the two companions raised his gun and killed him as he slept. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment. The murder occurred several years ago, but to this day the murderer can offer no explanation whatsoever for his act. A study of his life, however, made it certain that the person killed unconsciously represented a certain quack doctor who had married the patient's beloved older sister. Of course, such identifications with 'an unknown man' are well known but it is rare that the neurotic compulsion can go to such criminal extent without either some rationalization, some consciousness of the identifications, or else a psychosis. In this instance, however, the stranger was unconsciously identified with the stranger who intruded into his obviously happy love life with the sister.

Press reports must be relied upon, also, for evidence concerning unconsciously purposive accidental suicides for the obvious reason that such cases, if they are successful, are no longer amenable to clinical study. Sometimes they seem quite obvious. One can have little doubt, for example, from such an account as the following that the fatal accident was in part a self-inflicted consequence of terrific rage:

CHILD LAUGHS: DAD OF 11 KILLS SELF

J.G., 52, of Aslip, near Blue Island, shot and killed himself yesterday after a series of petty annoyances. He had a job as a stationary engineer, and earned a fair living for himself and family of eleven children. Yesterday was his day off and he was busy making minor repairs about the house. On a trip for plumbing materials he damaged his car slightly—and then found the supplies defective. One of the children laughed and this seemed to irritate him.

Chicago Herald Examiner, November 26, 1930.

One should read in connection with such an episode a more familiar one in which the suicidal reaction to rage was conscious. For example, the following:

WHOOPEE

In the Bronx, N.Y., Rose McM., 14, was given 25c., told that she might go to a cinema. Overjoyed, she danced about, shrilled 'Whoopee!' Her somnolent father, Thomas McM., bade her be still. Again she crowed. Savage, wrathful, Thomas McM. sprang up, tripped, fell headlong into a china closet, cut his throat, fractured his skull, died.

Time, February 9, 1931.

Automobile accidents often occur under circumstances which are suspiciously indicative of at least unconscious intent. We sometimes say of a man who drives his car recklessly that he 'must want to kill himself'. Sometimes in the course of psycho-analytic treatment the evidence for a particular instance of this becomes convincingly great'.[4]

[4] The following example cited by Alexander (*Psycho-analysis of the Total Personality*, p. 30) is a case in point.

'This very intelligent man suffered in middle life from a severe depression which developed out of an unsuccessful struggle for existence. He came from a well-to-do socially eminent family but married into a different social stratum. After this alliance his father and family refused to have anything more to do with him. His unsuccessful struggle for existence through many years terminated (on account of neurotically determined inhibitions) in a total psychic collapse. I advised him to begin an analysis with a colleague, because I had personal relations with him and his family, and was well acquainted with his previous history. He found decision difficult. One evening when the final decision about the analysis was to have been made, he wanted to visit me, in order to talk over once more the pros and cons. But he did not arrive, because he was run over by an auto in the neighbourhood of my home. He was taken to a hospital suffering from many severe injuries. It was only the following day that I heard of the accident. When I discovered him in the third-class division of the hospital he was bandaged up like a mummy. He could not move and all one could see of his face were his eyes, shining with a euphoric light. He was in good spirits, free from the oppressive melancholy of recent days. The contrast between his physical condition and his mental state was particularly striking. The first words with which he greeted me were, "Now I have paid for everything, now I will at last tell my father what I think of him". He wanted to dictate a determined letter to his father immediately, demanding his share of his mother's estate. He was full of plans and was thinking of starting a new life.

'The economic relationships are very obvious in this case. He desired to replace the analysis by a different form of treatment, by the automobile accident, in order to free himself of the pressure of his sense of guilt. Instead of recognizing these feelings of guilt, he lives them out.'

Patients frequently confess to conscious fantasies of ' accidentally ' driving their cars off cliffs or into trees in such a way as to make their death appear to have been accidental. Such a theme appears, for example, in Michael Arlen's play, *The Green Hat.* One can only conjecture how effectively fatal accidents are brought about through some more or less conscious suicidal intention.

Whether or not it can be authenticated, the writer is convinced that automobile drivers not infrequently drive their cars successfully, even at a high rate of speed, while asleep. Upon one occasion he himself had the following experience: during a drive of over six hundred miles in one day, he was astonished at one time during the afternoon to realize that he had been asleep for a few seconds, and recalled a dream which he had had during the brief interval in which he was asleep. His wife, who sat beside him, said there had been no deviation whatsoever in the even character of the driving during the period of somnolence. Since then I have also interviewed the drivers of freight buses and night garage men on this question and was assured that they frequently sleep while driving.

I mention this point only to indicate that in those cases where serious accidents take place because the driver has fallen asleep, they are probably sometimes determined by unconscious suicidal impulses. This is suggested, for example, in a press clipping [5] describing an automobile accident in which the driver did not fall asleep but a companion beside him did. This companion awoke suddenly while they were travelling between thirty-five and forty miles per hour, wrenched the wheel from the driver's hands and whirled it around so that the car upset in the middle of the road. The companion later explained that he had had a vivid dream in which he thought the automobile was heading straight for a telegraph pole. In great anxiety he had seized the wheel (so he dreamed) and turned it away from the threatening pole. Psycho-analytic experience with fantasies of saving someone would lead us to believe that this dream must be taken in conjunction with the symbolic significance of the telegraph pole, the car, driving, etc., suggesting a near-the-surface fear of homosexual attraction to the driver with a consequent impulse to escape from this situation and at the same time punish himself (and exterminate the driver).

What is the difference between fatal accidents of this sort and accidents in which only a part of the body is destroyed? Here again

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[5] *Boston Globe,* September 5, 1932.

we may assume some failure of full participation of the death instinct and suspect that it has been bought off. In this it would correspond with other forms of focal suicide which we have been studying.[6]

Such speculations are supported by the more dependable evidence of psycho-analytic case material. One patient, for example, had the following experience: She had talked for several weeks about the expense of the analysis, of how stingy her husband was, and how he would not allow her to complete the analysis, of how small and mean he was about money matters, and of how mercenary the analyst was because he insisted on a definite business arrangement in regard to the fee which her husband was now refusing to pay.

It became clear that she felt very guilty about her own grasping tendencies which she refused to admit, and for this reason could not bear to accept money from her husband, toward whom she was very aggressive. She preferred to take money from the analyst and contrived to do so in the following way: She came to the analytic session one day and announced that she had managed to secure a loan from a friend which would enable her to continue the analysis without being dependent on her husband's generosity, but that she would be obliged to reduce the fee she was paying by almost half, provided this was satisfactory to the analyst. As the hour was almost at an end when she made this announcement, the analyst merely said that she herself should analyse this suggestion before accepting it.

After the hour the patient drove to her home, some distance away, in her own car. On the way she ran into another car and both automobiles were badly wrecked. Her dreams, associations and other minor accidents which she sustained at this time showed plainly that she felt very guilty for cutting down the fee paid to the analyst (taking money from the analyst) and that her great sense of guilt and her subsequent desire for punishment led her to drive in such a way as to have brought about the wreck. She freely confessed that it had been her fault, although she was ordinarily an excellent driver. It seemed also to serve as sufficient punishment to permit her to continue the financial arrangement without any conscious pangs of conscience.

For another example I am indebted to Dr. G. Leonard Harrington, an analyst of Kansas City. A twenty-year-old girl suffered from fears so great that she had been unable to attend school since the age of ten. During the analysis she mentioned one day the desire to exhibit her

[6] *Vide* Menninger, Karl A.: 'A Psychoanalytic Study of the Significance of Self Mutilations'. *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, Vol. IV, p. 408.

genitals and shortly afterwards the thought occurred to her that she would like to cut off her pubic hair. Then she confessed that the day before this she had attempted to masturbate by inserting her finger into her vagina. The analyst recalled that upon that same day she had ' accidentally ' cut her finger with a razor blade. Here, then, were two sets of two associated events of precisely the same sort—a forbidden sexual act followed by a cutting. One could go further and show that the cut finger perhaps had reference to hostile wishes toward men, but this leads to another aspect of the case with which we are not now concerned. It is sufficient to indicate that she mutilated herself by accident in order to punish herself for an act which to her was a very guilty one—and also to permit herself to continue it.

In another case of my own a patient, who was prone to act out his aggressions and hatreds in a dramatic way on various members of the community, had given himself justifiable cause for the notion that he might have acquired gonorrhœa. He had done so by a sexual attack on one whom he identified with his own brother toward whom he had had homosexual feelings and also great hate. He felt very guilty on account of this episode and proceeded to punish himself in many ways apart from the gonorrhœa. He became very depressed and penalized himself severely in the matter of pleasures ; he spent an unnecessarily large amount of money on doctors, restricted his diet, and with the idea that he might infect someone refrained for a time from going to see any of his friends. Besides this, he had many fantasies of self-punishment. He learned of the seriousness of gonorrheal infection of the eye and tortured himself for several days with the notion that he might get some pus in his eye and go blind. For this reason he left off all reading which he greatly enjoyed. He washed his eyes and guarded them with scrupulous care and with a constant anxiety that he could not prevent their being injured.

One evening as he sat brooding he noticed that the door of his room did not close easily. He seized a razor blade and without procuring anything to stand on attempted to scratch and shave the door in such a way that it would close more easily. In so doing he managed ' accidentally ' to scratch a splinter of wood or hardened paint into his upturned eye, painfully injuring it.

Of course this immediately gave him occasion for more solicitousness about his eye, more visits to the doctor, more appeals for sympathy and more justification for aggression. He himself recognized all this immediately and described it as a purposive accident. It is another

clear example of self-mutilation equivalent to self-castration since we know that attacks upon the eyes, as well as fears concerning them, are directly related to castration anxiety.

It is not sufficient to indicate that these accidents serve an unconscious purpose. It is essential to know exactly what purpose, and this we are able only to *infer* from the newspaper accounts, whereas in the psycho-analytically studied cases we are able to see precisely how the accident serves to punish the individual for guilty acts or wishes. In those cases which are not fatal, however, this punishment serves not only as the price of atonement but as a permission for further indulgences in the same guilty acts or fantasies. This is quite clear in the case just cited. The guilty act stimulates the conscience to demand of the ego a price. In some instances this price is a (self-inflicted) death penalty. In other instances, however, it seems to be less severe and yet, curiously enough, to be an overpayment. This can only be accounted for in terms of psychological economy if we assume that the local self-mutilation is in some way or other a ransom and protects the ego against the imposition of the death penalty. This offering of a part for the whole, not alone for past atonement but for future protection, is as well known in American politics and racketeering as in the old Jewish religious rituals of sacrifice. The proprietor of an illegitimate business pays ' hush money ' or ' protection ' to the police in his district who, in order to retain this graft, pay a portion of it to the officials higher up, and so on. Occasionally, however, this entire system breaks down—for example, if the proprietor refuses to pay his price. In such a case the external forces of law and order are invoked and the illegitimate business is snuffed out.

One can see this same principle of periodic payment for the continued indulgence in forbidden erotic or aggressive tendencies in many neurotic patients, and melancholia is often forestalled or deferred by various obsessive and compulsive techniques. Particularly is this principle discernible in those patients described as ' neurotic characters '. In such individuals the aggressions are apt to be acts rather than fantasies and are quite well known to those intimate with the patient. On the other hand, one cannot but draw the same conclusion from the lives of certain individuals who seem to fall victim to successive disasters with an uncanny, sometimes almost incredible regularity. Such individuals are often designated by newspaper headline writers as ' hard luck champions '.

Recently the following example of such a case appeared in the

Time magazine (March 19, 1934). This man, states the report, had been struck by lightning three times ; he had been buried alive in a coal mine ; he had been blown through the air by a cannon, suffering the loss of an arm and an eye ; and had been buried alive under two tons of clay. ' Next he fell thirty feet off a cliff ; still later he was thrown by a horse and dragged through a barb wire fence. Then he fell from a speeding bob sled fracturing his skull. At eighty he recovered from double pneumonia. At eighty-one he was downed by a paralytic stroke. At eighty-two he was run over by a horse and wagon. At eighty-three he was run over by an automobile.' The same year he slipped on the ice and fractured his hip !

We can hardly expect to have the opportunity for the psychoanalytic investigation of an eighty-three-year-old man with such an array of accidents, but in the light of cases we have studied and of the principles we are able to derive from them we can infer something of the unconscious mental content of a personality that is forced into these repeated contests with death, but is able each time to emerge victorious, though at the cost of suffering.

I myself studied a patient who had had twenty-four major disasters in his life, including, for example, the accidental poisoning of his own child and three successive automobile accidents at the same spot in which each time his car was entirely demolished. He wrecked successively eleven automobiles. It was possible to discover that his guilt arose in part from terrific unconscious wishes to kill certain members of his family.

In conclusion, we see that while some of the most dramatic illustrations of purposive accidents are to be found in news journals, accurate and definite understanding of them can only be had from psycho-analytically studied cases. From these it is possible to make certain of the existence of the same motives familiar to us in other forms of self-destruction, whether extreme (suicide) or partial (self-mutilations, compulsive submission to surgery, etc.). These motives include the elements of aggression, punition, and propitiation with death as the occasional but exceptional outcome.

INFANTILE IDEALS[1]

BY

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The only dictionary definition of the ideal which does not prejudge the situation—as that it ' exists in imagination only '—is ' a conception of something or a thing conceived as perfect in its kind '. But used in its more absolute sense we can say it means the highest conception of *every*thing—of a total situation excluding nothing of which we have or can have awareness, or of which we can conceive. When we speak of a something, of a particular situation, out of this everything as being ideal, we are obviously subtracting the enormously greater part of the total situation, and are using the word in a limited and secondary sense. But this is the sense in which I shall use the word in this paper, using the term absolute ideal for the unqualified and unlimited or total ideal. This ideal, in which *everything* reaches one's highest conception of it, is naturally the more nearly and easily attainable the more limited our ' everything '. Therefore infancy with its limited radius of desire and conception is the time when, other things being equal, the absolute ideal can, from that point of view, be most nearly realized, as well as most hopelessly threatened, with the exception of adult sexual relationships in which the conscious world is limited to two people become one. Those who do not put the whole stress on conscious formulation will not stumble over the word ' conception ' in connection with infancy. The smallest infant certainly has some kind of awareness of the difference between happiness and unhappiness, pleasure and pain, comfort and discomfort, content and discontent—whichever pairs of words best describe his type of awareness of contrasting states.

But I am also in this paper using the term ' negative ideal ', which may seem a contradiction in terms. I do not think it is, if we keep to the definition ' the conception of *some*thing or a thing conceived as perfect *in its kind*,' or, more shortly, ' the highest conception of *any*thing '—that is, keeping it in the limited and secondary use of the term, and remembering also how the conception of what is highest or perfect can vary according to person and circumstances.

In his attacks of extreme rage the infant's temporary ideal, the

[1] Based on a paper read at the Thirteenth Psycho-Analytical Congress, Lucerne, 1934.

height of his desire, may well be the most complete aggression and destruction. Yet if there *were* nothing but aggression and destruction he obviously could not live at all. The very fact of existence shews that even in such circumstances we cannot use the term negative *ideal* in its absolute sense. Neither from the point of view of the onlooker can such a situation of rage correspond with any adult ideal even of the limited type. This negative ideal, then, must be limited and secondary, as compared with the positive absolute ideal. Also it must be infantile, while a conception of positive perfection obviously is not necessarily and inevitably infantile, whether or not it may be in certain settings.

Since contrast lightens understanding, let us consider for a moment or two a very simple case of more mature ideals.

It is extremely probable that we all hold an ideal of a paper in which a thesis is gradually developed and supported by adequate case material. Clearly any such situation as that provided by the last Congress programme of fifty-six papers is not the opportunity for an attempt to realize such an ideal. We do not for that reason feel any necessity to discard it as an ideal. Nor do we hesitate to make an attempt towards another ideal, the ideal short paper, even if this ideal is conditioned as much by circumstances as by our own desires and judgements. Further, we may know that we have never realized, we may have doubts of our ability to realize our ideal of either a long or a short paper. That again, is no reason against the retention of the ideal, with efforts to come nearer its realization. Our ideals for our own papers are based on experience ; we have either read one or more papers which at all points satisfied our desire for perfection, or have put together such an ideal from a diversity of papers each of which seemed to us to suggest perfection in one or more points. The creation of a taste for, or appreciation of, perfection in papers will have had a long history. But precedent to every experience of complete satisfaction from the encountered concrete ideal, even if complete in a limited sphere and time only, there must have existed the desire for the ideal. For desire, the wish, is the dynamic of every part of the psychic life, and must precede satisfaction. And the simple wish for more, the desire for limitless ' good ' can expand every experienced ' good ' into an ideal.

This very simple example serves to remind us (1) that what we may call an adult ideal, or an ideal free from the drive of anxiety, is not discarded from lack of realization or satisfaction. (2) It still, as a desire, influences the ego ; while yet, the ego, as regards practice,

retains its powers of discrimination and decision. (3) It allows the adoption for immediate purposes of what we may call a secondary or tertiary ideal, one in which circumstance plays as large a part as desire alone. We then have interaction uninfluenced by the super-ego between the present-day ego and a specific desire entity, itself the product of previous interaction between desire and the ego. Thus in considering a mature ideal we obviously obtain a glimpse of psychic development uninfluenced by the super-ego as we have come to regard it. And I will at once anticipate my conclusions, and attempt to clarify the relation between the super-ego and the positive ideal I have been describing, by calling the former the negative ideal. Thus in considering ideals we also have a glimpse of psychic development conditioned by desire, which must always mean desire for what we love, without negative tendencies.

It may be quite true that in ordinary life we never encounter a negative ideal completely uninfluenced by the positive, or a positive ideal entirely free from negative tendencies: that experience shews us only fusions of the two in very varying proportions. Neither have we experience of development free from negative tendencies or free from anxiety. This is true even if we differentiate carefully, as I am sure we should, between development without psychical tensions, which does not seem even a theoretical possibility, and development without tensions of that quantity or quality which may be called or which produce anxiety: between strong tensions of desire which still retain a plus of pleasure, and those of anxiety in which ' pain ' predominates.[2] None the less it is a great help to our understanding both of positive and negative fusions in ideals as in object love and hate, and of the part played by anxiety in development if we try to envisage simple positives and negatives and development free from anxiety.

[2] I do not think that, except possibly in the first two, three or four weeks of infancy, the distinction between ' pleasure ' and ' pain ' is *simply* that of quantity and time—the amount of tension and the length of time before it is resolved—however important the influence of these must be. Certainly an infant of a few months, five or six, for example, will at times shew by the sounds he makes, by his expression, his efforts and his muscular tension how intensely he desires to get something just beyond his reach. He may continue a long time in this state and obviously not unhappily, although, also, obviously in a state of considerable tension. At other times the same child may cry in a lazy, slack way, obviously in a state of lower tension than in the former situation, and obviously with less pleasure.

That effort is as old as the hills, metaphorically speaking, in life in general, and in psycho-analysis as old as Freud's first efforts to unravel the tangled web of neurotic manifestations. There are no analytical writings in which it does not play a part. In recent contributions to our knowledge of the analysis of children Melanie Klein's [3] work on the good and bad object, followed by Melitta Schmideberg's [4] is outstanding. But in so far as that work deals with introjection and projection resulting from anxiety it still leaves room for a further effort to differentiate between processes determined by, and those free from, anxiety. For one cannot conceive of varying degrees of anxiety in dynamic processes of equal strength, even in infancy, without conceiving of an effective dynamic other than anxiety. In other words, we must have the possibility of distinguishing, theoretically at least, between processes determined by wish tensions without anxiety and those determined by anxiety tensions, even if we never encounter them completely unmixed, or we cannot hope to understand those processes only minimally determined by anxiety and the negative aspects. In the same way we try in all our work to distinguish between the positives and negatives in the love-hate series, even if we know in practice only varying degrees of fusions of the two.

However obvious this may sound, I can, I think, quote two examples to shew that further work may still be done in this direction.

Jekels and Bergler [5] make a most interesting attempt to do this very thing. They themselves think, and quote Nunberg to the same effect, that there is still much confusion over the relation of the ego-ideal to the super-ego. When I read their contribution after completing this paper in its original form, I was interested to discover an approach apparently very similar to my own. Also I at first thought Jekels and Bergler made a distinction similar to mine between the super-ego and the ego-ideal. They contrast the super-ego under the name of the Dämon as the ' thou shalt not ' derived from Thanatos, with the ego-ideal, the ' thou shalt ', derived from Eros. But further consideration shewed differences between their view and mine at least as pronounced as similarities except in the attempt itself. For it is clear that the forbidding ' thou shalt not ' *can*, according to circum-

[3] E.g. *The Psycho-Analysis of Children* ', 1932.

[4] E.g. ' Some Unconscious Mechanisms, etc ', this JOURNAL, Vol. XIV, p. 225.

[5] Jekels and Bergler : ' Ubertragung und Liebe ', *Imago*, Bd. XX, S. 1.

stances, proceed from love as well as from hate. And the commanding or even permissive ' thou shalt ' *can*, again according to the situation, proceed from hate as well as from love. To forbid a child to do something harmful or inadvisable is not necessarily a negative attitude ; to permit a child to do something harmful or inadvisable not necessarily a positive. From the child's point of view, too, it is only in earliest infancy, if always and inevitably then, and certainly not at the beginning of the latency period, that satisfaction of impulse is regarded as completely safe and desirable regardless of circumstance, and its restriction necessarily the opposite. The authors have not therefore drawn a clear distinction between negative and positive forces, and this fact invalidates their otherwise logical conclusions. Similarly and consequently, not only does their ego-ideal comprise some negative forces, but also their ' object love ' is largely derived from anxiety and contains much negative. In both cases they are really considering reaction formations, and not the unmixed attitudes they set out to describe.

A further search for the theoretical source of this substitution of mixed for theoretically unmixed states brings me to my second example, on which Jekels and Bergler themselves rely for much of their work on the ego-ideal—i.e. Freud's own approach to its understanding, and his description of it as derived from the state of being in love, in which the idealized object becomes the ' ideal '.[6] We must, I am sure, be free to question whether even in the state of being in love it is not possible to distinguish to some extent between the results of love more or less unmixed, and the results of anxiety, of which one would expect to find some at least in any average person. With regard to the ideal connected with being in love, the distinction would first lie between the ideal state of loving, and the object loved ; secondly, between the *reality* of the situation, the *desire* for the ideal person, and the feeling of *necessity* due to anxiety. That is, we must be free to question whether the ideal state has really been presented to us in Freud's own description of what it means to be in love. The idealization connected with it may be rather a symptom, originating to some extent from anxiety, rather than an integral part of the love situation as such.

The following analytical material seems to me to shew clearly the need to look closely into the construction of ideals, and to be very sure we have accurately distinguished the positive and negative elements

[6] *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, pp. 73 *et seq.*

involved. An adult patient consciously rejected 'ideals', as they appeared to be, in terms that shewed them to be the psychical deposits of various situations in which her parents and their substitutes were concerned. In other words, they were derived from the introjected parents, or parental situations, in accordance with analytical theory. One of the most important of these situations seemed to be an occasion when the father had put the little girl out of the room for behaviour below the required standard—whether nose-picking or passing flatus or some impertinence is not quite certain—possibly we have a fusion of different incidents. Even in the present her 'ideals' threatened to behave in the same way to her, i.e. put her out, if she did not come up to their standard, the shutting out of the room involving some of the death and destruction she herself had desired to inflict in her furies. Therefore, in the later acting out of the past situation, and of the wish derived from it, she shut her father out of the room instead, by shutting her 'ideals' out of her mind. But as finer differentiations gradually became possible, one saw that the father who shut her out was not by any means identical with her ideal in any primary sense of the term; that, on the contrary, she had to struggle by every means in her power to idealize him, *just because* she was terrified of the hatred and the results of it engendered in the situation, while at the same time she admired his strength and decision in upholding standards of conduct she appreciated in others. Her apparent struggle with her 'ideals' was actually not a struggle with ideals at all, but with idealizations containing a very strong drive of anxiety, derived from the admixture of rage and primitive super-ego. They were reaction formations.

Having, I hope, made out an adequate case for closer enquiry into the formation of positive ideals as such, i.e. uncomplicated by negative feelings and anxiety, I will first shortly glance at previous work on the ego-ideal, with special reference to the connection between ideals and idealization. Then I hope to shew that the positive ideal is never in conflict with the ego, that the pre-ambivalent [7] attitude in which

[7] See on the meaning of 'pre-ambivalent' Edward Glover's paper, 'A Developmental Study of Obsessional Neurosis', this JOURNAL, Vol. XVI, p. 142, footnore. I use the term in what he calls the 'formal sense'—i.e. 'in the sense of ego-object organization', and agree with him that ambivalence is an endeavour to reach a more stable state which will control the swing from love to violent and painful hatred. I would add that I cannot see any need to control by ambivalence the return swing to the

both positive and negative ideals originate is connected with lack of experience of time, and that the child's struggle is to maintain a relation to (? memory of and hopes for) his positive ideals of sufficient strength and vividness to counter negative ideals based on very violent emotions. And lastly I will give some case material to indicate briefly some of the effects of this struggle in fusions of the two and attempts at defusion.

It was, as we know, Freud's epoch-making discovery of the unconscious conscience, and the anxiety and guilt emanating from it, which led to his substitution of the term super-ego for ego-ideal. In keeping with that change of term, the important and arduous work of studying the aggressive and cruel super-ego has been more prominent than, and probably is a necessary precursor of, continuation of enquiry into the line to some extent abandoned with the name of ego-ideal.

The analytical literature on the subject in addition to that already mentioned is extensive, and I will refer only to that which seems to bear very directly on the present subject.

Freud's own fullest description and study of the ego-ideal is in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego and in the Ego and the Id. He tells us [8] that it can act separately from and even aggressively towards the ego ; that its functions are those of observing the self, of acting as the moral conscience, of dream censorship and of being the chief influence in repression. It is the heir of the primary narcissism in which the childish ego found enjoyment in itself. Gradually it accepts also out of environmental influences those demands which these make on the ego, and with which the ego cannot always comply. In this way, when the human being cannot be satisfied with his ego itself, he yet may find his satisfaction in the ego-ideal differentiated from the ego. In idealization the object serves to replace an unattained ego-ideal of our own.

There is then identification with and incorporation of the object in the place of the ego-ideal.

In [9] *The Ego and The Id* Freud gives his clearest description of the

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love affect where this is not already ambivalent ; i.e. where the child's ego-object organization is not affected by the preceding hatred, in the sense either of lessened or of exaggerated love. The child's difficulty is in retaining a love relation which will lessen the hatred, without retaining a hate relation which will affect the love.

[8] Freud : *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, pp. 73 *et seq.*

[9] Freud : *The Ego and The Id*, pp. 44 *et seq.*

derivation of the super-ego or ego-ideal from combined identification with the two parents, in place of the bisexual and rivalry attitudes of the Œdipus situation, in order to bring about its repression. It is ' the heir of the Œdipus complex, and thus it is also the expression of the most powerful impulses and most important vicissitudes experienced by the libido in the id '—' Whereas the ego is essentially the representative of the external world, of reality, the super-ego stands in contrast to it as the representative of the internal world, of the id '—' It is easy to show that the ego-ideal answers in every way to what is expected of the higher nature of man '.

If we understand the ideal as representing the possibility of keeping touch with immediately unrealizable wishes for the best one has known, that is, as conditioned by desire and unaffected by present circumstance, we understand the force of Freud's definition of it as the representative of the id in contrast with the ego. When we realize the difficulty of retaining a desire unaffected by circumstance, we realize how difficult it is to separate desire for the best from the great variety of other experiences with which it has been connected. This seems one reason why we can so often find aggression and every shade of negative feeling linked with the positive ideal.

Further it is only after a variety of experience and the trying out of many different attempts to find satisfaction that the child is in a position to form some stable estimate of his highest and most permanent values. As the Œdipus situation is the child's attempt to push the hope of satisfaction through physical relationship to its furthest limits, we should expect some more definite orientation of his more permanent desires after this path is more or less abandoned. Also a permanent desire entity which can remain conscious or preconscious and remain to a certain extent unaffected by immediate circumstance is to be contrasted with those permanent desires of the id which remain unaffected by circumstance only because they are unconscious.

Freud also speaks of ' the general character of harshness and cruelty ' [10] exhibited by the ideal—most unideal qualities to find bound up with an ideal. He gives defusion resulting from desexualization as the explanation. It seems to me that the source of this combination is in the first place *fusion* of the negative with the positive ideal, though there may be a secondary defusion resulting from the failure of efforts to make and keep the positive elements stronger than the negative.

[10] *Op. cit.* p. 80.

In the Future of an Illusion and Civilization and Its Discontents it is of cultural ideals that Freud speaks, and these have the same unideal or negative qualities associated with them—e.g. 'on the strength of these differences' (our ideals) 'every culture claims the right to despise the rest. In this way cultural ideals become a source of discord and enmity between different cultural groups as can be most clearly seen among nations'.[11] The effort of the individual to solve the problems of ambivalence and create a 'good' object by means of another 'bad' object is not a result of love alone, or of desire for an ideal alone, but an effort to dissociate the negative from the positive. This description of ideals seems another case of a mixed standard, of taking the average as the norm.

There is much in Melanie Klein's and Melitta Schmideberg's writings on the introjection and projection processes with regard to good and bad objects. I will not attempt to summarize here Mrs. Klein's chapter on 'Obsessional Neurosis and the Early Super-Ego'[12] in which she describes the effect of object relations on the sadistic super-ego, of the child's belief in imaginary helpful figures such as fairies or Father Christmas to help conceal and overcome its fear of its bad imagos, etc., but will quote one passage of her own.[13] 'As far as can be seen, there exists in the child, side by side with its relations to real objects but on a different plane, as it were, relations which are based on its relations to its unreal imagos both as excessively good and excessively bad figures. Ordinarily, these two kinds of object-relations intermingle and colour each other to an ever-increasing extent'.

I do not go into similarities and differences more fully here because, as I said above, both Melanie Klein and Melitta Schmideberg are considering the subject from the point of view of anxiety processes, while I am for the most part attempting to contrast the anxiety-free position with this.

Fenichel writes of the idealization of an otherwise forbidden impulse as a means to the satisfaction of the ideal, and says that as every failure to fulfil an ideal decreases self-respect, so every fulfilment of it increases it—brings the ego a portion of his early infantile feeling of omnipotence.[14] But surely it is again anxiety which makes omnipotence a necessary part of satisfaction.

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[11] Freud: *The Future of an Illusion*, p. 22.

[12] Melanie Klein: *The Psycho-Analysis of Children*, Ch. IX, 1932.

[13] *Op. cit.* p. 213.

[14] Fenichel: *Perversionen, Psychosen, Charakter-störungen*, p. 140.

Jacobssohn [15] gives a striking case of change in a disillusioned boy, who thereupon adopted the least satisfactory qualities of his father as the bad ideal instead of his previous following of the more admirable qualities as his good ideal. Here there was obviously more idealization than ideal; hence the change of balance, under additional pressure, from the positive to the negative side.

Reich,[16] in his study of the Impulsive Character describes in one place the ego-ideal adopted 'for love of' the beloved person, that is, based on a wish, but elsewhere emphasizes rather the essential part played by renunciation with which some hatred is always connected. Thus he says that 'At every stage of libido development renunciations are experienced, so that one may say that ego-ideal formation begins directly after birth. For even accustoming the infant to fixed feeding times involves a renunciation of the constant desire to suck'. (In passing one may remark that one might be led to suppose the infant never voluntarily ceased to suck.)

Reich contrasts the freedom and possibilities of variety of the adult or cultural ego-ideal with the imperative nature of the neurotic ego-ideal—'I *must* be like my father', whatever the difference in talents and capabilities. This 'must' from the side of the child seems to me of equal importance and closely connected with the child's sense of the father's 'You shall be like me'. He further contrasts the isolated with the repressed pathological ego-ideal and both with the organically fused ego-ideals of the healthily developing personality. From his case material he shews that the super-ego can only be tolerated and allowed to exercise a direct influence on impulse where there is sufficient opportunity for the formation of a positive ideal.

Edward Glover has given an unpublished paper on Idealization,[17] connecting it with infantile psychotic mechanisms.

In some unpublished lectures (1930) I suggested maintaining a distinction between the ego-ideal and the super-ego. 'Is the child in analysis really given no food for the formation of a super-ego? Here I would prefer to return to an earlier nomenclature and speak of an ego-ideal. The term was no longer suitable for the less conscious formations of the ego-ideal. But when they are analysed, that is,

[15] Jacobssohn: 'Beitrag zur asozialer Charakterbildung', *Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, XVI, p. 210.

[16] Reich: *Der triebhafte Charakter*, Ch. III.

[17] 'A Note on Idealization' read at a meeting of the British Psychoanalytical Society, November 1, 1933.

when they become conscious, I think that the term becomes once more applicable, and this without implying an impassable gulf between ideal and performance—ideal and ego '.

Melitta Schmideberg made a somewhat similar suggestion in 1932.[18] She says ' I take "super-ego" to refer to the more strongly desexualized imagos, which are incorporated in the early stages of development and felt to be phantastically cruel. The imagos, narcissistically loved and nearer to consciousness, which go to make up the " ego-ideal ", are mainly perceived as good, and are desexualized less—or libidinized more—thus approximating more closely to real objects. While in many instances (young children, asocial and psychotic subjects) we find a total or partial failure in the development of the " ego-ideal ", the super-ego is never lacking '.

In a discussion Ernest Jones suggested that the ideal was the libidinal aspect of the super-ego—a view which seems to be in agreement with my own.

Returning to Freud's connection of the formation of the ego-ideal with the passing of the Œdipus situation, I agree that there are many reasons for placing at this juncture the average formation of the positive ideal as a more or less independent, conscious entity—independent to some extent, that is, of immediate circumstance. Certainly after the anxieties and struggles, the disappointments and hatreds of the Œdipus situation, which finally lead to its more or less complete abandonment, the child has great need to find some other type of satisfaction in his or her parents ; and to find—or perhaps re-find them, different from their negative rôles in those struggles. The better the parents, the better, of course, the reality basis for the type of relation in which the child adopts the parents, one or other, as the concrete ideal. But in so far as this relation is in addition motivated by anxiety : by the need, for example, that the little boy's father should be his source of a positive ideal *instead* of the negative one of the Œdipus situation, by the need that the one should contradict or eliminate, i.e. repress the other ; and in so far as it contains a denial of his other real feelings and desires to him and to his mother, i.e. does not arise from desire alone, it contains, according to circumstances, greater or lesser elements of *idealization* rather than ideal formation.

[18] Melitta Schmideberg : ' The Psycho-Analysis of Asocial Children ', this JOURNAL, Vol. XVI, p. 37 (note). See also Alexander : ' A Meta-psychological Description of the Process of Care ', this JOURNAL, Vol. VI, p. 320 (note).

And I agree with Edward Glover that the denial of both external and psychical reality contained in idealization has necessarily a close connection with psychotic and early infantile anxiety mechanisms. But none the less it contains the recognition of the psychical reality of the *desire* for the ideal, along with an attempt to find its realization in a real external situation. That contrasting elements were contained in idealization was clearly indicated by Freud in his description of the double attitude of the father to the boy in the ego-ideal: 'You shall be like me' and 'you shall not do as I do'; although, as I have said, these do not correspond with absolute positives and negatives. I think one may well glimpse the ideal as compared with the idealized father attitude: 'You *may* want to be like me, *and* to do everything that you admire in me or in others, provided only that you are sufficiently ruled by the reality principle to be able to postpone satisfaction of your desires for their fuller realization'. It is, certainly, viewed from a reality basis, not so much the wish itself, it is the imperative 'mustness', the impatience which cannot wait and which has no regard to circumstance which creates the danger of and therefore the impediment to the wish. Let us, then, try to come nearer the underlying infantile situation from which this impatience is derived.

While we may accept Freud's timing of the formation of the ego-ideal in his original sense of the term, we must suppose and we clearly find in our clinical work that long before this every child has desired perfection in his parents or in himself, in the sense of that which will bring full contentment to his total personality. Before he has desired to be perfect in his parents' way, that is, before he has adopted *their* ideal of themselves or of himself, he has desired that both they and he should be perfect in his own way, and according to his own desires.[19] Not by any means always, but more or less often, according to circumstances, his ideas of perfection, his desires for complete contentment will have clashed with theirs in means if not in aim. And certainly for the infant and small child there is little or no distinction between aim and means. Not to bring about contentment in the child's own way is often not to bring it about at all. Not to bring it about at all is not to want to bring it about, as long as the immediate wish still remains the criterion. Further, acute lack of satisfaction is apt to pass over from the region of desire into that of an imperative aggressive urgency, which has lost much of its connection with the

[19] See also Weiss: 'Regression and Projection in the Super-Ego'. this JOURNAL, Vol. XIII, p. 451.

original desire, and which in its completest form would stop short of nothing to enforce itself and its fury on the environment. The infant can pass quickly from desires for complete satisfaction to the most absolute rage—that is, from the positive to the negative ideal. And the connection between them is not merely one of temporal contiguity. For he tries to bring about his positive ideal by negative forces—by the greatest possible exertion of negative strength to compel people and things to be and do as he wishes. I submit that the negative ideal or super-ego is derived from impatience and its accompaniments and results, while the positive ideal, which is never in conflict with the ego, and therefore is the true ego-ideal, is *directly* derived from love and desire.

Certainly not only does impatience know no trust in any ideal state : it also destroys its possibility.[20] It is difficult to say where the line is passed between strong and happy desire and unhappy impatience or anxiety, the exact point at which tension becomes pain.

But certainly as soon as the object relation is established, resentment at the impatience experienced can prevent complete satisfaction, even when the previously absent means of satisfaction are forthcoming. The impatient infant feeds more voraciously than happily. When impatience has passed over into fury, he refuses to feed at all, because in that fury nothing good exists for him.

Put in other words, that possibility of postponement which is the opposite of impatience, and which is the basis of the rule of the reality principle, makes for retention of an ideal through all circumstances, including those of non-realization.

Let us consider briefly some characteristics of infancy in which impatience plays so large a rôle :—

1. The infant has small hold on external reality.

2. He is ruled by the pleasure-pain principle, that is, by his psychical tensions.

3. He learns reality in two ways—

(*a*) quickly and sharply under the influence of pain—and also unstably, always trying to abolish the painful reality.[21]

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[20] We must distinguish three classes of children and adults in this respect : (*a*) those who really are minimally impatient, (*b*) those who are openly impatient, in a great variety of degree, (*c*) those who have been driven by anxiety to eliminate impatience by one method or another.

[21] Freud : ' Formulations regarding the Two Principles in Mental Functioning ', *Collected Papers*, Vol. IV, pp. 14 *et seq.*

(*b*) more slowly and steadily under the influence of that pleasure which is not full contentment.[22]

If the first way largely predominates over the second, if, that is, the infant has learnt reality chiefly under the influence of pain, which is coupled with the demand for immediate relief, he cannot well learn postponement of immediate satisfaction for greater gain, the true reality principle. This is obviously of importance for the possibility of possessing ideals difficult, or even impossible of quick attainment.

4. The infant has limited but uninhibited power of immediate expression of states of psychical tension coupled with executive weakness of the ego in protecting him from them. The connection with impatience is obvious.

5. The unity of child and parent is greater than at any later time. The perfectly happy infant does, as far as he is concerned, possess the perfect mother, and the completely unhappy infant possesses the unmitigatedly bad mother from his own point of view.

The omnipotence of feeling or emotion to change completely the perceived character of the environment is precedent to and far more important than omnipotence of thought, and is the real psychical basis of the omnipotence of the wish. Thus the ideal state and the ideal object, or state and object approximating thereto, are in early days one and the same. But after there is some differentiation between the two, and the child has shut his eyes tightly against his outside world and screamed at it with all his might, he never knows what harm he may have done. He may have destroyed his good objects completely. Previously his own recovery and the recovery of the good parent were one and the same. Henceforth it always *may* be the child's fault if the parental figures are not ideal—for before the attack the really good and happy child had the really good and happy parents. Hence the idealization and god-like character of the parents. If they remain thus the child cannot have injured them. Also if they are not thus the child can reproach them and not they him : they always *could* help it if they would. In this way the dichotomy of state and object becomes to a certain extent falsified—it is not, as before, the ideal state which creates the ideal object, but the ideal object which must recreate the ideal state : it must prove that the child's attack and inaccessibility during the attack of rage have not

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[22] M. N. Searl : ' Play, Reality and Aggression ', this JOURNAL, Vol. XIV, p. 3.

triumphed too disastrously over the parent figure. Otherwise the memory of and desire for an ideal state which includes objects, but yet has a certain independence of or differentiation from them, is seriously imperilled, and the negative forces seem to have been the stronger. (Games meaning 'you can't touch' or 'you can't catch me', conduct implying 'you can't do anything with me' are attempts to come to terms with the anxieties of these states of inaccessibility, to choose instead of fearing them.)

6. He has, in early days, a pre-ambivalent state, connected with the lack of organized experience, of object relation, and of the sense of time.

That is, while he certainly knows intermediate states, can be a little unhappy, not very contented and so on, there is a tendency to absolute states. His states of contentment are both timeless and unaffected by memories or anticipations of anything different, and form a real basis in experience for an ideal of timeless contentment. But his states of pain are also timeless and unaffected by experience of the possibility of their resolution. Aggression engendered in them is unmodified by love. Impatience is again the result. The child must be out of them at once in order not to be in them for ever.

Thus we have the basis of a kind of double, sharply contrasted ideal.

1. In the positive kind, the desire for complete satisfaction and happiness involves the possession of the perfect parent, and is the foundation in experience of the social attitude—'I can only be perfectly happy when those in my environment are happy too'.[23] As it knows no impatience it can be brought under the control of the reality principle, and is in no conflict with the ego. In its connection with external reality it will be of slower growth than

2. The negative ideal, derived from the results of unhappy experience.

The negative ideal tends to have both sharper and earlier definition —earlier *because* sharper, in accordance with the infant's more powerful exertion of strength in his states of rage and anxiety than of happiness. We are all familiar with the fact that we tend to pay far greater attention to infrequent discomforts, pains and disagreeables of all sorts than to the smoother uneventful parts of everyday life. We must

[23] Pathological narcissism in connection with the ideal seems to be due to fixation and regression—a subject requiring a separate paper.

suppose that this is even more the case with the infant, ruled by the pleasure principle, and taking the undisturbed and happy part of his life for granted, as it were, his by right.

I think this fact of the slower growth of the positive than of the negative ideal may do something to reconcile the differences between Freud and Melanie Klein in the timing of super-ego formation.

The ' ego-ideal ', Freud's first ' super-ego ', even allowing for the negative elements in it, would, it seems to me, naturally be formed later than the super-ego in which negative elements predominate. The main struggle of early childhood is to keep free from the negative forces of the super-ego until the positive forces of the ego-ideal are sufficiently strong and stable to counterbalance the former.[24]

We are on familiar ground when we remind ourselves that not only does the child's subjective experience closely connect positive and negative ideals, but that he also encounters very frequently the same state of affairs in his objective experience. Adults often urge on him quite ideal conduct in very unideal ways—for example with great impatience or rigidity. And this fusion of the positive and the negative ideal the child tries to avoid lest he should have to abandon the positive along with the negative—that is, he tries by various means to defuse them, both in himself and in his parents. For example, he may seek to be what the parents want him to be in order that they shall remain what he wants *them* to be—not angry, or disappointed. This may be more or less successful when the love and desire motivation is the stronger. But when he seeks mainly from anxiety not to be what they do not want him to be, partly in order that *they* shall not be what *he* does not want them to be, he is again ruled not only by the fusion of positive and negative forces, but mainly by the negative part of them.

I do not intend to go far in this paper into this highly involved and complicated state of affairs. Paradoxically we are more familiar with it than, I think, with the simpler state of affairs I have tried to

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[24] Cf. Melanie Klein : *The Psycho-Analysis of Children* ', 1932, p. 217. ' In my view, in the earlier anal stage the child is making a defence against the terrifying imagos which it has introjected in the oral-sadistic stages '.

Also p. 243. ' As the libidinal impulses of children grow stronger and their destructive ones weaker, qualitative changes continually take place in their super-ego, so that it makes itself more and more felt by the ego as an admonitory influence '.

describe. It is precisely these complicated fusions and defusions which all analytical studies of the super-ego have shewn us.

I suggest the following tentative classification as useful in considering mixed ideals :—

1. Active attempts to achieve ideals.

2. Attempts to eliminate positive ideals.

3. Conflict of secondary with primary and with other secondary ideals.

4. Attempts at passive achievement of ideals, with a tendency to reject the objective unideal.

Obviously the more successful attempts and the more positive ideals make a less urgent call for help and understanding on our part. Consequently in the following section I refer to ideals in which the admixture of negative and anxiety elements is marked.

1. Active Attempts

(*a*) These are marked by greater or lesser regression and fixation to infantile circumstances of maximum happiness, preceding, and in order to overcome, fixations to painful infantile situations. That is, the regression and fixation are less in the desire itself than in the choice and rigidity of conditions for achieving it.

The demand for ease of attainment is a very general mark of such infantile fixations. It is the more necessary because the most violent and prolonged exertions in infancy are connected with fits of temper and aggression. Therefore difficulties calling for considerable effort in the way of striving towards an ideal, where there is a strong admixture of negative with positive, endanger its whole position as an ideal. On the other hand, sublimation of some types of anal erotism tends to make a powerful effort an *essential* part of any ideal achievement. This sublimation however is difficult if not impossible to stabilize where early oral fixation and regression are marked. Smooth easy feeding and smooth easy giving, ease of attainment, are then an essential part of the ideal situation. One such patient, for example, desired intensely to make his life and all those with whom he had strong affective relations into a poem, or as beautiful as a poem. Awkwardness was a sin because it signified the unwilling sampling of enforced awkward food in his mouth in contrast with the smooth rhythmical flow of milk. It indicated the presence of the violence and fury connected with bottle weaning, with the difficulties in later life connected with the unwelcome introduction of a dental plate to regulate

his teeth. Difficulties in the way of attainment threatened to rouse that impatience which in early life had culminated at times in the rejection of all food, and in boyhood and again in adult life had led to various guilt-laden sexual incidents in the endeavour to retain his object relations. In all these as in the ideal itself, urethral ease of function and smooth rhythmical flow carried over the oral sucking erotism in order to overcome oral impatience.

It would take too long to follow out the intermediate links of urethral and anal functioning. Suffice it to say that the effort required for the latter took over much of the effort put out in angry impatient screaming, and therefore of the negative ideal, while difficulty of control conflicted with the positive ideal qualities of urethral functioning—ease and rhythmic flow as in sucking.

Another patient had a strong ideal of the ' open door ' of hospitality, to which he himself endeavoured to give effect. The anxiety side, the feeling of necessity, of ' mustness ' was derived from the wish to nullify certain incidents in which the super-ego predominated. Had the door remained open, these could not have happened. In the latency period he could not have been shut out to play alone in the garden, with associated misdemeanours, nor could he ever have been shut out or in as a punishment. With the open door there could have been no struggle for control of the door. With no withholding he would never have wanted to steal, and would never have met the particular aspect of the threatening super-ego associated with it. Living up to his own hospitable ideal he himself could never have wanted to keep away visitors or babies from the family. Further, there could have arisen no conflict with his father over the pupil boarders in the house. Earlier and acutely anxiety-ridden situations demanded no fear of a large hole in his mother's body and no trouble for having himself an open anus when it should have been closed, no danger from a trap, from a closed biting mouth. A happy suckling provided an early foundation for the positive ideal, but a particularly difficult weaning from a wet nurse who disappeared behind a closed door added the anxiety drive to the basis of desire for contentment already known in giving and receiving.

A small boy of four and a half years with a great admiration for his artist grandfather had had a most prolonged and obstinate struggle with him over defæcation, time, place and amount, carried over into a more sublimated contest over artistic productions. A swiftly realized picture of firm outline and clear bright colour, such as he

himself produced at this time became his ideal also for his environment, for behaviour, speech, etc. Otherwise the cruel and obstinate super-ego threatened to be in the ascendant. But this apparent ideal was actually more idealization than ideal in connection with both his grandfather, for whom and for whose artistic productions in oils he had divided feelings, and the urethral function which played such a large part in his own painting. While he had for so long mastered his desire for anal functioning and fought his grandfather over it, his urethral functioning mastered him as far as consciousness went, and resulted in messes and blurred outlines. In his unconscious, however, he was constantly defeating his grandfather with it, as well as a nurse who had trained him in cleanliness in his grandfather's house. Hence the more ideal qualities as well as feelings and situations involved in his painting were fused with the anxiety contribution of *necessity*—they *must* protect him from ugliness, dirtiness, cruelty, harshness and impatience; just as his anxiety turned his *wish* for an ideal mother into the agonizing demand that she *must* be ideal in the sense of protecting him from his determined grandfather and from all super-ego attitudes in himself or others.

An adult woman patient felt driven to fight the devil of quick violent temper with the devil of dull obstinacy unless she was successful in establishing happy relations by means of quick wit and amusing brightness. If this did not dispel all gloom, the devil once more threatened. Here again, the positive ideal was largely determined by the negative—that which would best counter and protect from the infantile super-ego, quickness, speed, being an essential element. The ideal must needs be quicker than the quickness of impatience if the one had to fight and conquer the other. What I have called the fusion of positive and negative ideals might equally well be called their clash or quarrel, as of physically united but psychically warring parents or parent and child.

Another patient was at pains to shew me her ideal of the handling of children as a form of good instead of forbidden exhibitionism. In this way she could prove her power to shew those parts of herself connected with the making of good children in contrast with her powerlessness to see her mother's child-bearing functions and organs, and particularly in contrast with her exclusion from the room while her mother fed the babies and ideally made them good and contented. It also contained a strong element of reproach—as indeed do all the examples quoted—reproach for such exclusion as compared with her

own powerlessness to exclude from her ears terrifying sounds from or talk about the confinement room; reproach that her mother (also analyst) was not good or clever enough to make in a good and safe way good children who would never have wanted to attack her.

The infantile elements fused with an advanced ideal were shewn in three ways :—

(*a*) Its liability to sudden breakdown, allowing the occasional eruption of angry impatience—or the fear of the recurrence of such impatience.

(*b*) The use to which the ideal was put—as an attacking weapon, albeit an apparently mild one. This corresponds with the most general conception of the ego-ideal—the fusion of positive ideal with aggression. The patient in question had, it seems, similarly called her mother away from feeding a baby, the situation in which she most loved and admired her, and found her nearest her first ideal, to reproach the quarrelling sister and brothers. In infancy she had herself attacked with most violent and reproachful cries and screams those who had threatened her own more ideal conditions, these being the standard by which she measured all others.

(*c*) The bitterness and intensity of the reproach which the milder use of the ideal as a standard was designed both to conceal and to convey.

The familiar subject of the ideal used as a means of or associated with violent reproach for lack of ideal qualities brings us to the second group.

2. Attempts to Eliminate Positive Ideals

The ideal wrested from its position of dynamic desire containing only positive elements into that of aggressive reproach is obviously connected with anxiety about the application and imposition of standards. We may distinguish four main phases of it.

(*a*) The infant's intensity of aggressive reproach for lack of ideal conditions influencing his attitude to encountered impatience and anger, as well as deprivation, when he is not ' good ' himself. Contrast forming the basis of understanding, his happy states, those forming the foundation of his ideal, are his standard, and by them he knows or measures the badness of his unhappy states.

(*b*) The introjection of the total situation in the super-ego attitude to the id and the ego, and of the ego and the id to the super-ego—intolerance and ruthless punishment for lack of ideal qualities, reproaches of cruelty, etc.

(*c*) The projection of this same situation in two forms: (1) the danger of non-ideal conduct on one's own part or that of others, the danger now proceeding from their super-ego or one's own. (2) The danger of ideal conduct on one's own part or that of others because of reproach, discouragement or despair associated with it. (*d*) The repression of either the ideal or that conflicting with it.

These are all familiar situations to you, though possibly (*c*) (2) the least—the danger of ideal conduct on one's own part or the part of others. Margaret Mead,[25] quoted by Roheim[26] gives a striking illustration from Samoan culture, where all pre-eminence and virtuosity are avoided. The Samoans' fear of and domination by crying children are noteworthy in this connection.

I have already given one example of the apparent absence of conscious ideals of the more primary type, that is, those which would satisfy the total personality and be largely independent of circumstance. I shewed that this was due to the fear of an absolute negative.

Another adult patient shewed that her despair of possessing or creating a father sufficiently near to her ideal, which was fused with infantile impatience and intolerance, led to her adoption as a kind of secondary ideal of just that part of his sexual conduct which had troubled her most. In addition there was an uncle who possessed many of the manly qualities she missed in her father. But when he died, and it was said that women and drink had been his ruin, she felt under the necessity of proving that death could not have punished him for such conduct; in order that her father, for his lesser but to her far more significant sexual misdemeanours, and herself, for ways in which she had imitated her father, should not be under the same threat. The infantile basis of the situation lay in somewhat prolonged breast-feeding as a result of a bitter struggle over earlier weaning. This had entailed fierce competition with her father for possession of her mother, and resulted in disillusionment, in the sense of an uncertain attitude to the regained breast-feeding mother or ideal after the fight. Since good people—good by comparison—were not safe from death either—and that meant that no amount of goodness would satisfy the insatiable child in the hidden judge—the only hope lay in proving her safety from both the good and the bad. She would in turn prove that the 'bad' could not condemn and kill her without laying themselves open to the same fate, and in the 'good' she herself would find the

[25] M. Mead: *Coming of Age in Samoa*', 1928, p. 33.

[26] Roheim: 'The Evolution of Culture', this JOURNAL, Vol. XV, p. 392.

' bad '—by contempt, suspicion and so on. Thus there would be no really ' good ' to judge her, any more than she herself felt it safe to judge either father or uncle.

I have represented the process as far more absolute and unvarying than it actually was—but this was the tendency which at times became uppermost. In more serious cases it leads to criminality, for the super-ego or negative without the positive ideal cannot be tolerated.

3. Conflict of Secondary with Primary and with Other Secondary Ideals

The material I have just quoted gives a good example of conflict between the more primary ideal, one which more nearly satisfies the total personality, and a secondary ideal, one which only satisfies in certain circumstances not completely satisfactory in themselves—not ' the best ', but ' the best in those circumstances '—when it is adopted from the feeling of necessity, from anxiety and not from ego choice. The simple example of adoption of a secondary ideal I gave at the beginning of this paper was by hypothesis free from anxiety, and not in conflict with any other ideal.

A very familiar example of this conflict is the struggle between two ideals of the mother—the secondary, anxiety-motivated and -ridden ideal of the jealous child desiring a mother exclusively loving him or her, and the primary ideal of the all-loving, all bountiful mother, loving all her children and excluding none. This ideal develops out of the infantile ideal of the mother equal to every varying need of the one child—every different child in the one child, as it were ; for every child contains a whole family of children.

4. Passive Attempts to Achieve the Ideal and Tendency to Reject the Objective Unideal

This I contrast with the first group of active attempts to obtain the ideal. Activity of *demand* is now the main activity in the direction of the ideal, demand that it and nothing less shall be given or provided. Discouragement or despair has checked personal efforts, but less so than in the third group—attempts to eliminate the positive ideal. These are always limited in scope, even in criminals. Most certainly such attempts were very partial in both the cases I have quoted. And certainly, too, no patient but gives some examples of what I have called the passive attempts, necessary in order to maintain some relationship with the ideal when the active attempts succumb to anxiety. As far as I know at present the discouragement and despair

always arise from the complete failure in infancy to create an ideal situation by even the most violent exertions of screaming in order to make the parents ' good '. From this failure results the demand that the parents shall prevent such a painful failure—actually shall have prevented it, by giving the child all it needs—actually all it then needed, thus being—having been—ideal themselves without effort on the child's part, and relieving the child from the danger of others trying to make him good in an equally aggressive way.

The slowest and most obstinate little boy I ever knew, who had had very frequent and prolonged fits of screaming, had as one ideal all electric fittings ; for they worked almost instantaneously with very slight noise and the minimum of effort on the operator's part. They were, in fact, ideally obedient to him in striking contrast with his own emotions. His relations with his parents were approximately loving and objective chiefly when they provided him with food, music and possibilities of working electric switches—lights, hotel lifts and so on.

I will conclude this long paper with a brief summary of what seem to me its most important points.

(*a*) A clearer distinction between the fused positive and negative elements of Freud's ' ego-ideal ', and ' super-ego ' ; necessitating differentiation between the desire and the anxiety aspects, that is between strong wish-tensions and anxiety ; and between idealization and ideal formation.

(*b*) The ego-syntonic character of the ideal, which cannot be in conflict with the reality principle, but on the contrary, because the absence of impatience allows of postponement of realization, is in accord with it.

(*c*) Closer study of pre-ambivalence connected with lack of organization and of experience of time.

(*d*) The slower growth of the positive than the negative ideal in childhood, much of the positive being wrested from its position of desire alone in order to counteract the anxiety connected with the negative.

And I would add that I see no reason why the infantile need to dominate in anxiety by aggressive negative forces should be perpetuated in the term *super*-ego applied to an instance in which these play so large a part. The true *super*-ego should surely be the ego-ideal in the positive sense of the term, and the negative the sub-ego. Or, in accordance with Freud's rejection of the term *sub*-conscious, it might be better to use the words positive and negative ideals.

DOMINANT IDEAS AND THEIR RELATION TO MORBID CRAVINGS [1]

BY

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Rado, in his most recent paper,[2] has provided a schematic basis for the process at work in morbid cravings and placed our understanding on such a broad foundation of clinical experience and analytical knowledge that we are entitled to assume that we have properly grasped the laws which govern the course of its development. His investigations commence at the point at which the preliminary depression has reached a stage when psychical means no longer suffice to master it unaided, and the ego has recourse to medicinal remedies.

Accordingly we have still to enquire into the question whether the preliminary depression presents a uniform clinical picture, and if not, as to the nature of the libidinal structure and morbid processes which furnish a compelling motive for the ' pharmacothymic discharge ' of the tension produced by conflict.

The problem pertaining to the libidinal structure has likewise been clarified to a great extent. Since the earliest relevant work of Abraham [3] and Rado,[4] a large number of analysts have brought forward abundant confirmatory material to show that a strong oral fixation and the associated disposition to states of depression provide the libidinal conditions for morbid cravings. Nevertheless, discussion arose as to their nature and essence, more correctly, as to the specific morbid process by means of which the oral fixation leading to addiction is liberated. On this point, we have as yet not reached unanimity. Whereas Simmel [5] is of opinion that addiction represents an obsessional-neurotic mechanism of defence, and that a primary trans-

[1] Read at the Thirteenth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Lucerne, August, 1934.

[2] Rado, ' Psychoanalyse der Pharmakothymie ', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XX, 1934.

[3] Abraham, ' The Psychological Relations between Sexuality and Alcoholism ', also ' A Short Study of the Development of the Libido ' ; *Selected Papers on Psycho-Analysis.*

[4] Rado, ' The Psychical Effects of Intoxicants ', this JOURNAL, 1926, Vol. VII.

[5] Simmel, ' Zwang und Sucht ', *Bericht über den V. Allgemeinen Ärztlichen Kongress für Psychotherapie*, Baden-Baden, April, 1930.

ference-neurosis is first transformed by the experience of intoxication into a narcissistic neurosis, Glover [6] raises the question whether there are not cases of addiction which develop in the reverse direction. According to him, a deep regression, in the sense of a paranoia, is succeeded by a second phase of the illness, the restoration of relations with the environment, in which the addiction functions as a quasi-curative process.

Glover himself does not contend that his theory should be treated as applicable to all cases of addiction. In the same way, it appears to me as though the preliminary depression which leads to addiction had not a uniform genesis, that is to say, one for every case alike. Thus analysis of the depression would constitute the essential task of the analysis of the addict.

In this connection, the following case seems to me to be specially instructive. In it, the structure of the depression leading to the addiction is revealed in a particularly convincing manner as a primary clinical condition. It was possible to obtain an unusually clear view of the addiction as a secondary illness, a defence against the initial depression created by the primary morbid process.

An unmarried woman of twenty-six years, emaciated to the bone, came to me with the complaint that she is addicted to alcohol. A closer anamnesis shewed that the patient suffered from a very complicated form of addiction, which had been expressed in different ways at different periods of her life. At the time when she came to me she took every kind of alcoholic drink, mild and strong, in order to intoxicate herself, and as it was not always easy for her to get alcohol, she had recourse to Hoffmann's drops—a mixture of ether and alcohol —by which means she was able to secure intoxication both quickly and cheaply. Besides alcohol and ether, the patient took vast quantities of aperients, thyroid preparations and various salts, as well as homœopathic preparations. Narcotics excepted, one might say she took everything. Of narcotics she was afraid. During periods in which she felt better, she was able to renounce alcohol ; the addiction itself was then succeeded by an obsessional-neurotic system. She associated herself with some dietary movement, and lived on uncooked foods, or became a vegetarian, and for a time took her nourishment in accordance with these systems, exerting every ounce of strength in

[6] Glover, ' The Ætiology of Drug-Addiction ', this JOURNAL, 1932, Vol. XIII.

her personality until she once more lost control and the craving broke through afresh.[7]

The driving force behind this complicated addiction was the idea, which for the patient was conscious, *that she did not want to have a woman's body*. This idea suddenly emerged with overwhelming force when the patient was fifteen and a half years old and destroyed her whole life.

The patient comes from a well-to-do lower-middle-class family. Her father was a man of athletic build and robust appearance, in whose life eating and drinking played a great part, without his ever having been an ' addict '. He died some years ago from a nervous illness, probably of post-luetic origin. The mother is a frail woman, lovable and indulgent, but efficient ; modest and unassuming as far as concerns herself, but able to meet the claims made upon her by her husband and her daughter.

The patient was the only child of the marriage ; the birth was effected by means of forceps after a normal pregnancy. According to the mother's statements, the child took the breast well, and was suckled for nine months. The mother cannot remember that the process of weaning and accustoming the child to solid food caused any kind of difficulties. As a child, the patient had eaten well ; at that time she ate a great deal of meat, as did her father. Until she reached her fifteenth year, she was a healthy talented child, rather frightened and shy with her father, but lively and clever at school. She was stout and was often teased on that account. It made a specially deep impression on her when a master teased her in front of the whole class in a manner which was far too friendly to be misunderstood, taking hold of her and fondling her. Both the patient herself and her mother brought forward this incident as the reason for the hate which she began to feel for her body and for her desire to become thin at all costs.

There is nothing at all unusual in a manifestation of this kind. But in this case the ' slimming cure ' was carried out with such destructive rage and relentlessness that we may justifiably suppose that it covered a mental process of serious import.

The patient suddenly managed to give up eating altogether in

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[7] Glover calls attention to similar cases ; this changeover from a true addiction to an obsessional-neurotic eating ceremonial in itself points to the part played by the super-ego in morbid cravings.

the surroundings in which previously she had eaten with such hearty appetite and pleasure ; in a few months she lost sixty pounds in weight. From then on, the patient was ill-tempered, defiant, impatient and insatiable in her demands. The alteration in her character went so far that she destroyed and burnt food, even throwing it into the closet, and occasionally in an access of rage tore her clothing and linen or burnt it in the stove. Her whole existence was one long struggle not to become fat, which became all the harder as her pleasure in eating grew beyond normal proportions to a veritable gluttony. She remained at first able to work, and from time to time, when one thing or another provided the necessary spur, made up her mind to take food. But when she ate, she thought that her figure altered and increased in size and that her breasts got larger ; then it was all over with her good intentions. She would have liked most to destroy her body and tear off her breasts ; she raged against herself in the full sense of the word. This struggle had already been going on for years, interrupted only by intervals passed in various sanatoria, before she had recourse to alcohol.

Her condition was essentially a struggle against polyphagy. If it were ever legitimate to speak of intoxication with reference to food, then it certainly would be in this case. As the patient came to board with me so that I could supervise the extent of deprivation, I had opportunities for observing the different modes and forms assumed by these attacks of polyphagy. When the patient had taken alcohol, all her inhibitions vanished and she ate in enormous quantities without restraint. She consumed the most impossible things, the most highly-seasoned varieties of spices, without her stomach ever rebelling. One had the impression that she stupefied herself with alcohol in order to be able to permit this release of impulse. But this was only a rationalization of her craving for alcohol. For after the abstinence-course we found that she could consume very large quantities of food without having to intoxicate herself with alcohol. Instead of the ' alimentary orgasm ', there appeared invariably remorse ; the fact that she had eaten made her profoundly unhappy ; she would have liked most to destroy her body and to get the food out and away from her again. But remarkably enough, she never took steps to vomit it. The oral way was always reserved for pleasure ; she was content to take aperients in huge quantities and if her remorse was too great to be borne, she got intoxicated.

Having developed in this way, the craving for alcohol reached the

point where it presented all the features of a severe addiction. The patient cannot walk along the street without stopping at every restaurant ; she procures alcohol as best she may, either on credit, or by borrowing or stealing the money from her mother. Other drug-substances are of secondary importance and may be classified as (1) substances used for thinning purposes : thyroid preparations, aperients ; (2) substances designed to alleviate hunger : food-substitutes, or those which reduce appetite ; (3) various food-substances conforming to the prescriptions of certain dietetic schools, thus intended to enable her to live in accordance with her ego-ideal.[8]

I will bring forward the following material from the analytical anamnesis. The patient was a much spoilt only child and she had experienced a bitter disappointment at the hands of her father. In the earliest years of her life her father could not do enough to spoil her ; he courted her. He fed her himself, played with her and bought her new toys every day, especially dolls of every sort and design and wearing an endless variety of clothes. Then her father's behaviour underwent a sudden change. He became churlish and mean with her and would not buy her even the barest of necessities. He now hated her and ordered her to work. He required her to fetch chicken-food from restaurants and carry it through the streets in pails. As in the fairy-tale, he had turned a princess into a serving-girl. It sounds as if we had here a ' screen-memory ', a phantasy of the patient, but this was not the case. The alteration in the father's character had already started years before his metasyphilitic illness and it shook the patient to the depths of her being.

The patient became awkward and timid with her father and now *hated him.* She hated his love of eating and his coarse muscular figure, and later she came to hate in herself above everything those things in which she resembled her father. Her conscious ego-ideal was the antithesis of her father, and all her energy was directed to the destruction of those resemblances. She tried to bring the conflict

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[8] Wulff (' Über einen interessanten oralen Symptomenkomplex und seine Beziehung zur Sucht ', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XVIII, 1932) reports similar cases, including one of a patient who was both polyphagous and ultimately an addict. Our material is more conclusive, in so far as in the case of our patient, it was not a matter of an accessory illness (biliary colic) activating the addiction, but one where the causal connection with phases in which eating was pleasurable or forbidden emerged in a clear light.

to an end in her efforts to find a new way of life and to lead a life not enslaved by the claims of materialism and the ' passions '.

At puberty, the patient experienced the profound shock to which reference has been made already, occasioned by the sensual advances and caresses of her teacher, a father-substitute. She reacted to this incident with a deep regression, and repudiated the feminine rôle. But this repudiation was not confined to the repression of vaginal sexuality with which we are familiar in cases of hysteria. The regression proceeded further and comprised the whole body. Thenceforward she rejected the *female body in its entirety*, together with all its visibly feminine attributes, on the ground that *all this served the man as a sexual object.* That was her rationalization. But the driving-force behind this urge towards the annihilation of femininity was the need to ward off repressed homosexual impulses. It is alike remarkable and characteristic of the course taken by the morbid process that the patient, who in the further course of her history suffered many other disappointments at the hands of men, continued always to seek refuge with men ; whereas she was filled with a pathological mistrust and hatred towards women. In spite of all her real experiences of disappointment with men, it was clear from the very beginning of the treatment that her hatred for women was deeper and more relentless —was in fact psychotic—than her ambivalent relations with men. This paranoid hate of women it was which inspired her rage against her own body, and was revealed also in the transference with a psychotic freedom of expression.

Her hatred for her mother was expressed in various direct and indirect destructive tendencies, and even in crude forms of abuse and acts of violence. At the beginning of the treatment, she made an attempt to play off two mothers one against the other, and to injure both of them. This was most clearly revealed when the transference was functioning with ambivalence at its height. At that time she had the following dream :—' There is a quite small baby on my arm. Usually I hate babies, but I pressed this child to me. The child belonged to you. I wanted to fondle the child, and was " nasty " with it ; that is, I kissed the child as one doesn't kiss children, eagerly and erotically, licking and devouring it '. (Actually the patient's libido was concentrated mainly in the mouth zone, otherwise she was frigid.) It soon became clear to her beyond all doubt that it was not a child, but the breast, which she embraced and kissed and would have liked to devour.

Following on this dream, she became very excited, in spite of the insight which appeared to have been gained, or perhaps just because of it, and that afternoon she behaved as follows. She ordered a meal, and a large meal to start with. When the things which she required had been collected and put on a tray, we noticed that besides these a bottle of butter-milk and a packet of cheese were missing, having in fact been taken by her. I went to see her. The trays were lying empty in the corridor. It was impossible for her to have eaten such quantities in the time. She had asked for and taken the food, not that she might eat it, but to hide it and to destroy it, as she admitted in scornful tones and triumph over me.

This acting out in the transference was not simply oral defiance or refusal of nourishment. Fundamentally it had the significance of an oral aggression aimed at her mother's breast, and lived out here with the full ambivalence appropriate to the oral stage. The wish to incorporate the desired object first broke through in the dream, and then expressed itself in the form of greed in respect of food. The gratification of this wish would have furthered the development of her femininity ; and made her identification with a hated mother manifest, consequently it was repudiated. In the symbolic action of destroying the food, she destroyed her mother and her mother's breast, but equally she destroyed her own feminine body and breasts, mortifying herself and refusing food. We see here, unfolded before our eyes in the transference, the same process of discharging aggressive impulses as had been constantly repeated from the commencement of her illness in her periods of fasting and in her fits of destructive rage.

The suffering which her conflict caused the patient was immeasurable. Eating as a form of instinctual satisfaction was indispensable, and was pathologically intensified in her case in the attacks of polyphagy. The remorse liberated by the eruption of impulse always lent fresh strength to her tendency to self-destruction.

Thus the following circle arises : the outcome of the original instinctual conflict demands (1) the extinction of the subject's femininity, which comes about through (2) refusal of oral gratification ; this is followed by (3) hunger. Hunger sets in train (4) the eruption of id-impulse, which is succeeded by (5) remorse. This releases (6) anxiety relating to femininity, which is again followed by (7) the prohibition against taking food, intended to lead to the annihilation of the female body.

This makes a closed circle, and presents the illness, so to speak, in cross-section. Here we see a morbid process which vents itself on the oral level *after* a regression.

I have made some remarks of an analytical nature in regard to the origin of this regression, but have not offered a ' complete analysis '.

Putting it quite shortly, we can still say : Great indulgence by the father and a great love for him announce the normal Œdipus phase. This was followed by a deep disappointment at the hands of her father, to which she reacted with hate. This hate brought in its wake a repudiation of men as sexual objects, and an increased narcissistic cathexis of her own body. She became genitally frigid, but sought nevertheless to maintain relations with men because they served her as a defence against her repressed homosexuality. This battle with her Ucs homosexuality drove her into a paranoid struggle to repel her mother, and at the same time forced her more and more deeply into an oral regression, so that the destruction of her mother and her own femininity ensued at the oral phase of the original identification.

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Before examining more closely the symptom represented in the idea ' I do not want to have the body of a woman ', I would like to bring forward another case with a similar structure, which did not, it is true, end in addiction, but where the primary morbid process shewed in its composition extensive similarities to the case here described in detail.

This patient was a girl of twenty-one years, slender and boyish in physique, and like her father. She was the younger of two sisters. The elder sister, unlike the patient, was pyknic in type. The patient, so far as she could remember, had always stood in conscious opposition to her mother, who had a special preference for her first child, ' her daughter '. The latter was easy to bring up, lovable and extraverted, whereas our patient was timid and inhibited in work, felt herself unequal to competition with her talented sister, and became increasingly introverted. It was of no avail that she was regarded as ' her father's daughter ' and was spoilt by him, because all the same the father stood by her mother and had often to punish the wayward, inhibited girl. As was revealed in the analysis, the embittered child had suffered markedly from depression between the ages of eleven and twelve, and was perhaps in actual danger of suicide. Until her fifteenth year there was nothing essential to be noted in regard to her eating habits. After puberty, she began to avoid meat ; later,

she reached a point at which she avoided all cooked food, and still later this extended to all nourishment that really was nourishment, so that now she ate mechanically only apples and tomatoes. To be sure, she ate them by the pound, in order to escape feelings of hunger and to be sure withal that she did not get fat. At times when her impulses broke through, as they did eventually, she consumed large quantities of biscuits, only to want to tear herself to pieces from remorse afterwards and to storm in rage at her mother and sister for enticing her to take food and become fat.

Very striking was her attitude of paranoid mistrust towards her mother and sister. To be sure, whereas other paranoiacs have fears of being poisoned or given bad food, our patient was in perpetual fear that her mother or sister might succeed in tempting her to eat. In her eyes, all food which might have possibly caused her to put on an ounce was as good as poison and her reaction of avoidance was correspondingly strong. But she herself persecuted her mother and sister with the very thing which she feared at their hands; she controlled their eating and tried to prevail upon them to do all those things which she so strictly avoided in herself. She chose gymnastics as a vocation, went in for sport a great deal and walked very long distances, so as to keep constantly exercising and be sure of losing weight. In the same way, she kept watch on her mother and sister to see that they always drove. She forced them to take the very poisons which she so anxiously avoided for herself. The aggression expressed in this behaviour is evident. The patient was dominated by the idea that she must not want to eat, in order not to have the body of a woman, *not to become like her mother*, whom she hated and killed in her own body.

I do not propose here to enter more closely into the analytical material. I will only make summary reference to the circumstance that in this case the prohibition against food is derived from the idea: ' I do not want to have the body of a woman '. This idea is the result of an instinctual conflict which arises from oral anxiety and oral hatred towards the mother, and by way of identification, rages against the subject's body, evoking a paranoid illness with a reversal of aggression against the self.[9]

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[9] I refer in this connection to Freud's conception of the development of paranoia in women. (Freud, ' Female Sexuality ', this JOURNAL, 1932, Vol. XIII.) Freud holds that the fear of being eaten by the mother

In both these cases we see that the primary morbid process—repression followed by regression—leads to repudiation by the subject of her female body. This repudiation is kept in force by means of an imperative which manifests itself in the system Pcpt-cs and runs: ' You are not to eat and have the body of a woman '. Inevitably our interest will be aroused by the question where the idea finds its intrinsic energy and what means it employs to dominate the personality and bring about its ruin with such merciless and unyielding persistence.

If we regard this idea as a symptom, it will strike us that from the very first it was felt as an essential constituent part of the ego. ' In the transference-neuroses, there is a struggle between the ego and the symptom '. ' This struggle is enacted on more than one stage and employs manifold resources '. ' And often enough, the symptom is in the course of time incorporated by the ego '.[10] But the symptom described here and treated by me shows that no ' time and heavy labour ' was required to effect this ; it appeared from the very first moment as an irremovable part of the ego. This is a peculiarity found only in symptoms which are released by psychotic processes. Whereas fantasies and compulsive ideas, and neurotic symptoms altogether, remain outside the ego, the ego playing the part almost of a spectator in relation to them, or else struggling against them, *every delusion* occupies a central position in the structure of the ego. If an idea or presentation acquires the quality of a reality, the ego-alteration which has then taken place exerts a decisive influence on every subsequent testing by reality.

How is an ego-alteration of the kind achieved ? Freud's investigations into the psychoses led him to assume that at the commencement of every psychotic disorder ' the world comes to an end ' i.e. a deep regression takes place and a withdrawal of all relations to objects and also of all normal libidinal cathexes of the bodily apparatus.[11] The world comes to an end, the individual is at the moment of the psychotic experience—for however brief a moment—*wholly id*. This psychotic regression is, as Freud assumes to be the case with every

represents, in women, the fixation-point of paranoia. In this case there developed a reversal into the opposite, into the details of whose structure I cannot enter here.

[10] Freud, *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst.*

[11] Federn, ' Narzissmus im Ichgefühle ', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, Bd. XIII, 1927.

regression, accompanied by a defusion of instincts, so that aggression is set free.

After regression has reached its furthest point, the process of recovery sets in. It is this ' attempt at cure ' which we see unfolded before our eyes in the clinical picture of psychosis. But this process of recovery does not merely constitute a fresh attempt to form libidinal attachments to objects, this being the aspect on which observers have so far laid most emphasis, but comes about also by means of a fresh investment of the aggression which has been liberated. Accordingly, the symptom represents a fresh instinctual fusion, and the structure of the illness assumed by the clinical picture will not depend simply on the fate and amount of *libido* involved, but as well on the fate of the primary instinctual *aggression* which the regressive process has set free. It can be bound and warded off in very different ways, and closer examination of these will assuredly provide us with an excellent opportunity for discovering finer shades of difference in the structure of the psychoses. We might quote as an example the well-known fate of the aggressive impulse in melancholia ; there the aggression aimed at the incorporated object is bound in the super-ego and turned against the ego on so large a scale as to cripple it. It is otherwise in the so-called manic-depressive mixed forms,[12] in which the binding of aggression has not been achieved with the same exclusiveness, since a part of it remains in the ego in free-floating form and must needs be abreacted as a conscious affect of hate or destructive rage.[13]

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[12] It would repay closer investigation to ascertain how far true cases of addiction belong to these manic-depressive mixed forms.

[13] Eidelberg, in his Lucerne Congress paper : ' Outline of a Comparative Theory of the Neuroses ', pursues a similar line of thought in his attempt to make use of cross-sectional views of the neuroses for the purposes of diagnosis. The essential matter in this classification is the quantitative proportions of Eros and Thanatos and the degree of intensity of the defences, also the participation of the single mental institutions in binding and erecting defences against these impulses. The case-histories given above were presented with the same end in view. The impression which one obtains from a careful investigation of psychotic and so-called borderline cases is that the aggressive instinct liberated by regression effects a variation in the intensity of the pregenital experience. Only the assumption of a primary instinct of aggression and of a primary masochism presents us with the means of deepening our knowledge in this field.

In our particular case, the aggression was bound by having recourse to the formation of a symptom which brought about an alteration in the ego. The aggression liberated by the regressive process accrues to the system Pcpt-cs where it cathects the representative of the instinctual conflict, that is, the idea of not wanting to have the body of a woman. So cathected, the idea becomes an essential constituent part of the ego ; I prefer not to say of the super-ego. For the criterion of the super-ego, according to *The Ego and the Id*, is its belonging to the system Ucs. This idea, which we have depicted as a circumscribed but irremovable part of the ego, is always conscious, belongs topographically, then, to the ego. But inherent in it is a *severity appropriate to the super-ego*. The ego is delivered over to the idea ; if the ego throws off its yoke, anxiety arises and remorse. The tension of conscience, the punishment inflicted on the ego is as great as that which we know generally to characterize super-ego conflicts. Accordingly *the dynamic and economic function of this idea corresponds to the function of the super-ego ; topographically, however, it belongs to the ego.*

We will now propound the question whether it is possible to arrive at a more accurate differential diagnosis between this symptom and others.

I will here call to mind an old psychiatric conception which has received no attention from psycho-analysis, that of a ' dominant idea '. It originated with Wernicke [14] who, however, was unable to define clearly enough the boundaries separating it from obsessive and delusional presentations. This had the result that the conception was challenged over and over again and the question of its admissibility gave rise to a controversy in the literature. While many authors embrace all presentations invested with affect, including obsessive ideas and presentations, in the conception of a dominant idea, and look for its distinctive feature in a persistent feeling-tone, Bleuler [15] understands by the term ' dominant idea ' one which is constantly obtruding, but which differs from autochthonous ideas, since it is not regarded as foreign to the personality, and from obsessive ideas, since it is not perceived as false. In this way Bleuler endeavours to distinguish a dominant idea phenomenologically, on the one hand from obsessive ideas, and on the other from delusions.

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[14] Wernicke, ' Über fixe Ideen ', *Deutsche medizinische Wochenschrift*, 1892.

[15] Bleuler, *Affektivität, Suggestibilität, Paranoia*, 1906–1926 ; *Textbook of Psychiatry*, 1924.

We shall not find it difficult, after our reflections on the structure presented by our two cases, to subscribe to Bleuler's definition and to express it with greater precision from the standpoint of psychoanalysis. So far as regards the relation between dominant and obsessive ideas, we are liable to be misled by the function of the dominant idea and its conformity with the super-ego into paying attention to just certain resemblances, or even into emphasizing these. Regarded metapsychologically, however, there exist considerable differences between the two groups of ideas. Both obsessional-neurotic symptoms and obsessive ideas arise from a regression to the anal-sadistic phase, involving the arrest of object-relations at this stage of libido-organization. The aggression here set free by the regressive process effects a general strengthening of the super-ego, but does not give rise to an alteration in the ego. In contra-distinction hereto, the dominant idea corresponds to a more profound regression which effects an annulment of all object and ego-cathexes, and is therefore the result of a *psychotic regression*. Thus we regard a dominant idea as a *monosymptomatic psychosis*. We have still to examine the question whether it admits of more exact demarcation in its relation to delusions.

The delusion ' is found like a patch on the spot where originally there was a rent in the relation between ego and outer world '.[16] Two steps moreover are discernible in a psychosis, the first of which tears the ego away from reality, while the second tries to make good the damage done.[17] It is this second phase which is responsible for the formation of fresh relations to objects and to reality. Where true delusional ideas are present, this result is achieved by means of projection. The affects liberated by the regressive process, and this includes both aggressive and libidinal ones, are in a sense intermingled afresh and bound by fresh attachments to objects. Following projection, the environment presents to perception an altered appearance. This is the case with all paranoid delusions. And this it is which distinguishes them from a dominant idea. The latter does not involve projection. The affects liberated by the process, both libidinal and aggressive, are worked over and bound without passing beyond the institutions which compose the mental apparatus. Similarly, no alteration is perceived in the environment, but there occurs simply

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[16] Freud, ' Neurosis and Psychosis ', *Collected Papers*, Vol. II.

[17] Freud, ' The Loss of Reality in Neurosis and Psychosis ', *Collected Papers*, Vol. II.

an ego-alteration which is operative as a new structure within the personality.

Putting it as shortly as possible, the dominant idea is distinguishable from its obsessional-neurotic counterpart in that it answers to a more profound regression, one which has brought about an alteration in the ego. This alteration in the ego owes its origin to a psychotic regression, as is always the case with delusions also; but differs from paranoia in that the affects which have been liberated in the course of regression are bound within the institutions which compose the mental apparatus, and not by being projected on to the environment. This does not have as a result the perception of an alteration in the environment, but only that of an ego-alteration.[18]

It is particularly easy and instructive to draw the line demarcating our own case from true delusions, seeing that both the symptom and the regression which preceded it had attacked the subject's body only, and this became the object of the dominant idea.

We may now ask if the introduction of this conception of illness

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[18] It is assuredly not unimportant that a dominant idea with the content of an annihilation of the body by oral rejection is mostly evident in women. The circumstance that these cases so often concern women can be related to other discoveries on the subject of female narcissism. (Harnik, ' The Various Developments Undergone by Narcissism in Men and in Women ', this JOURNAL, 1924, Vol. V.) Female narcissism is always retreating from the genitals, so that it cathects the body as a whole. This seems to us to explain why it so often affects the body as a whole, whether it annihilates or affirms it. In men, narcissism is concentrated far more on the genitals, specifically on the penis; because of the positive cathexis of the penis, narcissistic delusional ideas mostly relate to the genital or to a substitute for this.

After this, it is illuminating to find that the mechanism of the dominant idea frequently emerges with a *hypochondriacal delusion as its content.* That is to say that hypochondriacal delusions, and many also with a depressive content, bear a resemblance to a dominant idea. But there exist also dominant ideas at the centre of which we do not find the body or a part of it. For example, we have only to think of dominant ideas which impose tasks on the personality, say the obligation to reform the world In these cases too, there is no alteration in the world in the sense of a true paranoid projected idea, but an attempt is made to effect a change in the environment in the sense of an ego-alteration. We must suppose that in these cases, as distinct from those treated by me, the symptom contains a greater admixture of narcissistic libido.

represents a gain for our general theory of the neuroses. On general grounds it seems to us of essential importance that in the dominant idea a striking example of the ' synthetic function of the ego ' can be recognized. The ego binds aggression with the libido belonging to it, and the new structure thus created is stable. At this point the struggle to ward off the primary instinctual conflict is brought to a conclusion. But the total equilibrium of the mental apparatus is not thereby increased ; on the contrary, it is upset permanently in one direction. Owing to its aggressively severe nature, the dominant idea releases further conflict-tensions, the mastery of which imposes fresh tasks on the mental apparatus. The ' super-ego ' character of the dominant idea makes it intelligible to us that the attempt to master these tensions first takes shape as a depression, and equally that there occurs a heightening of oral instinctual tension. The resolution of the tension so produced can no longer be accomplished entirely by endo-psychic means. We have come to understand that the symptom, which originally rejected oral gratification, at another stage enforces it and so releases the addiction in the form of a symptom with two phases.

But we have already stated by way of introduction to these remarks that the structure of the preliminary depression does not by any means assume an invariable form. The case under discussion—in which the driving force behind the addiction is a monosymptomatic psychosis in the form of an idea, which in its turn automatically heightens oral instinctual tension and so leads to the addiction—is to be regarded merely as a specific type of addiction.

In other cases of addiction, the preliminary depression will be supported on instinctual conflicts whose structure is different, although they all have this much in common, that the accompanying urgent tension with its depressive stamp is no longer capable of being mastered wholly by endo-psychic means. Its action is directed externally, like an instinct, and it compels discharge of tension through the fixed course of the addiction.

We know [19] that the ego carries on a struggle against the primary instinctual conflict, and that only in quite isolated cases is this brought to an end by means of a single act of symptom-formation. The constant pressure of the addiction, which is directed externally like an instinct, gives us a typical example of this struggle of the ego against

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[19] Freud, *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst.*

the instinctual conflict, and it seems to us that from this point of view we could subsume addiction within a scheme of more general validity.

In general, after the process of symptom-formation the ego must either come to terms with the symptom or else overcome the new conflict-tension which the symptom has created. This succeeds most simply in cases of conversion-hysteria. In the obsessional neurosis, the struggle is already more noticeable and persistent. But it is characteristic of neurosis that the struggle is carried on within the institutions—id—ego—super-ego—composing the mental personality, and that the environment is not drawn into the process.

It is altogether different with the psychoses. The disturbance of equilibrium, the psychotic process, disrupts the connection with the environment. The attempt at cure has as its task to re-establish this connection. So long as a measure of equilibrium—if only of a pathological kind—has not been attained, the mechanism of projection will be kept in operation, and the tension of affect discharged along a path leading from within outwards. The constant pressure of this tension in this sense effects alterations in the environment, and works *alloplastically*.

This course is reversed in melancholia. The hated object (the object, that is, in regard to which the libidinal relation experienced a rent) is taken into the ego and so causes an alteration there. The direction followed in re-establishing object-relations leads from without inwards, and melancholia is in this sense *autoplastic*. We know that an oral disposition, fixation and regression provide the necessary conditions for the operation of this mechanism.

It is very much the same with the mechanism active in addiction. Here too, it is not possible to master the tension of conflict endopsychically. This obliges the mental apparatus, in conformity with its tendency to seek peace and release from tension, to establish a connection with the environment, and the path along which it does so (in contrast with the paranoid process) is from without inwards. Quite independently of the nature of the neurotic or psychotic process which maintains the preliminary depression, repeated attempts are made in addiction to resolve inward disquiet by means of *incorporation*. I would remind you of the affinity with the perversions, and of the symbolic significance of drug-substances, which act as partial or substitute objects and by a fresh investment of Eros seek to form fresh syntheses. But a final adjustment cannot be compassed, since

the forces in the ego making for unity have already been exhausted in the primary conflict. The discharge of the emotional tension arising out of the primary instinctual conflict, or due to the primary symptom, takes place *autoplastically*, an attempt being made to effect an alteration in the ego by means of the drug which is taken from the external world and incorporated in the ego. The path of incorporation is oral and is in this instance especially indicated and favoured by the regression to the oral stage. Thus it cannot cause us surprise that our knowledge of the workings of the oral mechanism is among the first and the most secure of our acquisitions in this field of investigation.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE FESTIVAL OF CHRISTMAS[1]

BY

LUDWIG JEKELS

VIENNA

I trust that you are not entertaining too high expectations of this present contribution, for I can assure you it is a quite unpretentious study.

In order that you may not be disappointed, I must preface what I have to say by explaining that, in the problem with which I have attempted to deal, there are, as it were, three possible cross-sections : psycho-analytical, historical and religious. In order to do justice to all three I should require at least as many months as I have had weeks of preparation. In the picture which I present to you there is therefore, if I may so put it, considerable foreshortening.

For this reason my treatment of the psycho-analytical section is subject to somewhat unusual restrictions : I have had to stop short in the middle stratum. For, in order to go deeper, it would be absolutely necessary to link up this theme with the whole body of Christlore, and this would carry us far outside the scope of the present paper.

Those of you who are psycho-analysts will, I fear, inevitably experience some disappointment at the outset.

When we come to the historical section I feel some doubt in my own mind whether the relations which I have tried to demonstrate really exist largely in my own phantasy. So far as I am aware, our material rests upon no firm historical basis and therefore it is extraordinarily difficult to ascertain with any certainty whether the course of events actually was as I have depicted it, or whether it merely might have been so. I am quite prepared for the historians amongst you to

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[1] Read at a meeting of the Finnish-Swedish Psycho-Analytical Society, December 13, 1934.

Immediately after the reading of this paper, which was written for the Christmas season, I was informed of Erich Fromm's paper ' Die Entwicklung des Christusdogmas ' (*Imago*, Bd. XVI, 1930), of the existence of which I had hitherto been unaware. Many of the ideas which I here put forward as conjectures are shown by Fromm, on the evidence of history, to be facts, and he has explored their origin in social and depth-psychology far more exhaustively than I myself. It is therefore only right that I should refer those interested in the subject to Fromm's paper, while gladly conceding to him priority of publication.

be indignant and to accuse me of amateurishness, incompetence and ignorance. But you will find no clink in my armour, for my reply is that it is all your fault! Why do you scold us amateurs? Why do you not do the job yourselves? If you would only appropriate our method and apply it to the material with which you are so vastly more familiar than we are! No doubt you would do it far better than we can—and certainly far better than you have hitherto done it yourselves!

Finally, as regards those of you whose standpoint is that of religion I think I may say that, relatively, you have the least grounds of all for dissatisfaction with my essay, for you must admit that it might have been worse!

With this preface let us turn to the subject of our discussion.

The problem which I present for your consideration is that of the psychological meaning of the festival of Christmas and is, I think, a perfectly legitimate subject of inquiry even for an orthodox Christian. In asserting this I am supported by the following passage taken from a work by Usener, a scholar of deep religious convictions who, at the end of last century, began an historical examination of the subject, so far as I know the first to be attempted. 'From the time of the Apostles the death and resurrection of Christ—the pledges of our salvation—were celebrated with due solemnity, but nearly three centuries had passed before there was any general feeling that the Church should observe as a feast that day which was the starting-point of the work of redemption, "the mother of all festivals", . . . the birthday of Jesus Christ. There is no word in the Gospels of the month or day, or even of the time of year, when the birth of the Saviour took place, unlike the founders of the Greek Schools of philosophy, unlike the testator who bequeaths to his heirs a rich inheritance, the Founder of our religion left no direction that His birthday should be kept in remembrance by a yearly or monthly festival'.

Now this is not an isolated opinion, peculiar to Usener; it is a point upon which all who have studied the subject are agreed. For example, Meyer of Zürich expresses himself as follows: 'The solemn celebration of special days in the life of Jesus was contrary to the temper and the opinions of the early Christians. . . . It did not occur to men's minds that the birthday of Christ should be observed as a festival; Origen, deeply versed in the Scriptures, pointed out, three centuries later, that in the whole Bible there is no instance of a righteous man's celebrating his birthday; we read of it only in the

case of Pharaoh and Herod, the enemies of God. At the end of the fourth century A.D., Arnobius derided the pagan custom of celebrating the birthdays of the gods, as though gods could be born or draw breath for the first time'. It can surely be but rarely that a student of history finds himself in such complete agreement with psychoanalysts as Usener is when he goes on to say in this connection: 'The exact time of year at which this birth took place could not be discovered and promulgated as the result of any process of historical logic; those who arrived at it were influenced by religious emotion or conformed to the modes of *mythological* thinking. It is worth while to observe how in the origin of a festival so solemn, so deeply rooted in the hearts of us all, this mode of thought prevailed, unconscious and, for that very reason, proceeding with the inevitable logic of the laws of Nature'.

In a list of Roman bishops, drawn up in 335 A.D., that year is reckoned as beginning on December 25, so that this date is first of all marked out as the first day of the New Year. In a Calendar of Martyrs, however, for the year 354 A.D., the following note appears against New Year's Day, i.e. December 25: 'Christ was born in Bethlehem in Judæa'. We know further that the Emperor Constantine allowed the festival to be observed at the Roman Court in the years 354 to 360. All this makes it practically certain that the festival was instituted by the Church. Hence our question as to the meaning of the celebration of Christmas should really be formulated thus: What motives had the Church in instituting this festival and by what tendencies was she probably influenced?

The psychological importance of the problem is, I think, in no way diminished when we state that we are dealing with an action by ecclesiastical authorities. If anyone questions this opinion, he evidently fails to understand the position of the Church in those days and her relation to the people: he is judging by present-day standards. It is sufficient for me to emphasize the fact that, at that period, although the early Church could record considerable success under the rule of Constantine the Great, Catholicism being actually declared to be the State religion, she was nevertheless in perpetual conflict with the old, pagan religion, the Neo-Platonists and, finally, with the Oriental religions which, thirty years later under Julian the Apostate, achieved a notable triumph. The state of militancy and constant insecurity probably kept the still young Church from throwing overboard those ideological contents which, as she developed, had found their way from

the living heart of the people into her system. We have only to recall how the profound popular interest in ecclesiastical questions gave rise to intense excitement on almost every occasion when some important dogma was in dispute, in order to realize how close was the bond which then existed between Church and people, how the pulses of both beat, as it were, to the same rhythm. This vivid empathy into popular feeling is quite excellently illustrated by the very subject we are discussing, for within a single decade the festival of Christmas established itself throughout the whole gigantic Roman Empire, penetrating even to Egypt and Palestine! Can we doubt that the Church was thereby giving expression to a popular craving? But what was that craving?

The answer to this question is, I think, suggested by the choice of the date. The twenty-fifth of December is, as we know, the day of the winter solstice; the shortest day is past and the sun seems, as it were, to be new. So this day—this *natalis Solis invicti*—is the birthday of the Unconquered One. The Orient had a strong and splendid cult of the sun, and its gods bore the title 'Invincible'. This seems to have been taken over by the Romans: in the late-Roman, pagan Calendar, December 25 appears as the birthday of the *Invictus*. The cult of the Sun God was closely connected with that of the Emperor, who enjoyed the god's special protection and companionship. After a victory, Aurelian dignified him with the title of god of the Court and Empire—and it was common for coins to be stamped with his image. 'Popular reverence for the sun', says Meyer, 'and religious enthusiasm at the season when the days lengthened were still alive in the heart of the people, . . . the leaders of the Church, too, shared at bottom in this feeling and this it was which influenced their thoughts and calculations so that they chose as the date of Christ's nativity the twenty-fifth of December, the time of the turn of the year. For Christ has actually conquered the Sun God and it is fitting that the Church in her triumph should do honour to Him on this day'.

This is certainly a reasonable interpretation of an allegorical relation which, it must be admitted, is not very obscure. But, misled by its very transparency, these investigators have evidently overlooked the fact that this idea of the winter solstice may have a far deeper symbolical meaning. I personally have no doubt that this 'turning' implies also a transformation.

This transformation may in the first place have had reference to the sun itself, in the sense that the old sun of the past year was changed into a new, young sun; in other words, the new, young sun took the

place of the old sun. For, as Meyer tells us, ' in ancient times it was very general for the sun, when the shortest day was past, to be called in the vigorous popular phrase "the new" or "young" sun. Poets, astronomers and orators have made use of this idea '.

Secondly, I think it is very natural to assume that the change thus indicated had reference also to the coming change in the seasons, the passing of the reign of winter and the approach of spring, especially when we remember that the countries originally concerned were of the East and South. And so we see the second deeper meaning in the symbolical reference to the displacement of aged winter by youthful spring. I can quote evidence, though of an indirect nature, in support of this view. In yet earlier times, as far back as the second century, attempts had been made to select a certain day in the year as the date of Christ's nativity. This was done on the initiative of over-zealous individuals, and the dates suggested found no general acceptance, all of them being regarded as arbitrary and by no means certain. But the interesting point is this : in most cases such dates as March 28, April 19–20, May 20–21 were proposed, i.e. all of them days in the springtime. The author whom I have already quoted was struck by this fact, for he writes : ' In spring, when new life burgeons ', but his attention was focussed so exclusively upon the allegorical meaning that he never even thought of a deeper significance.

However, the strongest evidence of the correctness of this symbolical interpretation of the solstice is that, from quite a differen angle, we arrive at the same conclusion, the same antithesis of old and new, the replacing of the old by the new.

It can hardly be questioned that the festival of Christmas is very closely connected with the idea of the turn of the year, i.e. the replacing of the old year by the new.

We have already observed this close connection when we noted that the Church dated the beginning of the year from December 25. I believe that in selecting this date the Church was influenced by her unconscious perception of the symbolism in the situation, far more than by the motive usually ascribed to her, namely, that ' every Christian system must begin with the nativity of Christ '. And, on the other hand, almost all the scholars who have studied the subject are agreed that the festival of Christmas, as we know it, had its origin in the New Year's festival observed in the latter days of ancient Rome, the calends of January representing, as it were, the ancient stem upon which was grafted the Christmas feast. This view is held

by Billinger and Tyle and also by Nielssen of Lund, who was the most distinguished Swedish historian of his time. Nielssen, however, held that there were also affinities between Christmas and the Nordic festival of Yule.

In ancient Rome the New Year was originally celebrated on March 1. The principal ceremony—and this has a special bearing on the hypothesis I am submitting to you—was the entering of the new, annually elected consuls upon their office in place of the retiring consuls of the previous year. So important was this feature of the New Year's festival that when, subsequently, it was decreed that the term of office should date from January 1, that date was adopted for New Year's Day also.

Now in Imperial times the calends of January had a twofold importance. In the first place they were marked by a solemn State festival, the principal feature of which was, as I have said, the conferring of office upon the new consuls, who, with a large escort, made their first appearance on the Capitol before the assembled Senate. But the calends of January were, besides, a popular festival of immense importance, lasting for five days. It is impossible in this paper to give even a brief account of the many traditional practices and customs which characterized this festival and which the untiring research of scholars has brought to our knowledge. I must, however, quote one or two passages from Nielssen's work so that you may see how strongly this Roman feast resembles our modern Christmas celebrations, both in spirit and in many of its principal features. 'The festival of New Year', he says, '. . . had penetrated to the remotest corners of the Empire, and with one accord the people took part in it'. 'Throughout the Empire, to its farthest boundaries, the calends of January were celebrated. The people looked forward to them with the utmost eagerness. Festal robes were worn and a stream of presents poured forth on all sides, from the country to the town and from village to village. Trains of men and beasts, laden with gifts, crowded the high-roads and the footpaths. Scarcely had the day dawned when the people began to decorate their doors with branches of laurel and green garlands. Large quantities of valuable presents were carried through the streets of the town; people delighted in giving no less than in receiving'.

This brief illustration must suffice to show that, on the testimony of those who have devoted their researches to this subject, there is a strong resemblance between the Roman celebrations and our own.

It is high time that we turned our attention to the crux of the problem : what is the true meaning of this purpose, whose presence in the Christmas festival we have gone so far afield to demonstrate—the ousting of the old by the new ? What, if I may so put it, is its ultimate real source ? Now, if psycho-analysis is sure of anything, it is of the answer to this question.

For here we have arrived by way of symbolism at the very same fact that has been proved, a thousand times over and beyond all possibility of doubt, in our analytic experience with neurotics : the fact, namely, of the son's rivalry with his father.

It is a theme which is embodied in some of the greatest works of poets as well as in countless myths, fairy-tales and legends, now in one symbolic guise, now in another.

For instance, we read how old Macbeth,[2] with his blood-guilt, is conquered by the Forest of Dunsinane, i.e. by the soldiers concealed by green branches. Seventeen years ago, on the evidence of certain established facts in the life of Shakespeare, I suggested and, I think, proved conclusively that behind the nature-myth underlying the story of Macbeth there lies this theme of the son's rivalry with his father. In this connection I quoted the old Hessian legend of King Greenwood : ' There was once a king who had an only daughter, endowed with wonderful gifts. One day there came an enemy, a king called Greenwood, who besieged the other king in his castle. Long they were beleaguered and always the daughter spoke words of encouragement to the king, her father, in his castle. At last came the month of May. Suddenly the daughter saw the enemy's army approaching, bearing green branches. Thereupon fear and trembling seized her, for she knew that all was lost, and she said to her father :

> Father, give yourself up as a captive,
> For here comes the green tree walking '. [3]

Here we have the same symbolism as in Macbeth, but a much more important point is this : this story, as is transparently clear, embodies the son's wish-phantasy of occupying the first place in the woman's (i.e. the mother's) affections and here we have the root cause of his

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[2] If the play is interpreted as a Nature-myth, Macbeth, of course, stands for winter.

[3] ' Vater, gebt Euch gefangen
Der grüne Baum kommt gegangen.'

antagonistic attitude to his father. This is the primal source from which all his subsequent social relations derive their strength and colour, by which, in short, their qualities are determined. I feel that it is quite outside the scope of this paper to do justice to this mythological problem, perhaps the most important of them all. For the present it must suffice if I point out that a man's relation to his father is, as it were, the prototype upon which a whole series of social relations are modelled, e.g. that of subject and ruler, employee and employer, servant and master, and so on, and that on it are based and in it are centred in the minds of individuals not only the ideals of equality, liberty and independence, but also the opposite mental tendencies.

The relation of son to father will occupy us in the further course of this essay. For the moment we will leave the general proposition and go back to our specific problem: the meaning of the festival of Christmas. Now we find that the first question that suggests itself is this: what bearing upon this problem has the son-father relation, which we have just stripped of its symbolic disguise? How can it be said to play a part in the celebration of Christmas?

To answer this question we must review the circumstances in which the Church decreed that Christmas should be observed.

The soil from which the festival sprang, the spiritual and mental atmosphere in which, *as I conjecture*, it originated, was the greatest doctrinal dispute which the Christian Church has ever known. I refer to the Arian controversy, which began about thirty years before Christmas was first observed and was terminated, about thirty years later, simply by a decree of the Emperor Theodosius the Great.

From the end of the second century onwards the controversy between the gnostics and their opponents gave rise to an extraordinary outburst of theological activity; numerous questions were propounded and discussed by theologians and the various schools of thought attacked one another violently, each striving to prevail in the Church.

The conflict of opinions, which lasted for a whole century, was above all concerned with the question of the nature of Jesus, the origin of His person and His twofold relation, i.e. to God and to man. Two explanations were put forward: the one led from the earthly plane to the heavenly while, according to the other, a heavenly being had come down to earth. The first problem gave rise to a second: were we to see in Jesus the revelation of a second Person in the Deity or did the Godhead remain one and undivided? This was the real

point in dispute and this it was which in the subsequent course of the Arian controversy roused men's minds to fever-heat.

In this controversy the so-called *Logos-Christologists*, who derived their doctrine from Origen, were arrayed against the *Monarchians*, who claimed to uphold the monotheistic view, according to which there was in the Godhead but one Person Who alone was supreme. The exponents of this theory did not concede the Divinity of the Son, although in all other respects they held Him in the utmost reverence. The followers of Origen, on the other hand, conceived of the Logos as the divine reason manifested in the world, the being, the substance, the essence of the Godhead. The Logos, they held, existed from eternity in the Father and was of Him alone, but the Father Himself raised up the Logos to be a separate Person. Or, more concretely and precisely: the Father caused a second personal centre to come into being within that substance which hitherto He alone indwelt, so that a second Divine Person was 'begotten', yet without division or cleavage of the substance, as in the procreation of human beings.

We see that both these doctrines are based on religious-metaphysical modes of thought which remind us forcibly of the mental processes in obsessional neurosis which, as we know, has a strong tendency towards transcendentalism. But there is another point to note:—

In the light of psycho-analysis these opposing schools of thought—in whose formulas and concepts there is, characteristically, far more mention of Father and Son than of God and Jesus—differ from one another by no means so widely as was supposed. The views of both parties in the controversy have far more points in common than points of divergence, for in both the fundamental psychic tendency is one and the same: the difference lies only in the emphasis placed on various conceptions. And their common platform is that to which I have already alluded: the attitude of the son to the father, that is termed *ambivalent*, by psycho-analysis, that inescapable psychological fate which decrees that, side by side with his love and respect for his father, there are in the son's mind powerful hostile tendencies which impel him to enter into rivalry with his father, to dispute his superiority, shake off his authority and, if not actually to supplant him, at least to rank himself as his father's equal.

And now I would ask this question. The strict Monarchian Arius did not, as I have pointed out, concede to Jesus a share in the Godhead but held that there was 'at the centre of His personality a pre-existent, heavenly being, "the Son," created by the Father out of

nothingness before all time.' Is there not in this conception, whereby Arius sought to enthrone the Son as near as possible to the Father, the same ambivalent tendency, only in a lesser degree, which in the Christologist Athanasius reached its climax in the assertion of the full divinity of the Son? Indeed, the two protagonists in the controversy differed not in their fundamental dogmas but in the degree of their ambivalence.

No wonder, then, that, with such a failure to recognize their own aims and such a lack of clarity as to their own intentions, the opposing parties in the Arian controversy could arrive at no decision, so that it continued for fifty-five years and was terminated only by an Imperial decree.

Nevertheless, even in the Logos-Christologists, ambivalence did not reach its zenith. For, they, no more than the Arians, could conceive of the Son as wholly independent of the Father, indebted to Him for nothing, as it were self-existent. Indeed, Origen's own doctrine of the Logos had laid stress on this very inequality between Father and Son: the Father made 'of Himself', the Son 'of the Father', begotten of Him from all eternity, without beginning, perfect God and unchangeable as the Father, *inferior to Him only in this—that He derived His existence from the Father.*

The same standpoint was taken by Athanasius, in whom the ambivalence was more pronounced in that he maintained even more uncompromisingly the Divinity of the Son. We read in Müller: 'Athanasius, on the other hand, did not assert that the Father and the Son were perfectly co-equal. On the contrary he assigned to the Father the divine substance, from which the Son was begotten. Thus the Father is ἀρχή and the Son γέννημα. His followers went on to declare that the Son was ὁμουσίος and ὁμοίος, but never did they claim for Him complete equality with the Father'.

In my view the introduction of the festival of Christ's nativity indicates a growing tendency to regard the Son as wholly co-equal with the Father, indicates, that is to say, a growing ambivalence. The Son, though born as man, yet already co-equal with God the Father: Himself God, not 'of the Father' but as it were by virtue of His own essential Divinity—this is the fundamental dogma implied in the inauguration of the Christmas feast.

In support of this theory let me cite the following well attested fact. Long before the birthday of Jesus was celebrated, the Early Church observed (right up to the fourth century) a Christmas festival

on the sixth of January, the Feast of the Epiphany. There were two reasons which probably decided the choice of this particular date: (1) In Egypt the virgin-birth of the god, Aion, was celebrated on that day and (2) on the same day the Christian gnostics—the Basilideans—commemorated the baptism of Christ. Now the fact that the Church chose this date shews very plainly that there was felt to be a connection between the baptism and the birth of Christ, and what this was we may learn from the doctrine of Basilides. He held that, originally, Jesus was merely man but that, at His baptism, the spirit and mind of God, in the form of the dove, entered into Him. Thus, it was only at His baptism that Christ the Redeemer was born: in that moment God was made manifest upon earth.

About the middle of the fourth century the Feast of the Nativity was suddenly dissociated from that of the Epiphany and a special date—December 25—was assigned to it. That is to say, the Son was declared to be God, not merely through the indwelling of the Spirit of God, i.e. through the Father, but as co-equal with the Father through His own essential Divinity. This, I take it, is the meaning of Meyer's explanation of the fact of the separate celebration of Christmas: 'If the nativity was held to be the beginning of the life of the God-Man, Jesus, there could no longer be any question of His deriving His significance as the Christ from His baptism, by which He assumed the office of the Messiah. Thus the prominence given to the Feast of the Nativity . . . was a protest against a less exalted view of the person of Christ'.

This action on the part of the Church was, indeed, revolutionary and therefore significant, for behind the façade of mystical religion lay the assertion of the democratic principle of equality.

What, then, were the Church's reasons for taking such a step? What impelled her to venture upon it? Documentary evidence is entirely lacking, but I believe that it is at least probable that the Church at this point had the people behind her and that, with her genius for empathy, in this instance if in any she sought to respond to a deep-felt popular need—nay, to a popular demand. In my introductory remarks I reminded you that the tie between Church and people was in those days beyond all comparison closer than it is now: the Church was in actual fact the mouthpiece of the Christian congregations, who still were in the minority.

Thus the concerns of her people were then, to a far greater extent than now, those of the Church and, conversely, the Church could be

sure of the keenest interest on the people's part in her problems and conflicts.

One way in which this interest shewed itself was that the whole Christian community participated with the utmost enthusiasm in the theological speculation of the age.

Thus it was while the Arian controversy continued to rage; for it is to the period of that controversy that we must return if we would study the problem upon which the people, at any rate in the East, were concentrating most intently and which they made their most intimate concern, so that the words *υἱός* and *λόγος* echoed in the streets like battle-cries. The Church historian, Schubert, explains this eagerness by pointing out that in those days knowledge of God had an independent value of its own. For, he says, the ecclesiastical leaders of the people, and especially the great Alexandrians, completely altered the relation between faith and knowledge, fusing the two into one. According to their teaching, knowledge was faith and faith knowledge, but personal cognition, i.e. knowledge, ensured a more direct union with the divine Logos. He believes that this was why it was to the interest of every earnest Christian, even amongst the uneducated, personally to master these problems.

While not questioning the accuracy of Schubert's assertion I am not at all inclined to accept it as a complete and adequate explanation of the extraordinary degree of affect manifested by the people when participating in theological controversy. We read, for instance, that in the streets of Alexandria and Constantinople heads were broken over the formula of the homoousia.

I have much less hesitation in conjecturing that here, in the guise of mystical religion, an outlet was afforded for affects which had their source in the exigencies of a social situation in which tension was high and differences were sharp.

But why, you will ask, did the affects in question assume these mystical trappings?

The question is not merely a perfectly legitimate one but is of importance and that not for our problem alone: it touches on a more general problem which, as far as I know, has not yet been solved, namely, why no mass-movement is ever free from the element of mysticism. I need only instance the great French Revolution in which, after the old religious values had been overthrown, men yet reached out after a divinity, even though they did but deify reason.

The clue, as I believe, is to be found in the conception of *sin and*

guilt with their inevitable penalties—a notion introduced by Christianity, i.e. if I am not mistaken, by the Apostle Paul.

Here, however, at the risk of repeating something with which many of you are already familiar, I must interpolate a few remarks on the psycho-analytical conception of the sense of guilt. Our view is that it represents some sort of endo-psychic perception of a state in which one part of the personality, the ego, is called to account—as it were, indicted—by another part, the super-ego.

Fundamentally the super-ego represents the extension of the early infantile relation of the individual to his parents but with this very important modification, that gradually the sensual-erotic tone of that earliest relation disappears and another aspect of it is stressed : the parents are felt and desired to be a protective, guardian institution.

As life goes on, the super-ego develops into a mental structure, the foundation-stone of which is the so-called parent-imagos and which is built up through the incorporation into the super-ego, as it were, of everything that represents authority. Here are embodied those who brought up the individual as a child and other governing forces of real life—civic authorities, rulers, communal feeling, scientific opinion and, besides these, metaphysical conceptions such as Fate and God—all these contribute their orders, instructions, rules and admonitions.

It can be no wonder that the super-ego, derived from such sources as these, is invariably felt by the ego to be a vastly superior institution whose authority and rule are absolute and which exercises over the ego itself a perpetual supervision, criticism and censorship.

Now a particularly important point for us to note is that the relation of the majority of people to their super-ego remains precisely the same as in their childhood, the period of their earliest development. As I have already remarked, their desire is that the super-ego should with unwearying vigilance protect and guard them and keep them secure in the vicissitudes of life. To make certain of this sheltering care the ego does its best to obey the demands of the super-ego, treating them as inviolable decrees, and it is the failure to observe these which gives rise to the sense of guilt.

The ego, dreading lest it should be abandoned and exposed to all manner of dangers by the super-ego, trembles at the thought of provoking its displeasure and resentment, while conversely every hardship and mischance in life is construed as a punishment and a chastisement inflicted by the super-ego.

Here we have the answer to our question why group-manifestations

are associated with mysticism. The reason is that human beings inevitably translate their experiences, on whatever plane of life, into terms of the super-personal, i.e. the metaphysical, holding them to be the dispensation of God, of Destiny, etc. And this is why a knowledge of individual psychology is not only indispensable but supremely important for the understanding of group-phenomena.

So we arrive at the final survey of the main problem which we are considering. The members of the Christian congregations laboured under a sense of guilt which the zeal of the still relatively young Church had fostered till it was very highly developed. In their unconscious minds, where they were identified with the Son Jesus, they seized upon the true tendency of the theological controversy. Undeceived by all the formulas with their attempts at compromise and by all the half-statements of the protagonists they penetrated to the true heart of the matter. For what it really amounted to was nothing less than an attempt to dethrone God, the collective Super-Ego, with which the super-ego of the individual had such close relations. True, the attempt was not carried very far but there could be no doubt of its revolutionary character.

Thus the passionate interest of the people in the theological controversy was but the expression of their revolt against God, and, moreover, a revolt arising out of despair.

For that same sense of guilt upon which Christianity had laid so strong an emphasis inevitably awoke in them the feeling that all the distress and deprivation they endured as the result of social inequality were inflicted upon them as a punishment by the super-ego—no matter whether it were collective or individual. And all this in spite of their prayers, repentance and expiation.

Their passionate feeling was, then, a flare-up of rebellion against a super-ego whose harshness, cruelty and implacability oppressed them so grievously. And how readily were they confirmed in this rebellious mood when they looked back only a short way into the past! Scarcely fifty years had elapsed since the persecution by Diocletian and scarcely a hundred since that under the Emperors Decius and Valerius: had not these persecutions, with all their martyrdoms and horrors, been inflicted upon them—or, if not inflicted, at least permitted—by this same super-ego? And what of the hecatombs offered up by the early Christians? All this cruelty perpetrated upon the best of His sons! Had it not wrung from the most perfect of them all the reproach, 'My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me?'

Away, then, with such a monstrous super-ego ! And evidence was in fact not lacking to show that man can dethrone a God or overthrow his super-ego ! Where were they now, all the deities of antiquity and of the Orient ? Their worship, if it had not wholly disappeared, had at least suffered a severe reverse, its power broken and its credit gone.

And had not the Emperors been deprived of their divine attributes ? Divus Augustus—god and emperor in one—enjoying his apotheosis for centuries in his own temples decorated with statues of his person, to which rich oblations were offered—now shorn of his divinity by the decree of Constantine, the temple rid of the imperial statue, a public place of honour without religious significance !

Away, then, with this super-ego !

Let them hear no more of a divine governance, against which, fifteen hundred years later, a great poet was to utter the reproach :

> ' You suffer us, miserable sinners, to fall
> And then into torment deliver us all ! ' [4]

No, the God of their worship should be Christ, Who had redeemed mankind from all guilt and Whose gospel love should be their pledge of freedom from future guilt.

But in a deeper stratum of the mind there rose this wish, born of a grandiose identification with Jesus : If the Son be co-equal with the Father, be very God, then there is neither supremacy nor subordination : all is equality, i.e. unity and harmony, and therefore there is no more guilt.

Thus, when she ordained the celebration of Christ's Nativity, the Church fulfilled the wish of the people, yet only half fulfilled it, for God the Father still remained enthroned.

As you probably know, analysis sees in myths the age-long dreams of mankind and maintains that their purpose, like that of dreams, is wish-fulfilment. Thus, if we examine our myth, we find in the birth of Christ—the God-Man, in Whom man is co-equal with God and God with man, so that all inequalities are done away with—the fulfilment of the unconquerable wish for equality.

Perhaps this is the unconscious basis of the title borne by the Messiah from of old : ' The Sun of Righteousness '.

And, if you have any lingering doubts, perhaps the following

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[4] ' Ihr lasst den Armen schuldig werden
Dann überlasst Ihr ihn der Pein '.

consideration will put an end to them. Some of you who are familiar with my material may have been struck by the fact that, when speaking of the antecedents of the Christian festival, I made no mention of the *Saturnalia*, the Roman feast of ecstatic revelry, which ended on December 17. I said nothing about it until now because the Saturnalia gradually merged into the celebration of the Calends of January, which took over many of the rites of the older festival, amongst them (and here I am quoting) ' the characteristic Saturnalian feature of the *libertas Decembris* : equality between masters and servants, in which the relation was sometimes actually reversed, so that slaves were served by their lords '.

In conclusion, let me say that in this paper I have not related to you a fairy-tale such as it is customary to tell in the evenings at Yuletide, for I believe it to be based upon a profound psychological truth.

THE UNCONSCIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF HAIR

BY

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While it is generally recognized that psychotic or symptomatic behaviour has relatively little reality causation, and must therefore be activated by endopsychic tensions, typically ' normal ' behaviour is readily assumed, even by some psychologists, to be amply conditioned by environmental reality. It is, however, sometimes instructive to attempt to define the rôles played by the pleasure principle and the reality principle respectively in some well-established form of ' normal ' behaviour.

Close examination of such ' normal ' behaviour as our daily habits of dress [1] and toilet reveals that these also have their principal cause in endopsychic tension. The attempt to explain such behaviour as a logical response to reality demands can be shewn to be a process having the defensive advantage of enabling the instinctive basis to be ignored.[2]

From the most primitive times, man has given much time to various forms of interference with his Hair. The primary advantage of this behaviour is, perhaps, that it keeps his hair out of his eyes and from interfering with his activities. Also the hair growing about the mouth is kept out of his food and prevented from collecting nasal and oral secretions. But if this should be considered a sufficient reality advantage to justify its daily removal by shaving, it must be admitted that the pubic hair, at least in women, is subject to similar disadvantages.

Clinical Material

Since these daily activities do not seem to derive their impetus from purely reality considerations, we turn to some clinical material to see if this can throw any light on their source.

A patient dreams as follows :—

He is sitting in a 'bus beside a young woman with brilliant red hair. He puts his hand on her head and presses her hair. (Feelings of pleasure.)

His associations :—

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[1] J. C. Flugel, ' The Psychology of Clothes '.

[2] The work of Dr. Ernest Jones has thrown considerable light on the defensive importance of such processes of rationalization.

' I don't know anyone with red hair like this girl had. My girl has fair, golden hair '. (At this point he suddenly flushes up, becomes silent, and finally confesses :)

' The other day I succeeded in exposing her pubic region, and was delighted to find that her pubic hair had a distinct reddish tinge. I laughed and called it " Ginger nob ", and put my hand on it—just as I put my hand on the girl's head in the dream. I have only just thought of this '.

I quote this dream as a simple and clear example of displacement upwards from the pubic hair to the hair of the head.

Another patient dreams as follows :—

' You (the analyst) were rubbing some stuff into my hair—like a white lather of soap. My mother was there and was very anxious to help '.

I asked what my rubbing his hair might mean. He said :—

' Well, I suppose you might be curing me—for that is what I am here for, and what you are here for. Curing me means making me normal sexually '. (His sexual life is limited to homosexual phantasy.)

Analyst : ' This white lather of soap ? '

Patient : (Silence—then he laughs and says :) ' I had a ridiculous thought just now. I thought of semen '.

At the next session the patient says :—

' I have been thinking about the dream. I will try to remember the theory I arrived at. The first thought that came to me was that you may have been cutting my hair, but it was not you, it was my father that wanted my hair cut shorter. I used to hate it. You were doing the reverse—making it grow '.

' Now, I have my hair cut as I want it—not too short. I thought my father noticed this the other day when I visited him, and I thought to myself : " He can go to hell ! " '

' I have thought that you were restoring my hair in the dream. Treating it in some way . . . and now I remember that my hair was *short*—shorter than I ever have it nowadays. I have a feeling that it had something to do with castration. Short hair is in the nature of a castration. It is part of discipline. In the army hair is cut short, and the same in prisons. Monks used to shave the head completely '.

' In the dream the emotion of anxiety was my mother's, but it actually indicates *my* real emotions and anxiety about the analysis. I keep thinking, " How can I get some progress ? How can I get better ? " I suppose it really means, " How can I get normal sexually ? " (How can I get my penis back ?) You are helping me to get it back. That, of course, is what you are doing in the dream. Rubbing my hair to make it

grow. The white lather, of course, is semen. The short hair is the castrated penis, which is being restored by you through the analysis. It reaches a stage where it can emit semen '.

A third patient dreams as follows :—

' I had my hair cut, and somebody (a lady, I think) remarked that it was very nice. Then I went out and had it done again. The barber cut off the same amount again. As a result it was very short. I put plenty of grease on it and plastered it down. People thought it looked absurd and laughed at it '.

Later on it transpired that the most striking thing about this dream was the nature of the second haircut, or rather the result thereof. It was that the head was left with several avenues of complete baldness. The avenues ran parallel from the forehead to the back of the head. Each avenue was one inch wide and four inches or five inches long. They were separated from each other by a row of single hairs. These rows stood erect one inch high. Each of the hair-free avenues was, therefore, one inch wide by one inch deep by four or five inches long. It was these erect hairs that the dreamer carefully brushed flat to cover the avenues of baldness. He was at some pains to do this.

His associations to this very striking dream are so voluminous that I shall have to select and condense, although the result will not do it justice.

Briefly, the woman is his mother ; the haircut pleased her, so he went still further and had still more cut.

He says :—

' I have brushed down what was left for the same reason. . . . To please the woman. I think I must have some sort of ideal woman in my mind '. (The ideal woman is the mother, to achieve whose love he must discard the penis.)

With regard to the haircut in general, he says :—

' Haircut is conforming to an ideal that civilisation has built up. Haircut, like other civilised acts, is the desire to conceal the nakedness of emotions and desires in order to please somebody '.

Other remarks of his are as follows :—

' I don't like to see hair standing up on end '. (He then remembers a man whom he knows, whose hair stands on end. He dislikes him for this reason. He says :) ' He is a gay dog, especially with the opposite sex. I was just the reverse of this type '.

' In the dream, after the second haircut I became an object of ridicule,

and that is what I am at the present stage of my life when I cannot enter into the fun of things, and cannot find a word to say if there is a girl about. I am in a ridiculous position '.

' It is rather a low-down business to have erect hair. Not the sort of hair that stamps a member of the upper classes. Makes me think of the " Bill Sykes " type of individual—anti-social '.

' Although there is no connection, I think of an incident as a kid. I took a cheap seat at a cinema. In the darkness I heard a noise—a drip-drip—and I could make out it was from some women in front relieving themselves on the floor. I was repulsed. A foul type of humanity—a stage between animal and human. The thought is of their genital organs and of their pubic hair '.

' I suppose the association to hair is really pubic hair. And to the erect hair—anti-social—the bold, bad penis. Erect penis is not tolerated by society ; it is anti-social, like erect hair. I might not please a woman with an erect penis. I would plaster it down like I did the erect hair. I would hide the fact, and control the desire. Desire is invariably manifested by an erect penis '.

' The idea of having to have less hair (second haircut) reminds me of the idea that I ought to have less penis. As a boy my elder brother once remarked what a hell of a big penis I had got, and that I would never get a woman to take me. I believed this bilge until the last few years '.

' I see now more or less what the dream is about. I don't like my hair for the same reason that I didn't like the erect hair or the erect penis. It was *rude*, so I had it cut and the woman was pleased. I wanted to please her so much that I went too far and ended up in this ridiculous state of almost complete baldness '.

' I tried to get back to a state of normality or to an appearance thereof by plastering down the rude erect hairs and at the same time covering the ridiculous avenues of baldness '.

' These bald avenues, one inch wide by one inch deep by four or five inches long, are the shape and size of a penis. They are the places from which the penis had been removed. They are as ridiculous and laughable as the erect hair between them is rude and anti-social. My plastering the erect hair down did away with the rudeness, at the same time as it covered the ridiculous nudity or denudity '.

It is unnecessary to call attention to the relationship between this patient's associations to his dream, and the usual social behaviour towards hair. We are all familiar with the objection to erect hair. We are all familiar with the tendency to plaster down the hair to prevent it from being unruly or untidy. We know the father who cannot bear to see his sons allowing their hair to grow too long. It is

perhaps significant that girls or women (who have no penis) are allowed by society to grow their hair rather longer than men. It is not offensive in them.

The bald patches in the dream, representing an extreme politeness, a complete castration, remind us of the social convention of being completely bald about the face and chin—of shaving.

Are we, in shaving, doing the same thing as this patient did in the dream—to please the parents (i.e. to renounce the Œdipus desire for the mother) ?

This same patient had a dream about shaving, but I shall not deal with it in detail, as we wish to get on to other matters.

Briefly, the dream was that he was about to be shaved by a particular barber. The barber put his razor across his mouth and slit it. He tasted the blood.

His associations to this barber are that he was a horrible ruffian, whom he would avoid at all costs if it came to shaving. He was forced as a boy, in spite of his fears and objections, to have his hair cut by this man.

His other associations are to an occasion on which he was operated upon for hernia. The matron of the nursing home shaved his pubic hair on the morning of the operation. He was frightened at first, but subsequently as a result of her ' operations ' he had always had a strong love attachment to her. We thus see a connection in this dream between shave, ' operation ', assault, and love.

The dream shows the patient in the feminine rôle being, not shaved, but brutally raped by the father instead. It occurs to us to think of the possible relationship of accidental cuts during shaving to an unconscious desire to make the shaving more thoroughgoing—to make it in fact not merely a castration, but even a rape, thereby perhaps compensating for the castration by experiencing a feminine gratification, as the patient did in his dream at the hands of the father. At any rate the cut, like the mutilation, seems to be something in the nature of the shave, only more extreme.

Our clinical material need not be limited to dreams. One gets actual symptoms, or even whole cases, which throw light on the subject under discussion.

I am reminded of a female patient, at the menopause, who came for treatment on account of a habit of rubbing her hair in one place. This habit was so persistent that she rubbed a hole in every cap she wore (she was a housekeeper). The history was significant :—

The habit began at fifteen years of age. She had been masturbating. (She had been rubbing her genitals—she has been rubbing her *hair* ever since.) She struggled against the impulse to masturbate, and suppressed it. It was then that she went into an orchard, and stole apples.[3] While doing so she fancied that an earwig had crept into her ear. In consequence she felt an irritation and rubbed her head above the ear. This rubbing had persisted ever since—a period of thirty years.

We can only think of one source from which such an absorbing and persistent energy could be derived.

The unconscious mechanisms at work are sufficiently clear. The unconscious incestuous phantasy accompanying the masturbation was repressed on account of strong Œdipus guilt. It escaped from repression in the form of apple stealing. The incestuous wish with its impregnation corollary expressed itself in the delusion of the earwig having penetrated her ear (vagina). Erotic (masturbation) impulses were expressed (and partly gratified) in the hair rubbing. The guilt attaching to the whole Œdipus phantasy is easily detected in the patient's state of mind and in the punishment which the neurotic habit inflicts upon her ego.

The symptom is (as are all symptoms) a compromise formation or a condensation of (genital) libido and its repression. Its relevance for our purpose is that again it is to the hair that the genital conflict has been displaced.

Dr. Eder describes how a woman suffering from pronounced castration fear (anxiety hysteria) kept putting off her shingling appointment. When at last she kept it, she was taken ill with the first cut. He refers to similar experiences in normal people and quotes a hairdresser as saying he is accustomed to his clients failing to keep their appointments. A normal woman, on the night prior to her appointment for shingling, dreamed that her son was drowned in the swimming bath, and awoke with the anxiety of a nightmare.[4]

Ernst Simmel describes the case of his boy, aged three and a half, who was playfully threatened castration with scissors by the surgeon who had circumcised him. The child who had stood the operation without alarm, became terrified at the playful threat. A year later

[3] A. S. Neill, who bases his theories entirely upon his ordinary observations of schoolchildren, affirms that stealing in children is invariably a masturbation substitute—that it arises as the result of suppression of masturbation.

[4] M. D. Eder, ' A Note on Shingling ', this JOURNAL, Vol. VI, Part 3.

he related his visit to the surgeon in great detail, but substituted ' haircut ' in place of the castration threat. Simmel says the conscious idea of cutting off the hair had taken the place of the unconscious idea of cutting off the penis.[5] (These appear to be the only two references to hair in the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS, and both papers are dated 1925.)

From a consideration of the material presented so far we can formulate a theory of our hair activities. In the first case quoted what binds the patient to his mistress is genital affect. The source of his pleasure in exposing her pubic hair is genital. His pleasure affect in the dream is experienced in pressing the head hair of the red-headed girl. We thus see that the genital affect is displaced via the pubic hair to the hair of the head.

In the second case the manifest content of the dream is :—

(1) Exceptionally short hair—shorter than the patient ever wears it nowadays. The latent content that gives rise to this is the fact that the patient *feels* castrated.

(2) Manifest content shows the analyst restoring the hair by rubbing it. The latent content is the hope that the analyst will restore not the hair but the penis by his analytical massage.

(3) The white lather is the wish fulfilment. The penis is restored and functions correctly by emission. (I think there is a deeper anal element here also.)

(4) The anxiety attributed in the dream to the mother is the patient's castration anxiety, ' How can I get my penis back ? '

In the third case we see a conflict between exhibitionism and castration manifested in considerable detail by means of the hair. For the sake of the mother, to retain her love, he has it cut more and more until he is reduced to the pitiful plight that brings him to treatment. In real life he feels castrated and an object of ridicule. He attempts to cover his castration and at the same time to control or to lay flat his erection.

We see in these cases the conflict between sexual impulses at the genital level on the one hand and the repressing forces of the super-ego or the ego on the other hand.

Can we not see the same conflict being worked out, without ever reaching a solution, in our normal daily hair activities ? They bear

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[5] Ernst Simmel, ' A Screen Memory in Statu Nascendi ', this JOURNAL, Vol. VI, Part 4.

the characteristic of every hysterical symptom, namely that, in some displaced or converted disguise, the original sexual conflict at the genital level is fruitlessly seeking solution.

An important element in the manifestation of this ' hair hysteria ' (one which is not always absent in ordinary hysterical symptoms) is that the conflict between libido and repressing forces is manifested largely in the form of exhibitionism versus castration anxiety. It is as if the hair were the only phallus we were permitted to *reveal.* Alternatively with the tendency to shew how fine it is, be proud of it and sue for its approval, is a fear that it should not be approved, expressed by brushing it flat, making sure that it is tidy, or removing it as in shaving, to avoid a still more serious castration at the hands of society. At least the anxiety is clearly present and is identical with castration anxiety. The normal concern about the hair becoming thin, falling out, alopecia, or greyness, are displacements of that anxiety.

Like all hysterical symptoms, the displacement of this exhibitionistic satisfaction and this castration anxiety from the penis to the hair saves a conflict from solution, and, therefore, the repetition goes on *ad infinitum.*

In making an attempt to systematize under the headings of Ego, Super-Ego and Id functions, the conclusions to be drawn from the foregoing, we shall, of course, continuously come upon an essential feature of psychological research—*the intrusion of the Id and Super-Ego into the domains of the Ego.* But it may nevertheless be worth making the attempt.

The Ego.—It may be the Id which causes us to grow hair, and the Super-Ego which prompts us to cut or shave it, but the adjustment between these two and external reality is the work of the Ego.

Asked for the cause of his individual hair-behaviour, any person will answer in terms of its ego-psychology. His ego requires him to do what society expects of him. He cuts his hair and shaves his beard, and, in spite of the attendant inconveniences, he feels better for it. In assessing the reason for this, the ego will lay stress on the advantages of conforming to social usage, and will, of course, omit those of which it is unconscious, namely, that he feels better because his hair-behaviour deals with the unconscious conflict between Id and Super-Ego without unduly embarrassing his Ego—that is to say *by a symptom rather than by a character change.*

Custom may blind us to the fact that this hair-behaviour is indeed a symptom rather than an essentially ego-reality behaviour, until we

are faced with unusual manifestations of it. For example it is easy to detect something beyond the borders of ego-function in the Melanesian hair-combing ritual,[6] or without looking so far afield, in the case of the lady plunged into an anxiety state by the discovery that her plucked eyebrows of single-hair width are being menaced by the growth of another row of hairs.

In addition to its function of adapting the individual to his environment (including social environment), a function of the ego is to defend itself against id demands. But is the Ego in danger of being overwhelmed by the id's insistent growth of hair ? Or is the hair merely the symbol of the real enemy—as the flag symbolises the nation ? In so far as the Ego is wasting its defensive energy against a harmless intruder, the function is a morbid one, however widely adopted by society. The Ego, severe in its defensive control of this misplaced libido, whose symbol is hair, shews a corresponding leniency to those aggressive components of the Id which have gone over to the Super-Ego, and permits the attack upon hair in a variety of more or less violent forms, from shaving and plucking to scenting and shampooing.

The Super-Ego.—It seems likely that another and more complicated mechanism has also taken place in this connection. We know that the whole person becomes a symbolic representation of the phallus, and the narcissism or love of the self (including love of the Ego) diverts genital libido from its usual object. We know that pleasure in one's own hair is clearly one of the manifestations of this narcissism, and now we see the cutting of this hair not only as Super-Ego versus libido, but as an attack by the Super-Ego upon the Ego itself, albeit an ego that has dared to have hair (i.e. phallus). The tortures inflicted in the neuroses by the Super-Ego upon the ego are here performed in a social hair-symptom instead.

We may interpret this hair-cutting as the original parental castration, now taken up with diligent and repetitive insistence by the super-ego (the parent successor) ; or we may choose to delve to a level deeper than that of the Œdipus Complex and detect here the death impulse barely disguised as aggression and repetition. For it is not only aggression (of Super-Ego) against aggressive libido (hair) that we may detect, but destructive aggression against the narcissism of the whole self. Through narcissistic mechanisms the phallus has now become the

[6] Malinowski, *The Sexual Life of Savages*, p. 253.

self (hair) and it is this which we are destroying (death-impulse) with our cuttings and shavings.

Perhaps it should be a matter for commendation of the Ego that such primitive and powerful instinct drives have been so skilfully deflected into such a harmless field of conflict.

In considering the forces arrayed against the free expression of primitive instincts in their displaced (*hair*) position, we need not confine ourselves to Super-Ego structure. There were forces, perhaps earlier than the Super-Ego, which forced the energy of these instincts from their primitive erotogenic locus to their displaced (hair) position. But neither the primitive instinct drives nor their opponents have expended their respective energies in this first encounter. As we have seen the former (i.e. instincts) in the positive aspects of our hair-behaviour, we can more readily discern the latter (repressive forces) in the negative behaviour, the anxiety and the reaction formations connected with our hair preoccupation.

The early reaction formations against Œdipus wishes obtain their expression in several ways. First of all the very fact of *displacement* from the genital level on to the hair is evidence of conflict against positive genital Œdipus wishes. Reaction formations are shown in the ritual of cutting the hair—as one of my patients expressed it, ' to please the woman '. It is as if the little Œdipus conceived the hair (phallus) as a menace to his mother, which would meet with her disapproval or with a withdrawal of her love. Therefore he cuts it off to please her. Similarly the reaction formations are expressed in endeavours to keep the hair flat, tidy, etc., and perhaps most conspicuously in the ritual of shaving. We thereby become at peace with our various social parent-substitutes.

Reaction formations against the anal component embodied in the symbolism are evidenced not only in this painstaking tidiness, but more noticibly by the scenting of the hair. I have had dream evidence to show that the custom of covering the hair with hat or other head-dress is an expression of each side of the conflict. In so far as the hair is hidden it shows a fear of its exhibition resulting in repression as a mental consequence and hiding as its behavouristic equivalent. In so far as the head-dress itself is exhibitionistic we have the positive impulses gratified by means of this displacement.

A patient dreamt that he was a soldier in uniform walking through the woodlands, with his helmet missing, and his hair blowing about in the breeze. He knew in consequence that his uniform was not in order.

Eventually, as he had feared, he was arrested by the sergeant and forced to wear a blue badge to denote his misdemeanour. The curious interplay of castration elements and exhibitionistic elements was clearly revealed in his associations. The missing helmet was castration. The unruly hair was exhibitionism. Anxiety was present and justified by the arrest. The blue badge had an association to gonorrhœa, which he had acquired through wearing a defective French letter from a blue envelope. This idea in the dream destroyed any doubt there might otherwise have been as regards the phallic significance of his untidy hair-behaviour, and also (since gonorrhœa was a castration) of the castration significance of his arrest.

Thus we see that our hair-behaviour is an expression of affect belonging to each side and every section of Œdipus, sexual and pre-genital conflicts. It includes Id-resistance in the form of instinctive fear of the positive impulse, Super-Ego resistance in abundance (as exemplified by fear of parent-social-disapproval), and ego resistance, which latter is shewn by the various rational arguments brought forward to justify it.

Id.—Let us now consider what are the primitive sources from which our hair-activity obtains its dynamic force. It is repeatedly conspicuous that the hair is a genital symbol, and it would appear that the instinctual level from which the displacement occurs is plainly phallic. While endorsing this obvious truth, I would remind the reader that there are other instinctive factors to be discerned hiding behind the conspicuous phallic symbolism as well as embodied within it.

(*a*) *Œdipus Organisation.*—To start from the higher, later levels of organisation and to work backwards: embodied within it we discern its object-relationship showing its derivation from the fully developed Œdipus Complex. Beneath the manifest adult behaviour of suing for social approval of the hair, we can discern the little Œdipus suing for his mother's permission, approval or love of his phallic sexuality. The anxiety attendant upon falling hair and baldness and the lavish expenditure on care and treatment of the hair may well be a measure of the anxiety attendant upon the early unconscious supplication. These facts should not surprise us if we remember that being observed, showing or exhibiting the phallus which is the first tentative step towards the supplication for approval did not merely meet with frustration at its primitive level, but was displaced in some measure on to the hair. This has now clearly become a socially visible phallic substitute. What was at one time visible to the parents and dis-

approved (phallic-sexual frustration) is now in its substituted form (hair) being anxiously exhibited to society (parent-substitutes). Much hangs upon its acceptance. Let us remember, in the perversion of exhibitionism, the enormous amount of anxiety attendant upon the exhibitionist's performance. Let us correlate this with the anxiety about the appearance of our hair in response to which so much time and money is expended. Is it less of a social cult now than it was when forming part of the social-religious system of primitive people ?

(*b*) *Anal.*—Hiding behind the phallic symbolism of hair we can detect signs of pregenital component instincts. The association of hair with odours (sprays, lotions, oils, etc.) is well known. Tidiness, orderliness, and cleanliness, can be mentioned as anal components. Libidinal components from the anal level are clearly shewn also in the clinical material I have collected.

I do not think that the theory to which this brings us appears in the literature. With one exception, no one has ever drawn attention to this particular unconscious significance of hair. The notable exception is Dr. Ernest Jones, who makes a passing reference to it :—

' Hair itself has several sexual meanings, being indeed biologically a secondary sexual characteristic. *One that I do not remember having been pointed out but which I have several times found during psycho-analysis, is an association with fæces.* . . . It was a general superstition in the Middle Ages that horse's hair, laid in manure water, turned into poisonous snakes (cf. Medusa's snake-hair) '. [7]

A patient with strong exhibitionistic tendencies produced the following dream :—

' I put sand or grit upon my face preparatory to shaving, and was about to go into the street to shave. It occurred to me that I should have used a soap lather first and put on this sand afterwards. It was unsatisfactory and I felt some anxiety, but I was too hurried to alter it. I started shaving hurriedly in the street. The sand blunted, or rather, made jagged the razor edge, and finally I cut my chin on one side. The blood welled out and kept on bleeding profusely '.

The association to sand is ' brown muddy sand ' and, finally, ' shit '.

His associations continue :—

' If I could get to a stage where I didn't *mind* having a dirty anus, if I could feel quite at ease with a dirty anus in spite of its being known and

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[7] Ernest Jones, *On the Nightmare*, p. 299. Ernest Jones refers also to Shakespeare's *Anthony and Cleopatra*, Act I, Sc. 2.

visible, *then* I would have no anxiety about appearing and being seen in public. I would not have to tidy my hair when I was to appear in public. I would not mind if my hair were out of place or untidy '.

All this (and its intimate connection with his exhibitionism) has a pregenital origin in his infantile desire that his mother should allow and appreciate his anal-erotic instincts and pleasures.

Evidence from anthropological sources, though amply confirmative of the phallic level of libidinal impulse in hair symbolism, is not so obvious in its anal undercurrent. Nevertheless, we may detect in the leaving of bodily residue in the form of hair in tombs as a sacrifice to the gods,[8] a close analogy to the infant's surrender of its valued material to the loved parent. The erotic value of the smell of hair is also referred to by Havelock Ellis.

All this is not very surprising, for a patient reminds me in unmistakeable terms of the anal origin of phallic erotism : ' the penis is only shit '.

(*c*) *Aggression or Death Instinct.*—But this is not the whole story of the positive instinctive drives that lend their energy to hair activities. We have said that they were clearly libidinal. And certain factors remind us that the aggressive impulse if not the primary destructive instinct is here also. Aggression, at least libidinal aggression or sadism, appears clearly in my clinical material. May it not also be detected beneath the *reaction-formation* of the prevalent cutting, singeing and especially the shaving of our hair ? Is it not against our aggression, rather than against an otherwise harmless phallus that we are directing insistently the sharp blade of the razor ? Do we not intuitively detect something of this objectionable quality in our fellow man who has neglected to shave ?

In shaving and hair-cutting we cathect our aggression by directing it against our aggressive hair.

If it is granted that hair is conspicuously a genital symbol, and that our mental attitude towards hair and our activities with it are a displaced expression of our sexual conflict (at the genital level), the problem then arises as to why it is *hair* we have picked upon for the symbolic expression of this conflict.

The first answer one finds to this problem is merely that hair

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[8] Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, Bk. I, Vol. I, pp. 28, etc.

serves as a convenient and suitable symbol for the repressed tension of the unconscious conflict both at its genital and its anal level :

(1) Hair is freely admitted to consciousness ; indeed it cannot easily be ignored by consciousness.

(2) It is part of us and yet not a part. It is detachable, removable. We can innocently play with it. It is visible socially to our fellows.

(3) The sexual conflict is not limited to hair in its symbolic expression. A host of other objects can be, and are, freely chosen for its expression and relief. They are seized upon by the unconscious in proportion to their convenience and representative ability ; e.g. finger and toe nails, hats, shoes, clothes, umbrellas, sticks, purses, jewellery, etc. (objects detachable from our person). The process reminds us of that to which Freud alludes in describing dream-mechanisms.[9] Some *recent* object or experience is chosen to manifest the repressed latent thoughts. Hair is always with us —always recent.

In addition to these qualifications of hair to represent the genitals, we have the fact that hair is a secondary sexual character in so far as it develops in special regions (the face, pubes, etc.) coincident with genital maturisation.

Id proper.—Perhaps the true explanation of why Hair should be signalled out as a phallic substitute *par excellence* may be in its *physical* relationship to sexual maturity. Róheim at least seems to have no doubt about the matter when he says :—

' As a prototype of all the transformations to which the libido becomes subjected in the course of its long history . . . stags and lions grow antlers and *manes* (hair) in the rutting period *because the surplus of libidinal energy recedes back from the genital organ to the whole body* '. [10]

In the same way the surplus of libidinal energy at puberty recedes back from the genital organ to the whole body particularly to the pubes, lips and jaws, where it reveals itself in the physical outgrowth of hair. Apart from puberty, the hair of the body (e.g. head hair) may well be a similar diffuse physical expression of libido. Havelock Ellis points out that hairiness is commonly recognized as indicating sexual virility.[11] In confirmation of this we have an example of the opposite in a patient who lost his hair (alopecia) when he was unconsciously convinced of castration. This is a common phenomenon

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[9] Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Chap. V.

[10] Róheim, this JOURNAL, Vol. XIII, Parts 1 and 2, pp. 94–95.

[11] Havelock Ellis, *Studies in the Psychology of Sex*, Vol. V, p. 196.

of which many clinical psychologists have had experience. A large number of shell-shock cases (i.e. persons whose state of fear represented unconscious phantasy of castration or loss of life) suffered from alopecia, sometimes amounting to complete baldness during the weeks of mental illness following their traumatic experience.

It appears that conventional hair-behaviour, the periodic hair cuttings, the daily hair brushings and *particularly the daily shave*, are a present-day ritual-*symptom* exactly analogous to many savage and ancient customs—for example, the subincision ceremony of the Arundas. It has been shewn by Róheim [12] that the Arunda ceremony is a social symptom that serves the purpose of expressing dramatically their castration anxiety. In this symbolic fashion the cathexis of affect belonging to the castration complex is periodically discharged, thereby obviating the necessity for a characterological change. The only difference between this symptom and our modern hair ritual is that in the former the symbols used (penis and incision of penis) are, as one would expect in a primitive degree of culture, certainly not far removed from their anatomical sources, indeed their phallic origin is patent, whereas in our modern practice displacement and disguise are so extreme that to the average person the disguise is effective. He will not discern (without being psycho-analysed) that in dealing with hair so remote as that of his face and head he is unconsciously dealing with a phallic substitute.

Id : He plays with and treasures this ' phallus ' daily.

Super-ego : He controls (tidies), lays down, brushes flat, cuts, and shaves (castration) this anti-social phallus.

Ego : He does what society expects of him and is none the worse for it except for the loss of time and sundry minor inconveniences. Indeed he feels better for it, chiefly because he thus deals with the conflict between Id and Super-ego without unduly embarrassing his ego—*that is to say by a symptom rather than by a character change.*

As Róheim says, the Arundas by their subincision ceremony cathect the castration complex and avoid character changes. A castration complex that was not cathected would produce character changes, that is, would achieve its cathexis in character modification.

We have no subincision ceremony, but achieve similar results by our custom of shaving and hair-cutting.

All this may teach us nothing more than we have already suspected,

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[12] Róheim, this JOURNAL, Vol. XIII, Parts 1 and 2, pp. 113, 118.

namely that our hair activities are but another substitutive expression of our sexual conflict—conspicuously a genital level of conflict, but with the usual contribution from the pregenital component instincts. We have merely drawn attention to another habitual method of expression of well-known unconscious material.

This study will have served its purpose if it makes us realize once again the truth more or less strongly resisted by all in inverse proportion to their amount of psycho-analytical experience ; that, in spite of apparent contradictions, an examination of *any* example of our behaviour reveals that the unconscious is ever charged with the tensions of the unsolved Œdipus Complex and its pregenital components (including anal-sadism and primary aggression) ; and that our behaviour, whether ' normal ' or pathogenic, whether sublimation, play or symptom, is essentially an expression of the various opposed tensions of this unconscious conflict. In this paper we see this conflict displaced upwards to the socially visible hair of the head and face ; and so our preoccupation with the unsolved primitive past has found its way into our modern civilized life, in a form which by virtue of its symbolism ensures it against any likelihood of solution. Is this normality : to go on repeating our old struggles with obsessional persistence until death overtakes us and ends the matter with a final castration ?

THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM IN PSYCHO-ANALYSIS AND THE PROBLEM OF REALITY-TESTING.[1]

BY

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Allow me first of all to ask your indulgence if in the remarks which I am about to make I do no more than suggest some fresh formulations bearing on facts which as such will be familiar to every analyst. To begin with, I should like to say at once, for the benefit of those in whom the title of this paper may have inspired a certain misgiving, that I have no intention of entering into any metaphysical discussions or of debating the problem of free will, which for centuries long has been the crux of philosophical systems ; the problem to be investigated is the purely psychological one of freedom *from* something, for example, from affects or anxiety, or freedom *for* something, say freedom for coping with a task set before one. Anyone afflicted with an obsessional neurosis and acting under a compulsion is psychologically not free ; if he is ' freed ' from his compulsion, he will have acquired a measure of freedom.

Rather than circumscribe my subject-matter with elaborate definitions, I will try to take you at once to the heart of the matter with the help of some passages from Freud's writings, which will at the same time serve to shew that this kind of problem has always occupied a focal position in psycho-analytic interest. Thus, for example, Freud says in reference to the development of the obsessional neurosis : ' All these things combine to bring about an ever-increasing indecisiveness, loss of energy, and curtailment of freedom '.[2] In another passage we read : ' Since the rules of analysis are diametrically opposed to the physician's making use of his personality in any such manner (sc. as guide or prophet), it must be honestly confessed that here we have another limitation to the effectiveness of analysis ; after all, analysis does not set out to abolish the possibility of morbid reactions, but to give the patient's ego *freedom* to choose one way or the other.' [3] Or again : ' It, too (the cultural super-ego), does not trouble enough about the mental

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[1] Based upon a paper read before the Thirteenth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Lucerne, August 28, 1934.

[2] *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, p. 220.

[3] *The Ego and the Id*, p. 72.

constitution of human beings ; it enjoins a command and never asks whether or not it is possible for them to obey it. It presumes, on the contrary, that a man's ego is psychologically capable of anything that is required of it—that his ego has unlimited power over his id. This is an error ; even in so-called normal people the power of controlling the id cannot be increased beyond certain limits '.[4]

If we have now given a sufficiently clear idea of our theme, we will take up our first question and consider in what consists the most general significance which we attach to the idea of freedom. Freedom in its most general sense seems to us to consist in a man appearing not to be tied down to his biological situation and to his environment, to the *hic et nunc* of his actual existence, but appearing to be able on occasion to pass beyond the actualities of his perceptual relations, to rise above himself and to objectify his standpoint of the moment. Thus it has been given to man to concern himself with and apprehend things which lie beyond the range not merely of his immediate perceptual relations but also of the paramount necessities of a given moment—as for instance you do, when you devote your attention to problems the treatment of which is certainly not a matter of immediate vital importance. In virtue of this freedom, man is able to make himself the subject-matter of his own reflections, to objectify himself and to abstract himself from his own situation. The philosopher Georg Simmel has called this [5] 'the transcendence of life ', in accordance with the literal sense of the word *transcendere* : to step over, to place oneself above and beyond. A concrete manifestation of this is seen when a man, in virtue of his separate individuality, makes a will, thereby shewing that he is aware that his life is limited, and from an imaginary vantage-point beyond his transitory biological existence, as it were, is making dispositions for a time when he will have ceased to exist.

An array of facts, which time prevents me from entering into here, has inclined us to assume that in this transcendence, this rising above oneself, lies the essential difference between the nature of man and beast, that here and here alone we find the dimension which is missing from the life of the animals.[6]

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[4] *Civilisation and its Discontents*, p. 139.

[5] G. Simmel, *Lebensanschauung*, 1922.

[6] These facts include in the first instance the investigations made into the language of animals, which have shewn that their means of expression

These considerations, at first sight so far removed from practical interests, have been applied in the field of pathology in elucidating neurological disturbances. Head, Gelb and Goldstein have traced a whole series of phenomena in the asymbolias, e.g. the so-called central aphasia, back to disturbances of just this dimension or stage in the development of human life ; as when, for example, an aphasic subject is unable to find a certain word when he is asked for it to describe an object or situation, but has no difficulty in making use of identically the same word when in a specific vital situation he has need of it to express his state of mind ; he is ready with words and gestures conveying threats and curses when he wants to threaten and curse, but remains silent and uncomprehending when one asks him for words and gestures conveying threats and curses.[7]

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lacks a dimension, namely the function of representation, this being reserved to human speech, and that animal language can only perform the tasks of expression and notification (K. Bühler). Further material is yielded by Wolfgang Köhler's observations on the difficulties encountered by the animals in his experiments over negative achievements ; such tasks as involved, not imagining something (such as an implement) added to the environment optically perceived, but subtracting something from the field of vision, very soon brought them to grief. Of the same order, finally, is the circumstance that animals are without culture in the human sense. (Thus men concern themselves with the psychology of apes, but not apes with that of men.) In conclusion, we would refer to the impossibility of attributing to animals affects which pre-suppose a capacity to rise above oneself, such as irony and humour.

How the arrangement of organic life in grades is to be reconciled with the idea of evolution, whether there is a kind of uninterrupted process of transition from the animal stage to the human, what the position is with domesticated animals, are all questions which we cannot here submit even to the most cursory examination. A particularly noteworthy attempt to outline the development from the animal stage to the human has been made by G. Bally (' Die frühkindliche Motorik im Vergleich mit der Motorik der Tiere ', *Imago*, Bd. XIX, 1933) in accordance with the sequence : biological retardation of development—prolonged care of the young—emancipation of functions from biological aims. The conceptual framework of Bally's work does not coincide completely with the formulations attempted here. But I must renounce the thought of discussing this now ; I will only express my view that ultimately the two theories are identical or capable of being reduced to a common denominator.

[7] For the purposes of the conclusions to be drawn, it is not essential to accept the theories of Head and Goldstein in their entirety or to determine

If now we translate this into the familiar idiom of our psycho-analytical terminology, we shall find that this rising above oneself, this self-scrutiny, self-appraisement and self-elimination which bring with them the possession of a world transcending an environment bound to perceptual and instinctual life, are a function of the super-ego, which we have long come to recognize as a grade in the ego. We know that in his super-ego man turns towards his own ego, sometimes attacking and punishing it, as in the phenomena of conscience, sometimes kindly and comforting, for instance, in humour, or again with emotional indifference, as when he observes himself and eliminates his personal standpoint. What is common to these modes of manifestation of the super-ego, their common factor, we might say, is the observation, objectification of one's self, the attainment of a position above one's own ego.[8] Permit me, if you will, to speak here of the formal function of the super-ego ; its concrete content will be disregarded for the purposes of this investigation.

Freedom, then, in its most general sense is found in the existence of the super-ego, in that formal function of the super-ego in virtue of which man rises above himself and apprehends the world from without and beyond his immediate perceptions and his biological needs.

Now it would appear that there are three aspects of the problem of freedom : the formal function of his super-ego lifts man above things ; at the same time, owing to his perceptions and affects he stands in their very midst, absorbed by them ; but besides this, he

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the extent of their sphere of application. It is quite enough that such disturbances exist : a circumstance taken into account by other theories as well.

[8] Although there exists a wide-spread usage in virtue of which the term ' super-ego ' is not infrequently applied as a synonym for ' conscience ', we should nevertheless remember that Freud originally introduced the ego-ideal (' On Narcissism : An Introduction ') in the light of the phenomena of delusions of observation, that is, as the institution of self-observation, and that even in his latest presentation of the tripartite structure of the psychic personality (*New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, p. 80) he states the problem in the light of the question ' How can the ego take itself as object ? ' We therefore believe that we have not extended the psycho-analytical concept of the super-ego—although, had we done so, motives of expediency might perhaps have provided a justification—but that we have remained entirely at one with Freud's conception.

finds himself face to face with them. We can therefore speak of a threefold freedom: its most general form which constitutes the essence of man, and is founded in the existence of the super-ego; a second form of which we may say provisionally and without strict regard for accuracy that the more he is 'in the thick of it', the more he is in the grip of instincts and affects, the less this freedom is his; and thirdly, freedom to assess objects and reality as they are. Commensurate with these three aspects of freedom, we find a threefold derangement of it: the failure of the super-ego's function, over-absorption in affects, loss of freedom in relation to objects. These three disturbances or limitations of freedom seem to be realized in the three great realms of psycho-pathology: neurosis, psychosis, and asymbolia. In asymbolia, the formal function of the super-ego is apparently injured or eliminated; in neurosis man is over-much absorbed by his instincts and affects, i.e. by fixations and anxiety; in psychosis, freedom is lacking in relation to objects. We see that this threefold stratification in the problem of freedom and its disturbances coincides in the main—although not wholly—with the tripartite division of the psychic personality with which analysis has made us familiar. Basing ourselves on our attempted formulations, we might add that asymbolia has its abode in the super-ego, neurosis in the id, and psychosis in the ego.

We will now proceed to consider the law which appears to hold in this sphere. Man is indeed able, in virtue of the formal function of his super-ego, to rise above himself, his impulses and his past, but he can do so only on certain conditions. A comparison will perhaps help to illustrate my meaning. When Archimedes discovered the laws of leverage, he exclaimed: 'Only give me a fixed point in space and I will lift the world from its axes!' We, too, need to have a fixed point such as this if we are to lift the psychic structure from its axes, rise above our instinctual life and our past; a fixed point, however, located not in space, but in this mental life of ours itself, in our instinctual life and past. Thus man is able, it is true, to rise above his instinctual life (to overcome his fixations, for instance), but only if and in so far as he once more finds a fixed point in this his instinctual life and secures a foothold in his instinctual needs,—as for example when he once more finds instinctual satisfaction in the very act of rising above himself; and he is able to vault beyond his past as it persists in his present life—if that were not possible, there would not be a psycho-analytical therapy—but he can only do so if and in so far

as he regains his foothold in a past which really lives on. Accordingly we may say that man is able, in virtue of the formal function of his super-ego, to rise above his id, his instinctual life and the vicissitudes of his past, yet only if and in so far as he finds again in the id the Archimedean point which he needs. We see that the two axioms ' man is free ', and ' man is not free ' are both equally true and equally false. We are entitled to say that he is free, since he is always potentially capable of placing himself above and beyond the bonds of his historical and biological past.[9] We are entitled to say that he is not free, since he can only do this if at the same time he is able to secure a foothold in that past, and only to the extent to which he does so.[10]

It seems theoretically important to distinguish between plasticity—in a biological sense—and transcendence, raising oneself above oneself. We talk of plasticity in referring to the adaptation of a living being to a changing environment, when its experiences have not left an imprint so deep that that fact acts as a fixation for the experiences immediately following, and when its impulses readily find another object in place of one which has failed them. The psychical plasticity of a human being is at its height in early childhood and suffers a sharp decline with age ; but the formation of grades in the ego gives rise to a process which is something altogether different from the simple case in which the libido turns away from one object and is diverted to

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[9] The further elaboration of these theories would require us to distinguish between rising above something in a purely intellectual and in an experimental way (e.g. self-observation and humour). However we do not propose to pursue the question further within the limits of this paper.

[10] I have elsewhere attempted, using a different terminology, to hint at a formula to cover this same state of affairs (' Die latenten metaphysischen Grundlagen der psychologischen Schulen ', I. Internationale Tagung für angewandte Psychopathologie und Psychologie, *Abhandlungen aus der Neurologie, Psychologie und Psychiatrie und ihren Grenzgebieten*, Bd. LXI., 1931, S. 187 ff.). The philosophical influences at work in those formulations are there discussed in detail. I owe much to them for the phraseology employed ; the facts themselves belong to psycho-analysis and were drawn from its field of experience. In psycho-analysis, R. Sterba (' The Fate of the Ego in Analytic Therapy '), this JOURNAL, Vol. XV, 1934, has been the first to adduce anthropological trains of thought following a suggestive passage from Herder. The present study has many points of contact with the lines of thought developed in that paper.

another ; what happens is that an instinctual impulse is objectified, one rises above it—subject to the limitations imposed by the condition above discussed—and outgrows it, continuing the process at a higher level, so to say.

The former is a purely horizontal process, an impulse turns away from one object to another ; the latter is, as it were, vertical, no longer simply a libidinal process, but one which passes through the super-ego.

L. von Krehl in his address [11] observes that, for instance, a number of people will scarcely trouble about a fish-bone which is caught in their mouth, whereas in many the disturbing excitation evokes reactions of defence which grow more and more in intensity until finally the presence of the foreign body comes to dominate their whole existence and all their psychic energies are concentrated on its removal. There are people of great plasticity who pay little heed to a disturbing excitation of this kind ; but if the disturbing excitation has released its reactions, if the plasticity of the organism has been inadequate, the excitation can no longer be mastered except in a second way ; we are, of course, leaving out of account the removal of the foreign body, which is out of the question in the case of a psychic stimulus. If, then, plasticity has proved inadequate and fixation has taken possession of an individual, the only way which remains open is that of psycho-analysis.

But the distinction between plasticity and the attainment of a higher position, which in its turn is founded in instinctual satisfaction, is as a rule of as little significance for practice as it is important in theory. For the plasticity of instinctual life is also the basis on which the ' vertical ' function develops ; the greater the plasticity of instinctual life, the more readily forthcoming will be the instinctual satisfaction necessary to help one to rise above one's fixations.

Our ' law ' also enables us to see in a particular light Freud's momentous notion of the secret propinquity of the super-ego to the instincts, perhaps the most daring in the whole field of psycho-analysis, and in any case the farthest removed from popular ideas and expectations. We find that that notion coincides exactly with what our attempted formulation leads us to anticipate : namely, that the attainment of a position above oneself from which one considers, praises or punishes one's own ego must in any case have secured a

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[11] L. von Krehl, *Krankheitsform und Persönlichkeit*, 1929, S. 22.

foothold in instinctual life, and that it is only with the support of instinct that one can put oneself above instinct.

This also enables us to understand how it happens that psychoanalysis is anxious to effect alterations in the id to further its therapeutic ends, but in doing so always addresses itself exclusively to the ego.

From this point of view, man appears, as he is revealed by psychoanalysis, a creature endowed with limited degrees of freedom; the limitations of freedom are the sites at which scientific psychology has made its colonies.[12] From here, a path opens out towards the differentiation of three fundamental types of pathological process. It is of little moment whether or not the types so discovered coincide completely with the empirical concepts of neurosis, psychosis, and asymbolia derived from clinical experience, as little as it is necessary for the chemical elements to appear in a pure form in nature. The three types which we have separated out do not provide us with a key to the understanding of these three groups of illnesses, if only because we know that every illness, whether we are dealing with neurosis, psychosis or asymbolia is a process which passes through a course of development, and in which we find attempts to ward off the pathological process, attempts at assimilation, restitution, adaptation, and so forth. But we are inclined to think that along this path we may arrive at a means of setting up a system of co-ordinates in the realm of pathology, and that we do in fact find three distinct pathological processes corresponding to the three fundamental disorders at which we arrived, as it were, by way of deduction from the basic structure of the problem of freedom. Proceeding from the investigations of Head and Goldstein, we have already mentioned one of these fundamental disorders, namely the cessation of human freedom in its most general form, the disturbance of the function of the super-ego, the maintenance of man's animal tie, as we might call it, to the conditions of his existence. We can now find a more exact formula for neurotic disorder, which in a provisional and incomplete statement we defined as an over-great absorption in affects. In the neuroses, the subject does indeed rise above himself, the neurotic has insight into

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[12] It cannot therefore be a coincidence that this scientific psychology originated as psycho-pathology, as the science of mental illnesses. We could in fact say that in the sphere of the central phenomena of personality there *could* only be a psycho-pathology.

his illness and is able to take himself as the object of his reflections, but the Archimedean point never alters. His lack of freedom corresponds to the fixity of the props supporting his capacity for objectification. Lastly we find the third form of disturbance, that affecting freedom in relation to objects, in the psychoses.

It has to be admitted that this last subject has not yet been as fully elucidated as could be desired. The fact is that we understand the id and the super-ego better than we do the ego. From this third aspect of freedom and its disturbance a path leads us to the problem of the psychoses. The ego, or more correctly, its higher layers, issue from the two-sided situation between transcendence and absorption, between super-ego and id. We propose to select two examples from the higher functions of the ego which will demonstrate how far they really constitute the third co-ordinate; we refer to 'intentional' activities and to causal thinking.

Man, as we have said, stands on the one hand above things, and on the other in their midst. It is in this double situation of being absorbed by and being above them that he comes to conceive objects 'intentionally', as things that stand over against him; we regard this attitude as the third form of freedom. Now we know that a disturbance of volition is a characteristic of schizophrenia. A similar position obtains in relation to causal thinking, or, to put the matter in a more correct and generalized form, the 'why' question. The existence of the super-ego gives us the category of possibility, enables us to conceive possibilities which are not realized. On the other hand, our perceptions and affective life keep us absorbed in reality. It is in this tension between reality and possibility that the question 'why?' first originates.

We consider that we are entitled on quite general principles to distinguish two layers within that system which psycho-analysis has called the ego: those ego-functions which we would assume to be present even in animals and which do not pre-suppose the existence of a super-ego, and those again which are modified by the presence and existence of the super-ego and the capacity derived from it to occupy a position above oneself. We would suggest that the one should be called the 'animal ego' and the other the 'human ego'. The animal ego comprises the central control of the organism, which we may certainly assume comes very early into evidence in the animal kingdom, at latest with the appearance of the central nervous system; we may then attribute to the human ego those higher functions which

would not be conceivable without the formal function of the super-ego, as for example the apprehending of objects ' intentionally ' or the ' why ' question, but also quite definitely the testing of reality.

The development of the higher layers of the ego (the ' human ego ') coincides with that of the super-ego, or of the formal function of the super-ego.

Perhaps this enables us to understand the reason for Freud's having at one time ascribed the function of reality-testing to the super-ego and at another to the ego [13]; our investigation enables us to make the provisional statement that reality-testing is a function of the ego, but belongs to those of the ego's functions which have been modified by the existence of the super-ego.

In all these higher acts of the ego which we ascribe to the human ego, we are able to distinguish an id component and a super-ego component, much as we tried to do when discussing ' intentional ' activities and the ' why ' question. Three simple illustrations may serve to clarify this statement.

The extent to which a man is approachable (in the every-day sense of the word, when we say that a man is or is not approachable) has an id and a super-ego aspect. The id aspect is represented by the amount of love which the individual in question entertains for his fellows and the way in which he deals with his aggression; the super-ego aspect is manifested in his readiness to abstract himself from his own standpoint and take over that of another, to put himself in the other man's shoes, as we are accustomed to say.

Similarly we can distinguish these two components in the process of reality-testing. The id component consists in a man having a sufficient quantity of free object-libido and his ego not being poisoned by narcissism; for we have learnt from Freud that always when libido has been withdrawn into the ego to any considerable extent so as to upset the equilibrium maintained between narcissism and object-libido, manifestations of megalomania, the sexual over-estimation of one's own ego, make their appearance and reality-testing breaks down; just as an immoderate overflowing of the whole of the libido on to an object jeopardizes reality-testing, although in a different manner. But, besides this, the id component is dependent on the distribution of Eros and aggressiveness; if a complete severance has occurred between them so that all erotic strivings are concentrated on a single

[13] *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.*

person or group of persons and all aggressive ones on the rest of mankind, the reality-testing will suffer, since it is impossible to see clearly any more where one feels only love or only hate. The super-ego component in the testing of reality consists in man's distinguishing, in virtue of his capacity for self-observation, between inner and outer, between reality and phantasy.[14] Thus disturbances in all these higher acts of the ego may issue from two directions, from the id as well as from the super-ego.[15]

As our third and last example we may refer to the fact of communication or confession ; Reik's writings [16] have long made us familiar with its super-ego aspect, the compulsion to confess under the pressure of the sense of guilt ; recently a paper by Dorothy Burlingham [17] has revealed to us its id aspect in exhibitionism and attempts at seduction.

These provisional examples may serve to demonstrate, if only incompletely, that the position of the ' human ego ' is that occupied by those layers of the ego which, supported by the id, develop in an individual who has a super-ego, and disturbances in which help to populate the third province of psycho-pathology, that of the psychosis.

We could still try to add a number of equivalents to the formulations already attempted for the three principal types of pathological process which we have represented in terms of the three conceivable forms of disturbance of freedom. We will here only suggest one : the category of the possible is absent in asymbolia, the neurotic is over-absorbed by reality—and here reality includes phantasy, psychical reality—and the psychotic fails to distinguish between reality and possibility.

Let us try to clarify the three principal types of pathological process by means of a schematic example. Let us proceed from the simple

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[14] I have discussed these questions in greater detail elsewhere : ' Lettre sur l'étiologie et l'évolution des psychoses collectives suivie de quelques remarques sociologiques concernant la situation historique actuelle ' (*Publications de l'Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle*, Coll. Correspondance, Vol. III, 1934, Chapter VI : ' Atteintes portées a l'épreuve de la réalité ', pp. 107 et sqq.)

[15] This can also be seen in the pathological field : psychotic manifestations can appear as well following on neurological disturbances as on instinctual outbursts.

[16] Reik, *Geständniszwang und Strafbedürfnis*, 1925.

[17] D. Tiffany Burlingham, ' Mitteilungsdrang und Geständniszwang ', *Imago*, Bd. XX, 1934.

hypothesis that someone had lost a loved object through death and then ask ourselves which will be the appropriate reactions of each of the three types.

The aphasic patient will perhaps no longer be able to utter or comprehend the name of the lost object ; for him the world extends no farther than the horizon of his immediate perceptions, his mind no longer reaches beyond them ; unless a place can be found for it here, a thing ceases to exist. He has lost the category of the possible, his existence is confined to his actual environment at a given moment and to what his vital needs turn his attention to.

The neurotic may react with a protracted period of mourning or will perhaps develop a symptom which will allow the dead to survive in a psychical reality expressive of his longing, or with feelings of guilt and so forth. The neurotic has at his disposal the category of the possible, but he is absorbed by a part of his affective life, by pain, longing, or a sense of guilt. Here we see that every gradation exists between neurotic and normal. In this theoretical sense, even normal reactions of mourning can be described as a minor neurosis.

Lastly the psychotic will perhaps develop a delusion that the dead person is still alive or will hallucinate his presence. He also has at his disposal the category of the possible. He has not, as in asymbolia, reduced the world to the dimensions of his immediate surroundings and instinctual needs. The function of his super-ego is still maintained. Like the neurotic, he remains absorbed by affects, but he no longer distinguishes reality from possibility, he mistakes a part of the world of possibility for reality. Accordingly his disorder is related to the higher functions of the ego.

This example [18] also shows us how fully we are entitled in all three cases to speak of a curtailment of freedom. The aphasic subject's loss of freedom consists in his becoming enslaved to the things of his immediate surroundings and to current actualities, and in his no longer retaining that freedom to break away from his perceptions and the actual moment which is the most universal feature distinguishing

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[18] We see moreover where it is inadequate : what the asymboliac subject in our example fails to transcend (namely, the perceptual situation) is not the same thing as what absorbs the neurotic (namely, the affect). Whether this amounts simply to a flaw in the example itself or whether it betrays an as yet unresolved difficulty running through the whole argument must be left undecided.

human beings. The neurotic in his mourning reaction or the torments of his longing and feelings of guilt enjoys this species of freedom, but he stands in the shadow of his affects and lacks the freedom to choose a point in the life of his emotions which could help him to rise above the remainder of his affects. The psychotic, lastly, has also not sacrificed the most universal form of human freedom, but he lacks freedom to apprehend things as they really are.[19]

From the considerations which I have so far allowed myself to submit to your judgment a further line of thought carries us on to the problem of ego-expansion and ego-limitation. Let us recall Freud's dictum : ' Where id was, there shall ego be '.[20] We conceive

[19] If a loose conjecture may be allowed us here, we would express a surmise that there are also three biological processes corresponding to these three principal types. Absorption in instincts and affects has a corollary in modifications in the chemical substances—a very early anticipation of Freud's which recent work in the investigation of hormones seems to corroborate ; we know that the asymbolias arise from injury to the cerebral cortex, that is, from injuries to what are phylogenetically the most recent parts of the central nervous system. The correspondence between the more peripheral changes concerned in sexual chemistry and what we have described as absorption in affects is only too obvious ; whereas we are, of course, still completely in the dark as to the biological process which corresponds to the psychoses. It would be much too crude and misleading to base an analogy on this—peripheral disturbances in sexual chemistry, central disturbances in the phylogenetically most recent parts of the central nervous system—and then to conclude that here we have before us disturbances of the phylogenetically older parts of the central nervous system. Besides many other factors, the problem is complicated by the law in virtue of which, in the higher animals, functions are transferred to the phylogenetically more recent parts of the central nervous system ; even functions of a lowly order are, in the higher animals, regulated by higher organizations of the central nervous system. This law accords well with our psychological conception of a modification of the ego (the human ego) through the existence of the super-ego. We should certainly expect to find not a simple localized cleavage, but a severance between acts and modes of function. As, however, we already appear to have found analogies for at any rate two dimensions, it is perhaps not vain to hope that we shall one day discover them for the third ; or more correctly, for the third and fourth, seeing that human and animal components of the ego may very well correspond to different forms of organization of the central nervous system.

[20] *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, p. 106.

this expansion of the ego as an increase in freedom, indeed in that form of freedom which we found to have suffered detriment in the neuroses: freedom from absorption in one's instincts and affects, freedom to choose the Archimedean point in order to rise above oneself. The way in which this comes about and is constantly being realized in psycho-analytical therapy has, we think, been delineated in the 'law' which we have already formulated, namely that a man rises above his id if and in so far as he finds the Archimedean point in his id once more. The problem of ego-limitation mooted by Anna Freud [21] is also relevant here. Anna Freud described among the variety of forms which the mastery of anxiety assumes in the child, one which consists in withdrawing from the danger zone, in renouncing and abandoning activities which bring it into jeopardy. In that case freedom from anxiety is purchased at the expense of a limitation of the ego. A permanent curtailment of freedom has been effected, has become as it were—*sit venia verbo*—character.

Before we are in a position to subject to a more accurate analysis the problem thus raised of ego-strength and ego-limitation, it is important to distinguish real strength of the ego from what we might describe as a pseudo-strength of the ego, which when seen from the outside often presents a very similar appearance. An instance of this pseudo-strength of the ego would be when the fear of being thought a coward is stronger than the fear of danger. Certain recent tendencies in education which aim at allowing the child a greater measure of freedom during the latency period lead, as Anna Freud has shown, to the child's withdrawing under the pressure of its anxiety from activities which bring it into danger, and consequently to a limitation of its ego. In certain of the more antiquated forms of education which even now find favour in many circles, this way was closed to the child, since cowardice was utterly condemned and feared even more than danger. Under conditions such as these, the ego does not suffer a limitation, yet what remains is not a strong ego, although, it may sometimes appear to resemble this; we would call it a pseudo-strength of the ego.

We find a second instance of pseudo-strength of the ego when, for example, infantile omnipotence phantasies persist in part, when the belief in omnipotence has found confirmation in reality for some reason or other at a time so early that thenceforward it has in general

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[21] Paper read before the Twelfth International Psycho-Analytical Congress, Wiesbaden, 1932.

remained within the confines of reality, and not over-stepped the borderline of psychosis.[22]

Real ego-strength, on the other hand, seems to consist in the capacity to rise constantly above one's instincts and affects and—this is the crux of the matter—to apply the Archimedean lever at any number of different points in one's own id.[23] This gives to the ego a measure of real freedom, all that man with the inherent limits upon his freedom is able to achieve. Here we again come across a point to which we tried to allude before in passing, namely that plasticity also forms the basis for the ' vertical ' process of raising oneself above an instinct with the help of an instinct. This rather suggests to us that the antithesis of a strong ego may be found in the adhesiveness of the libido.

In conclusion, we propose to consider a few tentative applications of the point of view which we have here presented.

The difference which exists between our attitude in social relationships and a pedagogic or therapeutic attitude amounts to this, that in the former we treat our fellow-men as if they were completely free ; we make demands, appraise and condemn. As pedagogues and therapists we treat the other party, or, more correctly, the object of our pedagogical or therapeutic activity, as one who is not free ; or, to be more precise, as though his freedom were limited in the several ways we have described. Why indeed this should be the case, why man's social relationships require him to treat others as though their conduct were entirely free—failing this, the social relation is disturbed—would need a separate investigation.

A further application takes us to the problem of predicting human action and human conduct. Fundamentally it is only possible to do this if and in so far as freedom exists only to a limited degree. Accord-

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[22] On this process, see H. Nunberg, *Allgemeine Neurosenlehre*, 1932, S. 277 ff.

[23] When one rises above an impulse with the support of the *same* impulse, we call it ' sublimation '. The word describes the process and its result. This definition differs from the usual one (diversion of the impulse to other, more valuable aims) as a ' vertical ' description of the process, which takes into account the structural stratification, as distinguished from a purely ' horizontal ' one. It seeks at the same time to do justice to Freud's dictum that sublimation takes place regularly through the mediation of the ego (*The Ego and the Id*, p. 64) and may help us to understand why a repressed impulse is not capable of being sublimated.

ingly we can predict an individual's conduct most surely where we have to do with the most extreme form of limitation affecting freedom —in asymbolia. Goldstein declares that he does not conclude his investigation of a patient until he is able to forecast with certainty his reactions to any given situation. The probable correctness of a prediction concerning the future behaviour of a psychotic is already slighter, but predictions exist here as well, they go by the name of psychiatric prognoses, which we know to be subject to considerable uncertainties. Lastly, in the case of the neurotic, the probability is one degree more uncertain still ; the probable correctness of a prediction will be further reduced. In fact it is only possible to make predictions at all in so far as limitations on freedom are present ; but since these limitations are necessarily present in every human being—the differences between neurotic and normal are, as we see here, only a matter of degree—it is possible in some sense to make predictions even in the sphere of normal psychology. In brief, we may say that the greater the limitation on freedom, the more probably correct prediction will be.

This last point is also, we think, relevant to the question of founding a scientific sociology, the aim of which is to lay down general propositions concerning human conduct, in the last resort based on psychology. In one direction, the task of sociology is facilitated by the existence of a field, over and above the sphere already discussed of maximal limitations on freedom, in which it is possible to predict human behaviour with a degree of probability approximating to certainty, at least in the sense of a statistical mean : namely, the field of individuo-peripheral manifestations. We say of a process that it is individuo-peripheral if it is unaccompanied by internal conflict, as in the case of the satisfaction of needs which are more or less common to all men and approved by the super-ego, and if the means employed in obtaining this satisfaction are known and legitimate. Thus we can predict that people will prefer a cheaper market if they can obtain the same commodities with the same psychical satisfaction at a smaller sacrifice. This is not a case of limitation upon freedom, but an individuo-peripheral activity—no conflict arises. Behaviour such as this can also be predicted. This fact is at the basis on the one hand of a large part of non-analytical psychology, in so far as this has been stated in laws, and, on the other, of the possibility of political economy as the only body of scientific laws within the domain of the social sciences.

We will, however, abandon this survey of the field of applied

psychology in favour of a return to our proper theme, and in conclusion cast a few side-lights on the problems of the transformations of freedom during the course of man's life, of psycho-analytic therapy and of the theoretical bases of psycho-analytic pedagogy.

How then does freedom, as we have sought to describe it, develop throughout the course of man's span of life? Are we here dealing with a constant quantity or with a process of average regularity? We consider that two curves are here super-imposed one upon the other. On the one hand, man only gradually awakens to the freedom which has been given him. The super-ego is not there from the very first day, the formal function of the super-ego likewise fails to appear in the reactions of the suckling, and even when that function has become visible in behaviour and in the obtaining of mastery over things, it has still far to go before reaching its zenith. A variety of experiences has taught us that the child only very gradually comes to acquire a certain degree of relativism, that he finds it extremely difficult even during his latency period to eliminate his own standpoint and recognize its subjective nature, and that it requires maturity in order to objectify permanently one's destiny and actual situation.[24] Finally humour, the finest flower of the super-ego, seems to be a prerogative of more advanced years.[25] Accordingly we may speak of a development of the function of the super-ego, or of man's gradual awakening to that kind of freedom which we have described as its most general form.

But this rising curve has a counter-part in another, declining one. Every day of our experience leaves behind irrevocable traces which

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[24] Naturally this is not to say that self-observation is in all its forms an ideal thing. Self-objectification has its pathological forms as well; as when for example the obsessional type (in the sense of Freud's libidinal types) becomes, in the pathologically exaggerated form of obsessional neurosis, the spectator and reporter of his own experience. (Cf. in this connection Fenichel, *Hysterie, Phobie und Zwangsneurose*, 1931, S. 150 ff.). Relevant to this phenomenon is the question which we mentioned earlier, as falling outside the scope of this paper, of an intellectual and experimental rising above something; and in addition, there is the fact that it is always a part only of experience which is so observed—the other part is repressed and so shut out from the field of view accessible to self-observation.

[25] Cp. E. Kris, 'Zur Psychologie der Karikatur', *Imago*, Bd. XX, 1934, S. 465 ff.

tend to limit our freedom. I refer in part to external matters—love, marriage and a career create conditions which mark out a framework for later life—in part to internal matters, in the sense that the experience of each day turns some of the potentialities latent in the individual into reality, and thus causes a limitation of his possibilities; each day represents, as it were, a partial fixation involving a limitation of freedom in regard to his later life.

The super-imposition of these two curves seems to determine the curve of human life, which coincides in its course with the biological one—again clearly not a coincidence—leading upwards to begin with until it reaches its culminating point, at which it remains for a time, and then finally declining. On the upward gradient, awakening to one's possibilities still outweighs the twofold limitation imposed on freedom by the increasing demands of external reality and by growing fixation. The horizontal section corresponds to the maximum individual freedom to which man is able to attain within the conditions prescribed for him by his constitution, his past history and his environment, and so far as circumstances or illness permit. The downward slope shows where man becomes more and more the petrified image of his past.

A further application, finally, brings us to the problem of psychoanalytic therapy. Various forms of therapeutic influence are known to medical science, such as eliminating the point at which the pathological process has set in (for instance, an operation for the removal of diseased tissue), reinforcing the organism's powers of resistance, or lastly the implantation of another biological process (e.g. transplantation). Psycho-analysis comes forward as an appeal to man's freedom itself—to such freedom as is his, of course, and so far as it is his, to the limited but none the less existing degree of human freedom—and in this way it serves not only to overcome illness, but also to strengthen the ego and to augment freedom. Psycho-analytic therapy thus in any case stands nearer to the therapeutic ideal than any other method of cure known to medicine. The distinction between the psychoanalytic and other psycho-therapeutic procedures is found to be similar to that which in our earlier formulation we tried to draw between a real strength and a pseudo-strength of the ego; these latter procedures do not extend human freedom, but interpolate a new determinism and create a fresh situation of absorption (e.g. by means of an unregulated transference on to the physician). A satisfactory result may be obtained if the sole object has been the removal of a symptom;

just as the teacher who wishes his pupil to be good at sport may feel satisfied if fear of being a coward restrains the boy from flight from the danger zone. But it is certainly not therapy in the strict sense of the term.[26]

From here we can also discern the limits of psycho-analytic therapy. All that we have long known empirically concerning these may be arrived at by way of deduction from our scheme ; as for example the fact that the therapeutic prospects of analysis depend not so much on the severity of the neurosis as on a part of the personality having remained intact, and the extent of this. One point more than any deserves mention : the degree of freedom which an individual enjoys consists not in his being granted certain kinds of freedom and denied others, but in the circumstance that there is a contradistinction between absorption in the totality of one's affects and rising in a fundamental sense above everything. We have already said that the two axioms ' man is free ' and ' man is not free ' are equally true and equally false. Perhaps this will also explain how it happens that psycho-analytic therapy can at one moment convey the impression that a man has completely changed and at another that he has at bottom remained the same. In this favourable instance of a successful therapeutic treatment, he has become a completely different man, for he has risen above his instincts, affects, habits and morbid reactions. He has remained quite unchanged, for he has at the same time found once more a foothold in this his psychic nature and in his past history.[27]

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[26] We have thus reached by another route the same distinction between the psycho-analytic and other forms of therapy as Rado gave in his paper ' The Economic Principle in Psycho-Analytic Technique,' this JOURNAL, Vol. VI, 1925.

[27] The American poet-philosopher George Santayana, in his book *Dialogues in Limbo* (New York, 1926), makes a sage in the underworld speak of a book entitled ' The wheel of ignorance and the lamp of knowledge '. The wheel of ignorance would have the world based on a number of principles, regarded numerically, like the spokes of a wheel ; the correct view sees in these principles points of view which illuminate things first from one side and then from another, like a lamp swinging in space, shedding its cones of light upon things. (' My benefactor has entitled his profound work The Wheel of Ignorance and the Lamp of Knowledge ; because, he said, the Philosopher having distinguished four principles in the understanding of nature, the ignorant conceive these principles as if

In conclusion, we consider that proceeding from the ideas here discussed an attempt could be made to outline the theoretical bases of psycho-analytical pedagogy. Every pre-analytical pedagogy recognizes two ways of influencing the child. One of them is training, associating one kind of conduct with pleasure and another with 'pain', the method of rewards and punishments; at bottom, it is the same method as is applied by the animal psychologist when in a maze-experiment he trains the animal by means of electric shocks to follow a particular direction. The other method consists in holding up to the child an ideal, a hortative 'shall'. The first method estimates the freedom of its object as practically non-existent, the second, as unlimited. The first method is animal and sub-human, the second divine and super-human. Thus non-analytical psychology oscillates between a method proper to animals and another proper to God, but loses sight of one adapted to men. In contradistinction to these, psycho-analytical pedagogy represents a beginning of a human pedagogy. It regards its object as a creature endowed with a measure, albeit a limited measure, of freedom, takes into consideration the lack of freedom or the limitations on freedom present at the time, and tries to work with such freedom as is available and gradually to extend it.

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they were the four quadrants of a wheel, on any one of which in turn the revolving edifice of nature may be supported; whereas wisdom would rather have likened those principles to the four rays of a lamp suspended in the midst of the universe from the finger of Allah, and turning on its chain now to the right and now to the left; whereby its four rays, which are of divers colours, lend to all things first one hue and then another without confusing and displacing anything'.) This poetical comparison may serve as an illustration to show that we have not here set freedom and the lack of it side by side as materially distinct sectors.

SHORT COMMUNICATION

'HATEFUL', 'AWFUL', 'DREADFUL'

I was casting about in my mind the other day for a good translation of the German '*gehässig*', when the English 'hateful' occurred to me. The obvious objection was that while the German word is used to qualify a person who feels hatred himself, the English word qualifies a person who causes others to feel hatred.

'Hateful' differs from most English words formed in the same way. 'Beautiful' means 'full of beauty', 'graceful', 'full of grace', but it is not the person full of hate who is described as 'hateful'.

Perhaps it relieves us of our sense of guilt in expressing hatred if we project our feeling into the hated person. It is more comfortable to hate one who is full of hatred himself.

Analogies for this use of words can be found in other languages. The Latin '*amorosus*' could almost be translated 'full of love' and '*formosus*', 'full of beauty', but '*odiosus*' means not 'full of hate' but 'hateful'. The French '*odieux*' contains the same projection but the word is merely derived from the Latin. The projection appears again however in '*haineux*'—the original of the English 'heinous'.

To return to English. I wrote down a list of all the words I could think of that were made on the same model. Obviously such a list cannot pretend to be complete, but excluding words like 'unfaithful' and 'distasteful', which are made from others by the mere addition of a negative prefix, I found that I could think of eighty-seven, a number which I felt sufficient for my purpose.

The meaning of the great majority was what one would expect from the analogy of 'beautiful'. Typical examples are 'powerful' and 'thoughtful'. In one or two cases there is, or may be, a shift of meaning; for example, we can say that a piece of work is skilful when we mean that the man who did it showed skill. This shift, however, is not common and in the few cases where I found it it appeared to be, as it were, reversible; there was no difficulty in using the word in its natural sense also. The man who does a skilful piece of work can himself be called skilful.

There is one class of cases, however, where a shift in the meaning is very common. It is the class consisting of words connoting emotions, and the shift has the effect of a projection. Not all words in this class

behave in exactly the same way, and it seems to me that their behaviour bears some relation to the nature of the emotion that the words connote. Some words contain no projection, in some the projection is reversible and in some it is irreversible.

Words in which there is no projection are ' wrathful ', ' disdainful ', ' faithful ', ' trustful ', ' merciful ', ' bashful ', ' thankful ', ' remorseful', ' resentful '. I do not, of course, mean that these words cannot be used by a person who is in fact making a projection—for unconscious reasons attributing, for instance wrath, to others when he is himself wrathful. Here the conscious judgment is wrong, and the word is being used in what I have described as its natural sense. In the other classes of words that I wish to discuss, the conscious judgement may be perfectly right but the projection seems to creep out in spite of it, and appears merely in the form of the expression. The effect is analogous to that of a slip of the tongue of the meaning of which the conscious mind is unaware.

I have included the word ' merciful ' in this first class because though there is sometimes a shift in its meaning, the shift is on to an action which is called merciful, and seems not to be a true projection, but rather analogous to the shift of meaning in the word ' skilful '.

Words which can be used in either way—in which the projection is reversible—are ' mournful ', ' doleful ', ' sorrowful ', ' rueful ', ' cheerful ', ' hopeful ', ' joyful ', ' blissful ' and ' grateful '. We can talk equally well of a mournful or a cheerful occasion, referring to an occasion that made us mourn or that cheered us, and of a mournful or a cheerful person, meaning a person who is full of mourning or of cheer.

It must be noticed, though, that in these words the projection, when it takes place, is never on to people but only on to what may be called occasions. We can talk of a cheerful entertainment or party, but not of a cheerful person when what we mean is that we have been cheered ourselves.

It has been suggested to me, and perhaps rightly, that what I have described as a reversible projection is not really a projection at all. The shift of meaning may again be analogous to the shift in ' skilful ', or it may be due to an identification of the speaker with the event causing the affect connoted. It is certainly curious that the shift should never be on to another person, and I find difficulty in deciding on the reason for it.

' Grateful ' is an exceptional case. I have included the word in

this class because we do sometimes talk of grateful objects when it is ourselves only who feel any emotion, the *locus classicus* for this use of the word being the cocoa advertisement. One might have expected to find it beside 'thankful' in the first class.

The words in the third class, in which the projection is irreversible, seem to share, almost all of them, a common quality. They are such words as 'hateful', 'awful', 'dreadful', 'frightful' and 'fearful'. They refer to the emotions that we prefer to project—to externalize. I think that all the words that I have mentioned have in them an undertone of unconscious guilt or of anxiety closely akin to guilt which is responsible for the projection. 'Worshipful' is also in this class. It is the objects of our worship that are worshipful, perhaps on account of the dread—the awe—connected with worship.

It is not enough that a word should connote an unpleasant emotion to cause it to be used in this peculiar way. Sorrowfulness and mournfulness are unpleasant enough in themselves, but they do not contain the same peculiar quality of anxiety and guilt as do the emotions of dread and hatred.

There are one or two other words that perhaps also need special mention. A word that anyone unfamiliar with its common use might at first blush have expected to find in the same class with 'hateful' is the word 'spiteful'. Spite is not very far from hate. 'Spiteful', however, contains no projection, not even a reversible projection. The reason for this seems to me clear. 'Spiteful' is a word that contains in itself a conscious condemnation. We ought not to feel spite. It is therefore a word that we commonly use to describe the affects of others and not our own. Hence there is no need to project the spite—it is indeed more comfortable to leave it where it appears to be. Words like 'hateful' and 'dreadful' contain no such conscious condemnation and they are used to describe our own emotions. It is here that the unconscious guilt steps in and causes us to project our feelings on to others, even though we may be unaware that we are doing so. A word that ought perhaps to be included in this third class, for it certainly contains an irreversible projection, is the word 'painful'. The only reason for excluding it would be that I have been speaking of words connoting emotion and painful hardly comes into this class. It is interesting that the word should be used in this way because presumably it was pain that first caused us to project an external world at all—to distinguish between the ego and the outer world—and it is probably the intensely painful nature of the guilt and anxiety

underlying them that causes us to project such emotions as dread and hatred.

There is one last word that I ought to mention. It is the only one that I can think of that connotes an entirely pleasurable emotion, that seems completely free from all anxiety and pain and that yet contains, or seems to contain, an irrevocable projection. The word is ' delightful ' and I can only guess at the reason for its apparently exceptional position. In the first place it may be observed that the verb ' to delight ' is also used in a rather exceptional way. We say, for instance, ' I love this ' or, ' I hate that ', but we do not say ' I delight that ' but, ' That delights me '. Further, the Latin verb ' *delectare* ' means originally ' to draw on one side ', and so ' to allure ', ' to entice '. It seems to me that what the word ' delightful ' really means is ' full of delights ' or ' full of allurement ' rather than ' full of the emotion of delight '. If I am right about this the projection is apparent rather than real and the word ceases to be an uncomfortable exception. Perhaps someone learned in philology will say whether the explanation is sound.

Adrian Stephen.

ABSTRACTS

General

Alfred Winterstein. 'Echtheit und Unechtheit im Seelenleben.' *Imago*, 1934, Bd. XX, S. 383–392.

Winterstein distinguishes between genuine and spurious feelings, and describes the spurious feeling as depending upon the existence of the genuine one which comes from a deeper layer of the mind. The person himself does not necessarily realize that his feeling is spurious, if he does, it is because he senses the genuine feeling in the background of his mind. Often the spurious feeling and behaviour is unmasked by an element of extravagance and exaggeration, whereas the genuine one is felt to be natural and in accordance with all the actual or preconscious tendencies which belong to the feeling concerned. Spurious is not the same as pretended, since the intention to deceive is not necessarily connected with spurious feelings. The borderline between genuine and spurious feelings is not a sharp one. Further Winterstein discusses the problem in question with regard to the phenomenon of depersonalization and to the theories of other authors.

Paula Heimann.

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Hermann Nunberg. 'Das Schuldgefuehl.' *Imago*, 1934, Bd. XX, S. 257–268.

Nunberg raises the question as to whether the concept of the demand for punishment is coincident with that of the sense of guilt. He holds that the sense of guilt arises from the fear of the loss of love. As it is associated with incorporation it means a taking of something to the self and is thus associated with possession on a primitive stage. Expulsion of the object incorporated signifies, therefore, a return of that which was appropriated, or it may mean the resurrection of the introjected parent. In either case relief is sought for by atonement and reinstatement with the loved person, with a view to libidinal satisfaction.

Demand for punishment is brought about when the incorporation is mainly of an aggressive nature. The super-ego then stems the outward flow of aggression and the ego has to suffer the hostility originally willed against the parent. But as the incorporated parent is not only hated but also loved, libido returns into the ego and it is this libidinous moment which makes the ego subject itself to the sadism of the super-ego. Fear of punishment and the demand for punishment are an expression of narcissistic libido and aggression, while a feeling of guilt is concerned with object libido and libidinal dissatisfaction.

Evidence for the above may be found in the fact that a sense of guilt predominates in hysteria, while in the obsessional neurosis, melancholia

and schizophrenia the demand for punishment prevails. It is the amount of aggression which has to be dealt with which makes release from the demand for punishment so difficult. The relative fusion or defusion of Eros with the death instincts will determine whether the demand for punishment or the sense of guilt will be most to the fore, but both mechanisms contribute to men's capacity to live together.

I. F. Grant Duff.

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Paul Schilder. 'Personality in the Light of Psychoanalysis.' *The Psychoanalytic Review*, January, 1935, Vol. XXII, No. 1, pp. 36–48.

Schilder bases his thesis—that the personablity is a unit—upon the principles and implications of psycho-analysis, although his formulation differs from the formulations accepted by analysts. Proceeding from the accepted concept of the unbroken chain of psychic causation he claims also that an inner connection of meaning and intent constitutes the real essence of personality and denies the existence of a mechanical connection between experiences that is termed association, thus allying himself with the Wuerzburg school. Freud's formulation of the Ego, with its synthetic function, leads up to this concept that the inner unity of all the psychic processes of an individual constitutes the total personality. Ego, Super-ego and Id are different sides of this unit, different qualities of which appear under different conditions. Character, distinguished from total personality, is a temporary stabilization of various tendencies and qualities at certain developmental levels, and does not represent the deeper inner unity—or personality—which is plastic. A practical question of character study is how far the individual is bound to its rigid forms and how far it is able to go back to the deeper sources of personality which make possible a real adaptation to reality.

Lucile Dooley.

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Sieff Bornstein. 'Unbewusstes der Eltern in der Erziehung der Kinder.' *Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik*, Jahrg. VIII, No. 11/12, pp. 353–362.

The author adduces material which illustrates convincingly how measures adopted by parents in the upbringing of their children may be determined by their own infantile conflicts.

H. Mayor.

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Pearce Bailey. 'An Introduction to Rankian Psychology.' *The Psychoanalytic Review*, April, 1935, Vol. XXII, No. 2, pp. 182–211.

The author begins with a comparison of the psycho-analytic theories of Freud, Adler and Jung and their respective therapies which are coercive

in nature. Viewing the neurosis not as a disease but as a maladjustment of the individual to society, Rank regards the neurotic as a creative individual with a strong urge to immortalize his personality, but unable to convert this urge into positive action. He finds three principal forces: impulse, inhibition and will, the will producing a dynamic balance between impulse and inhibition in the normal personality. The neurotic, being fundamentally different from others, recognizes this difference, feels inferior, develops feelings of guilt, denies himself. He cannot accomplish the consecutive detachments necessitated by life, but becomes suspended at a primitive level. Fear of life and fear of death, universally present, are in equilibrium in the normal individual, but in the neurotic the conflict between them results in indecision. The environment of to-day fosters neurosis because of its individualistic tendencies strengthening the creative urge, but preventing adequate gratification through lack of collective values. Rank insists on separation of theory and therapy. Emphasis is laid on experience rather than learning, and the patient is urged to adjust himself to his own reality rather than attempt to conform himself to a norm established by the analyst. Re-living the past is kept at a minimum, inasmuch as it is the past from which the patient must free himself. The therapist is a depository for the negative aspect of the patient until he finally represents the neurosis and leaves the patient free to exert his positive self in a constructive fashion.

Lucile Dooley.

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Hans Zulliger. ' Pädagogen erliegen dem Fluche der Lächerlichkeit.' *Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik*, 1934, Jahrg. VIII, No. 9/10, pp. 286–295.

The psychological reasons why the pedagogue forms an object of ridicule.

H. Mayor.

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Nicholas Gotten and Clarence A. Patten. ' The Delusions of Spiritism.' *American Journal of Psychiatry*, May, 1934, XIII, 6.

After some discussion of the history of spiritualism in general and in the United States in particular, the authors give an abstract of the history of a young woman of thirty-three whose father, economically an unsuccessful man, had developed a spiritualistic religious philosophy. He singled out his daughter at an early age as ' psychic ', and at five or six she had already a rich fantasy life in which she would converse with imaginary persons and animals. The psychosis, which the authors consider schizophrenic, was delusional and consisted in the belief that a certain man, several years her senior, had died and become a ' spirit ', and in this form was continually visiting her, making sexual proposals and attacks,

and trying to take her soul from her body for sexual purposes. The authors regard this delusion as an expression of the patient's incestuous fixation. The implication is that this signified a bilateral fixation of father and daughter which led the daughter to reject the real world (she was suspicious of all but a few individuals) and to express her conflict in spiritualistic terms.

William V. Silverberg.

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Lawrence S. Kubie. ' Relation of the Conditioned Reflex to Psycho-analytic Technic.' *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, Vol. 32, pp. 1137–1142.

The author's aim is to shew that psycho-analysis as a method of fact gathering has a sound basis in accepted physiologic laws. Pavlov has demonstrated that the process of synthesis or association may take place subconsciously, and that under favourable conditions the unconscious synthesis may enter the field of consciousness. In establishing an excitatory conditioned reflex a state of instinctual craving is required. There is simultaneous inhibition of the cortical areas which are not involved in the reflex as well as a generalized cortical inhibition during the period of lag between the stimulus and the response. Pavlov has also demonstrated that a conditioned stimulus, which signals to an expectant animal that nothing is going to happen to it, exerts a spreading inhibitory action on cerebral function that leads to sleep. To study spontaneous cortical functions one must reduce to a minimum the mass of stimuli which impinge on the central nervous system, so as to avoid the distortion of accumulated inhibitory effects. Thus, the analyst in being passive is guided by a physiologic principle of keeping out ' external inhibitions '. The patient, with external stimuli at a minimum, works by free associations using the latter as both stimulus and response. Each response becomes in turn the stimulus for new responses, new speech and new feelings.

Pavlov has also shewn the importance of the time factor in conditioned and unconditioned stimuli. The analyst, likewise, assumes that the appearance of two ideas in the patient's mind in a definite sequence or relationship to time points to some dynamic relationship. The necessity of instinctual tension for the establishment of a conditioned reflex also has a parallel analogy in analysis. Here, too, libidinal tension is essential. Pacification or gratification of the patient spreads inhibition.

P. Goolker.

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Harold Lasswell. ' Verbal References and Physiological Changes During the Psychoanalytic Interview : A Preliminary Communication.' *The Psychoanalytic Review*, January, 1935, Vol. XXII, No. 1, pp. 10–24.

Reports of psycho-analytic interviews being of necessity ambiguous and

inaccurate as to descriptions of emotional changes, the author developed a technique by means of which fluctuations of emotional tension could be measured on the basis of the correlation between certain factors of the patient's verbal production and certain physiological variations. He found that changes in conscious affect are positively associated with pulse rate and changes in unconscious tension are positively associated with electrical skin conductivity.

Lucile Dooley.

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CLINICAL

Otto Fenichel. 'Zuer Theorie der psychoanalytischen Technik.' *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1935, Bd. XXI, S. 78–95.

This article is a discussion of H. Kaiser's paper, 'Probleme der Technik' (*Inter. Zeitschrift f. Psychoanalyse*, XX, 1934). Fenichel begins by speaking of W. Reich's work on technique, and considers that what he has to say about Reich's work holds good for many of Kaiser's theories too. Fenichel thinks that Reich's great service to the problems of technique is his warning against a technique based on intuition only ; his other service is his insistence on the importance of the economic and dynamic aspects of the psychic life. Fenichel gives a short sketch of Reich's ideas on characteristic behaviour ('Das charakterliche Verhalten') as resistance, and of the affects which are 'frozen' into the individual's way of holding himself, etc. These theories Fenichel looks upon as a logical continuation of Freud's theories on technique.

Fenichel criticizes adversely Reich's theory that psychic conflicts are layered in orderly sequence, and considers also that the understanding of the resistances 'frozen' into behaviour can only come gradually as the case unfolds itself. Fenichel then proceeds to outline Kaiser's paper, which he criticizes most severely. He holds that if Kaiser's ideas were carried further they would lead to a neglect of the unconscious and its specific characteristics.

I. F. Grant Duff.

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Grete Bibring-Lehner. 'Zum Thema des Uebertragungswiderstandes.' *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1935, Bd. XXI, S. 53–61.

The writer discusses a situation which arises where a patient has been very greatly terrified as an infant by one parent or the other. If then the sex, personality or mannerisms of the analyst remind the patient too forcibly of the terrifying parent three things tend to occur in the transference situation. (1) Conflicts are aroused in their full intensity and with great suddenness from the very beginning of the analysis, which increases the ego resistances enormously. (2) There is a form of fixation of the

transference difficulties. (3) The healthy part of the personality of the patient is threatened with being swamped by the return of the repressed emotions. If this occurs the analyst should send the patient to another analyst, who in his turn must beware of a masked form of the fixation in the transference mentioned above.

I. F. Grant Duff.

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Karl A. Menninger. 'Psychology of a Certain Type of Malingering.' *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, March, 1935, Vol. 33, pp. 507–515.

Menninger discusses malingering of the self-mutilative type. Here the aggression is frank. The most important psychological elements are the wish to suffer by injuring one's self, the wish to conceal and the wish to cause pain and embarrassment in others. This last includes the physician, and frequently succeeds in provoking him to retaliate. Thus the patient is doubly punished. Several case histories are presented.

Eugene C. Milch.

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Joseph C. Yaskin. 'The Feeling of Unreality.' *Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry*, February, 1935, Vol. 33, pp. 368–378.

The author considers the feeling of unreality a differential diagnostic symptom between mild depressions fundamentally psychotic in nature and various psychoneuroses. Patients presenting this symptom will probably be harmed by 'deep' psycho-therapy. The etiology of the symptom is unknown, but Yaskin thinks it is allied to depersonalization.

Eugene C. Milch.

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A. Stärcke. 'Die Rolle des analen und Oralen Quantitäten in Verfolgungswahn und in analogen Systemgedanken.' *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1935, Bd. XXI, S. 5–20.

In the light of Westerman Holstijns 'Oral Erotism in Paraphrenia Facts and Theories' (the *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, Vol. XV, S. 273) Dr. Stärcke reconsiders his well-known hypothesis of the scybalum as the primitive persecutor, and inquires whether oral factors are of greater importance than anal in this disease. Not denying the presence of oral *fixation*—connected with early weaning—as determining the regression to narcissism involved in paranoia, but reiterating the importance of anal-ambivalence in providing the break-away from the more sublimated and organized homosexuality of the same syndrome, he finds no reason to modify his previous views. He shews that even in delusions of oral persecution—poisoning—the persecuting substance always has a mixed or a purely anal origin, and that it is much more often something indefinitely defiling than a definite poison, while the result feared is not death but fertilization, impotence, madness or defilement

of spiritual purity. Dr. Stärcke further extends his conception of fæces (as the persecutor) from the limited adult sense of the term to that which he attributes to the child, and which includes urine, penis and nipples, on the ground that these are alike in sometimes belonging to the self, sometimes to the external world.

Dr. Stärcke also brings the problem of the determination of truth and the reality of ideas—' the greater frequency of the repetition of a thought than of its contradiction '—into connection with the security given by a society of numerous members as contrasted with the paranoie's solitary and inaccessible delusional system. He sees in the delusory idea a regression of the ego-instinct to the stage of rhythmic or reactive repetition, compulsive thoughts differing chiefly in secondary elaboration and in retention of doubt. He points out that economic factors, that is, the comparative amount of regressive *versus* socialized forces, rather than depth of regression, determine whether the result shall be a neurosis or a psychosis, by determining whether a state of conflict can be retained or abandoned.

M. N. Searl.

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Clifford Allen. ' Introjection in Schizophrenia.' *The Psychoanalytic Review*, April, 1935, Vol. XXII, No. 2, pp. 121–137.

Although introjection is accepted as a constant mechanism in melancholia, in schizophrenia it is frequently masked by a secondary projection. Four case histories are given briefly with a few dreams and associations, shewing the presence of the introjection mechanism in conjunction with schizophrenic symptoms. It is noted that although each case had certain oral erotic features, none of them were characteristic oral erotic personalities. Several suggestions are offered as to the difference in melancholic and schizophrenic mechanisms with reference to introjection.

Lucile Dooley.

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John M. Dorsey. ' The Psychology of the Person who Stutters.' *The Psychoanalytic Review*, January, 1935, Vol. XXII, No. 1, pp. 25–35.

Speech was originally an ' egocentric creative physioplastic act ' phonetically imitating experience. In the normal personality there is an adequate balance of ' take-in ' (oral), ' give-out ' (urethral) and ' hang-on ' (anal) functions. Stuttering indicates an under-emphasis of urethral libido cathexis in its onset, an over-emphasis of anal libido cathexis in its maintenance.

Lucile Dooley.

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Nicola Perrotti. ' Die Rhigophobie.' *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1935, Bd. XXI, S. 68–77.

This paper is concerned with the exaggerated fear of cold. This fear

may be found in people who do not suffer from cold; it is a genuine phobia, for which the name Rhigophobia is suggested. In certain cases there is a general tendency to hypochondria, and fear of cold is only the strongest fear. People who suffer from this phobia pile on clothes, and anxiously avoid draughts and damp. A slight degree of the phobia is widespread. Conflicts connected with bedwetting play a leading part in causing the phobia, and sweating, as a result of being too warmly clad, represents a return of the repressed desire to urinate in bed.

I. F. Grant Duff.

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C. P. Oberndorf. 'The Psychogenic Factors in Asthma.' *New York State Journal of Medicine*, January, 1935, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 41–48.

This article, in addition to an interesting case report, is a contribution to the study of organ choice in expression of psychic conflict. Issue is taken with Alexander, who tends to the view that peptic ulcer is found in a specific type of personality. It is pointed out that the respiratory system as well as the alimentary system could assume the organic expression of the psychic conflict where the question of intake, retention or expulsion is concerned. On the other hand, a purely receptive organ, like the ear, would be likely to be disturbed psychologically in cases of repressed passivity; and a purely expellant organ such as the rectum would shew dysfunction where aggression has been repressed.

A case of asthma is reported where an emotional conflict centring about the patient's repressed desire for love from her mother led to asthmatic attacks. For a brief period the asthmatic attacks were replaced by emotional outbursts resembling manic attacks. Analysis revealed a conflict between aggressive masculine and passive feminine tendencies. Two psychic incidents are cited in postulating the patient's association of respiratory disorders with masculinity and thus aiding in the choice of respiratory expression.

P. Goolker.

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Bernard S. Robbins. 'A Note on the Significance of Infantile Nutritional Disturbances in the Development of Alcoholism.' *The Psychoanalytic Review*, January, 1935, Vol. XXII, No. 1, pp. 53–59.

A case is reported in which an infant weaned shortly after birth developed severe nutritional disorders lasting through childhood. A neurosis appearing in adolescence resulted in a resort to alcohol which was a symbolic return to the breast. As the personality matured under analysis, the need for alcoholic sedation receded, and the compulsion to drink was replaced by a taste for alcohol in moderation and an enjoyment of food which had previously been lacking. The author suggests that in

analysing such a condition no external restrictions should be placed on the use of alcohol.

Lucile Dooley.

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Lewis B. Hill. ' A Psychoanalytic Observation on Essential Hypertension.' *The Psychoanalytic Review,* January, 1935, Vol. XXII, No. 1, pp. 60–64.

A case of essential hypertension which recovered under analysis is presented. Coming from a family in which circulatory inadequacy was prominent, the patient suffered an episode of frustrated rage in childhood, which was presumably the precipitating cause of his disability since its sudden and dramatic re-enactment during analysis resulted in cure.

Lucile Dooley.

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SEXUALITY

J. D. Unwin, J. C. Flügel and R. E. Money-Kyrle. ' A Discussion : Sexual Regulations and Cultural Behaviour.' *British Journal of Medical Psychology,* 1935, Vol. XV, Part 2, pp. 153–163.

Dr. Unwin (whose full results were published last autumn in his *Sex and Culture*) : Primitive peoples may be classified in two ways : according to the height of their culture (or the amount of social energy they display) ; and according to the degree of sexual restraint they impose upon themselves. As a measure of the height of their culture (or the amount of their energy) we may take their behaviour towards the supernatural. Thus we may distinguish a *zoistic* culture of least energy, in which there are no temples and no cult or tendance of the dead, a *manistic* culture of intermediate energy, in which there is a cult or tendance of the dead, and a *deistic* culture of most energy, in which temples are erected. On the other hand, we may measure the degree of sexual restraint in terms of the pre-nuptual restraints imposed on women, and distinguish three types : pre-nuptual freedom, occasional continence, and pre-nuptual continence.

Now there is a complete correlation between zoistic cultures and pre-nuptual freedom, between manistic cultures and occasional continence, and between deistic cultures and pre-nuptual continence. Therefore, it would seem that the height of a civilization is in direct proportion to the amount of sexual restraint that it imposes upon itself.

Professor Flügel : These results are at once hopeful, startling, puzzling and depressing : hopeful, because they represent a new phase in the co-operation between anthropology and clinical psychology, and because they confirm what, other things being equal, we might expect, namely an inverse relation between the degree of directly sexual activity and the degree of ' sublimated ' or ' cultural ' activity ; startling, in the definiteness of their results ; puzzling, because they go much farther than any

psychologist would expect ; and depressing, because, if true, they present us with the mutually exclusive alternatives of pleasure or progress.

Turning first to Dr. Unwin's criteria of culture, his results, at least in regard to primitive peoples, might perhaps be interpreted as correlating sexual restraint, not with civilization, but with disease—and, indeed, with none other than those three well-known pathological conditions of the human mind known as magic, animism and religion.

As to Dr. Unwin's criteria of sexual restriction, certain questions may be asked. Why does post-nuptual restriction only begin to become important after pre-nuptual restriction has become complete ? Why does the age of marriage have no effect ? How is it that no account need be taken of the *amount* of sexual activity—either before or after marriage ? Clearly more research is needed. In particular, it would be interesting to compare inter-group with intra-group findings.

Dr. Money-Kyrle : It is perhaps possible to interpret Dr. Unwin's figures in several ways. (*a*) There is some ambiguity about the exact nature of the correlates. What Dr. Unwin regards as a high culture seems to be associated with neurosis and discontent as well as with the more peaceable forms of expansive energy. Moreover, the chastity of marriageable girls (prostitutes excluded) is hardly a fair measure of chastity in general. Therefore the correlation between female chastity and social energy (not always of a desirable form) seems much more firmly established by his figures than the wider correlation. (*b*) The two correlates, whatever they are, may be collateral effects of some other cause ; or (*c*) causally related indirectly through another, at present unknown, link.

If either of these two last suggestions is right, we have still to look for the proximate cause of social energy. Perhaps this is to be found in specific infantile traumata (cf. Roheim), which in turn may be either the cause, or the effect, of the sexual regulations. Very likely they are both.

Roger Money-Kyrle.

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Edith Buxbaum. ' Uber einen Fall von exhibitionistischer Onanie.' *Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik*, 1934, Jahrg. VIII, No. 5/8, pp. 238–261.

An account of the unfinished analysis of a proletarian boy of ten, whose disorder was a severe one. Constant anxiety made it impossible for him to remain alone for any time ; he masturbated to excess and in the presence of other people ; he was intellectually very backward ; and he reacted to the slightest stimulus with nervous movements of his face, hands and feet.

His play at first depicted phantasies of murderous struggle with his father by means of which he expressed not only his hostility towards him, but probably also sadistic coitus. His exhibitionism and masturbation

signified on the one hand sexual aggression in relation to his mother, and on the other his wish to be robbed of or to destroy his penis in order to be loved by his father. Self-injury tendencies were much in evidence and were determined by identifications on a sado-masochistic basis, etc., etc. Stealing, which developed in the course of the analysis, was the boy's reaction to the phantasy that his mother had deprived him of his penis. It is probable that he witnessed an orally performed coitus between his parents and interpreted this as a revengeful castration by his mother.

The author asserts that the boy's genital activities were deceptive, in that they really expressed pregenital trends. This was no doubt the case, but we learn very little about these pregenital factors or the mechanisms characteristic of early phases.

The case presented every conceivable kind of difficulty, external and internal, but notwithstanding this, it was possible to effect very considerable improvements. The possibility of organic disorder could not be altogether excluded.

As regards technique, the analyst had recourse to more frequent interpretation.

H. Mayor.

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Michael Bálint. 'Der Onanie-Abgewöhnungskampf in der Pubertät.' *Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik*, 1934, Jahrg. VIII, No. 11/12, pp. 374–391.

The significance of masturbation at puberty and the vicissitudes it undergoes during this period. Recommendations in regard to treatment.

H. Mayor.

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Childhood

Alice Bálint. 'Die Bedeutung des Märchens für das Seelenleben des Kindes.' *Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik*, 1935, Jahrg. IX, H. 2, pp. 113–116.

The true fairy tale promotes freedom of phantasy, provides a legitimate outlet for forbidden longings, reassures the child that his sadistic impulses are not peculiar to himself, and for these and other reasons is to be retained as an instrument of nursery education. This does not apply to the Struwwelpeter type of story, whose sole object is to intimidate.

H. Mayor.

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M. Wulff. 'Phantasie und Wirklichkeit im Seelenleben des Kleinkindes.' *Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik*, 1934, Jahrg. VIII No. 9/10, pp. 306–318.

The author stresses the cathartic benefits to the child of the fairy tale and allied products of phantasy, which (it must be remembered) satisfy

needs still active even in the civilized adult (as witness the enormous appeal made by that modern equivalent of the fairy tale, the film).

H. Mayor.

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Editha Sterba. 'Ein Fall von Essstörung.' *Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik*, 1935, Jahrg. IX, H. 2, pp. 99–105.

Observation shewed that an eating disturbance which developed in a child of twenty months was determined by anal factors.

H. Mayor.

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Eduard Hitschmann. 'Der Vater als Eindringling.' *Zeitschrift für psychoanalytische Pädagogik*, 1935, Jahrg. IX, H. 2, pp. 106–112.

This paper calls attention to the special situation which arises when a boy has from birth or a very early age been living alone with his mother, and the father assumes or resumes his position in the family at a time when the boy's Œdipus complex is at its height. This lends particular intensity to the Œdipus relation to the father and so increases the likelihood of neurotic solutions.

H. Mayor.

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APPLIED

H. W. G. Hingston. 'The Meaning of Animal Coloration.' *Scientia*, February, 1935, Vol. LVII, pp. 130–138.

This short paper, an abstract of the author's 'The Meaning of Animal Colour and Adornment' provides unwittingly some interesting fresh confirmation of the Freudian theory. For reasons the writer gives, Darwin's views about the meaning of animal coloration, i.e. that they were due mainly to sexual selection, have never gained wide acceptance. The writer now propounds the view that they are related rather to the intimidating aspects of pugnacity. By logical steps he reaches the generalization that the sexual instinct arouses intense hostility from aggressiveness against rivals, and that this can be allayed only by successful sexual union. He thus confirms, not only the Œdipus theory, but also the analytical view of the close fusion between sexuality and aggressiveness.

E. J.

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Ernest R. Groves. 'The Development of Social Psychiatry.' *The Psychoanalytic Review*, January, 1935, Vol. XXII, No. 1, pp. 1–9.

The author is here concerned with the sociological approach to social psychiatry, which he finds to have developed along the three lines of psychiatry, sociology and mental hygiene. The sociologists have been largely influenced by psycho-analysts, and even those who oppose Freudian

theory adopt the foundation concept of the wish as the common denominator of human conduct. Six separate lines of development of present-day social psychiatry are enumerated, of which the first three are greatly indebted to psycho-analysis and have made thus far the greatest contribution. They are: (1) The approach to culture through psychopathic experience; (2) Analysis of the social situation; (3) Study of psychopathic maladjustment as a cause of social problems; (4) Endocrinology; (5) Neurology: (6) Clinical psychiatry.

Lucile Dooley.

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August Wimmer. 'Om Psykoanalysens Anvendelse i Retsplejen.' *Nordisk Tidsskrift for Strafferet*, January, 1934, pp. 45–55.

The author has an extremely poor opinion of psycho-analysis, and is very much opposed to its introduction in the sphere of criminal justice.

H. Mayor.

BOOK REVIEWS

Der Überraschte Psychologe. Über Erraten und Verstehen unbewusster Vorgänge. By Theodor Reik. (A. W. Sijthoff's Uitgeversmij N.V., Leyden, 1935. Pp. 292. Price R.M. 7.30.)

Perhaps it will seem a far cry from the undiscovered murderer to the surprised psychologist. Nevertheless the former individual may be relied upon sooner or later to produce a surprised detective, and we know that analyst and detective have at least one feature in common in the attention they pay to matters of detail. It may be remembered that Reik regarded the mental processes involved in the detection of crime as calling for psychological investigation and that they were then found to be more complicated than one might at first have been inclined to suppose. Few would be prepared to maintain that the mental processes involved in analysing a patient, or putting it more generally, in inferring and understanding the unconscious mental processes in another were exclusively or principally a conscious intellectual operation. But hitherto no comprehensive attempt had been made to arrive at a clearer understanding of them. This is the formidable task which the author has undertaken in the present volume, one which has not been rendered lighter by the fact that it involved ' describing things which almost elude description '.

Reik first examines the nature of the material on the basis of which we infer that one or another process is taking place in the unconscious of a given person. To begin with it may be divided into elements which are taken in consciously *viâ* the different sense-organs, sight, hearing, touch, etc., and those which are observed unconsciously. The latter group, and the more important of the two, can be further resolved into subgroups. In one of these, reception still takes place *viâ* the usual sense-organs, although (states of hyperæsthesia excepted) the perceptions are not made consciously. Trifling movements and gestures, physical attitudes, modulations of voice, a thousand nuances and subtle shades of expression belong to this category. But over and above these, it is very probable that we receive tidings of the unconscious *viâ senses* which have been lost to consciousness. It is easy to see that certain senses have sacrificed much of their original vigour in the course of the prolonged development of the race. For instance, it must be admitted that man compares most unfavourably with the dog as far as his sense of smell is concerned. (One might indeed venture to trace the origins of psychology back to this sense. Do we not still ' scent ' motives ?) Generally it may be said that cultural development tends to weaken our sense-perceptions and to substitute other, intellectual processes (especially memory) ; this tendency is probably closely bound up with the gradual increase of repression. Other senses again, in respect of which we must look to the animal

kingdom for information, have not survived even in a rudimentary form. Nevertheless we may assume that in some form or other they still function in the unconscious. Is it not of itself suggestive that when the normal senses fail to perform the functions assigned to them, others recover their original intensity, e.g. the sense of touch in the blind ?

One might be forgiven for assuming that the psycho-analyst will be found straining every nerve and muscle not to miss those trifling indications which are so important for his work. As we know, however, Freud requires him to devote an ' even flowing ' attention to everything he hears. Now psychology distinguishes between ' voluntary ' attention and ' involuntary ' attention. We concentrate our attention upon a thing, or again something ' forces itself ' upon our attention. Further, attention may be directed either to the external or to the internal world. Voluntary attention directed inwardly (as e.g. in the intellectual approach to the solution of some problem) gives rise to thoughts, whereas involuntary attention similarly directed (as e.g. when we let a problem ' sink in ') leads to ' ideas ' (*Einfälle*). It will be obvious that the two varieties of attention bear a different relation to surprise. Voluntary attention excludes surprise; this is at once its strength and weakness. When we concentrate our attention in a particular direction, the probability is that it is not so much a new active principle which is involved as the elimination and inhibition of all other mental content. (Cf. Ferenczi's account of the process.) The accompanying increased feelings of tension would then be the result of increased expenditure on inhibition. Similarly neurotics who complain of inability to concentrate are in reality concentrating very hard in the wrong direction, i.e. on their unconscious phantasies. Seen from this point of view, a voluntary effort of attention may become a positive handicap under certain circumstances, e.g. when investigating the unconscious. ' Even flowing ' attention stands half-way between the two extremes of voluntary and involuntary attention. It does not offer security against surprise, but only lessens its suddenness.

It would, of course, be absurd to suppose that the rule which prescribes an even flowing attention is invariably in place. A searchlight constantly moving over and over a given area (the same one with which the author so happily illuminates this part of his argument) will come to rest for a time on the spot where the enemy has been discovered. More important, however, than this change over to voluntary attention is that other one which occurs when attention is switched off, as it were, for a fraction of a second, precluding the sudden rising up from the depths of the unconscious of a ' surprising ' association (*Einfall*).

Here we have reached the theme of the paper which appeared in this JOURNAL (Vol. XIV, Pt. 3) under the title ' New Ways in Psycho-Analytic Technique ' and most of which has been incorporated in the present volume.

For the sake of convenience we may be permitted to give the very barest summary of it. Reik holds that the *essence* of the analytic process consists in the series of shocks experienced as the subject takes cognizance of his repressed processes ; that the essential factor in these shocks is surprise ; that surprise is a reaction of defence, the expression of our struggle against any call upon us to acknowledge something long known to us which has become unconscious ; that the analyst who gives an interpretation draws very close psychologically to a person who produces a witty remark ; that the *most important* discoveries and pieces of insight in an analysis come as a surprise to patient and analyst alike (now supplemented by the statement that in the course of a long practice the memory traces of experiences of surprise may to some extent fulfil the same function for the analyst as the experiences themselves). All this gives rise to certain explanations and recommendations bearing on problems of analytic technique Of these it is sufficient to say that they have been greatly amplified and extended, so that apart from the positive suggestions contained, e.g. in the masterly chapter on ' Tact (Takt) and Rhythm ' we are now presented with a brilliant and beautifully written criticism of the tendency apparent in some quarters to allow analytical theory to usurp the heuristic function properly to be attributed to the analyst's unconscious, forgetting that this theory is the fruit of experience, not its source, to ' pigeon-hole ' analytical knowledge and take defensive flight into terminology. More or less closely connected with this is the somewhat harsh but nevertheless just critical estimate of the ' militant ' technique championed by Reich which is cleverly compared with the ' anarchic ' procedure of Stekel (this latter might have been described as a caricature of Reik's own views). More directly relevant, however, to the author's central theme is the development of the comparison between the analyst's procedure and wit. From one point of view the analyst is in the situation of the second person in the wit triangle. The ' joke ' to which he listens, often to be sure an extremely poor one, takes the form of a neurotic symptom or a dream element. Freud has explained that in wit the hearer has to follow the path first marked out by the speaker ; and the analyst does likewise. But inasmuch as he reveals to the patient the significance of his repressed tendencies, he is himself in the position of the speaker. We see this most clearly when a witty thought comes to the analyst in lieu of an analytical ' association '. The witticism may quite well be psychologically correct and only need to be converted into a form appropriate to the analytic situation before being communicated to the patient. Much as in the psychogenesis of wit, preconscious thoughts and ideas are committed to the analyst's unconscious for elaboration ; the result of this process is then apprehended in consciousness. The situation will perhaps become clearer if we consider two main differences between the analyst

and the author of a witticism. The first relates to the time factor. The unconscious elaboration which precedes the birth of an ' association ' is a long-drawn-out process, in contrast with wit, where it is the work of a moment. (An analogous distinction appears when we compare the patient with the hearer of a witticism. The momentary fright (*Schreck*) (reinforcements rushed to the danger zone) which the latter experiences is immediately recognized as superfluous and discharged in laughter. The patient's experience is fundamentally the same ; but the like recognition only comes very slowly.) The second difference is that the analyst cannot dispose of the freed energy in the same happy way as the witty person, but must divert it to the purposes of psychological explanation.

Reik next calls attention to the great significance of the analyst's own *unconscious memories* for inferring the unconscious processes in another. This leads on to a stimulating discussion of the nature of memory itself. We are apt to think of ' remembering ' as the opposite of forgetting, whereas it would be far more to the point to contrast it with ' memory ' (*Gedächtnis*) regarded as a general quality of organic life. The function of the latter is to preserve certain impressions ; this it does in the form of memory-traces. The impressions in question are such as are either too painful to be borne (the repressed) or too intense or sudden to be psychically mastered at once. Repression is a special instance of the more general process of defence which sets in when the mental apparatus is unable to cope adequately with the demands made upon it. (Jones' ' hedonic repression ' might perhaps have been discussed in this connection.) It seems that the great majority of our impressions are of this kind. Our ' experience ' (*Erleben*) of an event lags far behind the actual occurrence (if indeed it ever comes at all). ' Experience ' may be defined as ' psychically mastering an impression which was so strong that we were not able to grasp its implications all at once '.

' Remembering ', on the other hand, destroys the unconscious memory-trace. ' Memory ' is essentially conservative, ' remembering ' destructive. It is only when we have remembered a memory that we can truly forget it. We might almost say that the man who constantly says to his beloved : ' Do you remember how we used to . . .' is well on his way to destroying the force of those happy moments. The bonds which unite human beings are not memories shared but shared memory-traces, and this is as true of nations as it is of individuals.

Remembering is a later edition of the repetition-compulsion and originally signified repetition in phantasy whereas the earlier method of dealing with stimuli implies repetition in action. It has its prototype in what we may assume was the earliest form of expression of this striving, one ante-dating the repetition-compulsion and perhaps supplying the condition for this. It is probable that the young child's first attempt to

master powerful impressions is by *hallucinating* them (and then reacting to them as if they were actual).

If we consider the relation of memory to the degree of receptivity for new impressions obtaining at different periods of a man's life, we find that this is at its highest during early childhood. Here the weakness of the ego rather than the intensity of the impressions themselves is the main consideration. In this sense *all* childhood experience can claim a traumatic character. At the other end of the scale, we find the aged living in their memories and little accessible to new impressions; early childhood experiences are vividly recalled once more. Thus receptivity for new impressions and memory (*Erinnerung*) are seen to stand in a functional relationship to one another. Analysis helps us to catch up with our accumulated arrears of memories.

For the analyst too, analysis is an experience (*Erlebnis*) and as such forms part of the general process of psychical assimilation. The impressions he receives cannot be mastered, i.e. in this reference understood at once. When he begins to remember them consciously he is also beginning to understand them. But understanding our fellows is nothing other than a particular form of mastery over our affective reactions towards them.

The procedure of the analyst has so far been conceived as involving two separate mental activities, i.e. *inferring* and *understanding* unconscious mental processes. The relation between them will become clear if we compare the former with the functions of a criminal investigation department, which proceeds from often trifling indications to formulate a theory concerning the crime, and the latter with the procedure of the examining magistrate, whose business it is to subject this theory to every critical test, supplement it and correct it until it finally becomes possible to reconstruct the crime in all its details. It is with the first of these two activities that the author is primarily concerned, for unlike the other it is peculiar to the analytic method. The distinction is justified for descriptive purposes but in reality we cannot draw the line so sharply, although there can be no doubt that the analyst's work involves the exercise both of his creative and his critical faculties.

In the difficult, but interesting and important development of the discussion which now follows, this distinction need no longer be kept in mind. Henceforward when the author speaks of ' understanding ' unconscious mental processes, he is evidently not referring specifically to conscious rational understanding. This is the end result of a far more primitive process, the nature of which may be inferred not only from our clinical material but also from the evidence of language. The German ' *begreifen* ', French ' *comprendre* ', and Italian ' *capire* ' all imply ' taking possession ' of a thing. Originally this took the form of *eating* it. But that cannibalistic act had a sequel; the individual now himself acquired the proper-

ties of the object he had incorporated, i.e. the ego became object. It would be more accurate to say that the object had again become part of the ego, since ego and object were originally one. This primitive mechanism continues to operate in an attenuated form in the most highly sublimated forms of ' cannibalism ', e.g. in psychologically understanding others.

We are now in a position to take a step further forward. The repressed instinctual tendencies expressed in those trifling indications which are registered by the analyst's unconscious activate corresponding tendencies in the analyst himself. They are not only unconsciously communicated to him ; unconsciously they communicate themselves to him. For want of a better one, we might borrow the term ' induction ' to describe the process. It is inadvisable to speak of empathy in this connection ; we have really to do with a transformation in the ego. It is not a question of feeling oneself in to another but of (unconsciously) feeling that other in oneself. The decisive factor is the analyst's unconscious memory of buried experiences or possibilities of experience which have been reawakened by contact with the patient's experience. This taking of the object into the ego can only be called an introjection. We are accustomed to apply this term in relation to permanent alterations effected in the ego following the incorporation of an object. There is nothing, however, to prevent us from speaking of a *passagère* introjection. In the special case of analysis, we are obliged to assume the existence of a whole series of momentary introjections since every essential piece of insight has to be acquired in this way. The ability to effect quick and easy transformations in the ego is most pronounced in childhood and must have played an incomparably greater part in the early history of the race. It is not for nothing that metamorphosis is so conspicuous a feature of myth and fairy-tale.

The unconscious reaction in the analyst accompanying the transformation in his ego following introjection now comes within the range of endopsychic vision. As a general rule it does not become conscious as such ; it has first to be externalized afresh, i.e. projected. It amounts to this : that to understand the unconscious mental processes in another person we have first for a moment to become that other person, but can then only see this reflection of him in ourselves in the reflection of ourselves in him.

Supplementing this somewhat condensed account of the process, Reik makes the following additional observations. (1) This introjection of the object presupposes a certain similarity of object and ego which is in fact present in those depths of the unconscious in which the process takes place. There no room exists for psychological misunderstanding. This is rather the responsibility of the higher layers of the mind : incidentally, it is these upper strata to which misunderstanding mostly relates. (2) How

is it possible to preserve the psychological continuity of the analytic process, having regard to the momentary and constantly changing character of the introjections taking place ? The answer is that the analyst can fall back on the unconscious memory-traces of earlier introjections. We are not really dealing here with a problem specific for the understanding of unconscious mental processes, but rather with a special problem of memory.

It sometimes happens that an ' association ' occurring to the analyst will enable him sooner or later (later rather than sooner) to acquire fresh and valuable insight into his own unconscious as well as into that of his patient. The author gives an elaborate example from his own experience of this ' mutual illumination of unconscious processes ' or ' multiple reflection ' as he calls it. At a certain point in a patient's associations, a sentence suddenly emerged from the analyst's unconscious ; it was not long before he was able to trace it to Molnar's play, *Liliom*, seen many years before. The latent content of this play, of which a detailed analysis is given, reflected precisely the unconscious psychic situation of the patient ; but further than that, the analysis, again very detailed and entirely (almost uncomfortably) unsparing of the author's own reactions to the play brought to light unresolved conflicts of an identical nature. This illustration, a very convincing one, serves three purposes ; it confirms the view put forward of the rôle assumed by the analyst's own unconscious in analysis ; it helps us to realize the therapeutic benefits to the analyst of the analyses he carries out on others ; and last, but perhaps not least, it offers a method of approach in the application of analysis (the possible limitations of which are not discussed) based on the unconscious elaboration of the individual's reactions to the subject-matter to be analysed, one which is amusingly compared with the results of imaginary investigations proceeding from conscious psychological hypotheses and assumptions and carried out respectively at the ' complex ' and ' instinct-theory ' stages in the history of psycho-analysis. (The author does not make it very clear whether he regards the therapeutic reaction on the analyst as confined to cases of ' multiple reflection ', but we assume not.)

It is obvious that the ' induced ' instinctual tendency will not compare in intensity and duration with the corresponding one in the patient ; otherwise there could be no understanding, only a parallel experience. It is as if the analyst were to hear the first few notes of a familiar melody ; he will then be able to recall the whole tune without waiting to hear it played through to an end or even needing to know anything further about it. The distinction between actual experience and the reanimation of the memory-trace of an experience becomes psychologically important here. The impulse awakened in the analyst is, as it were, nipped in the bud ; it must quickly give way to a fresh orientation. The analyst

must share in his patient's experience and yet recognize it as his patient's.

We now only need to know how the energy attached to the impulse awakened in the analyst comes to be transformed in the interests of intellectual understanding instead of pressing forward to motor discharge. It is clear that this is simply a special instance of the transformation of unconscious impulses into scientific curiosity. The decisive factors would appear to be early inhibition plus projection.

The whole process leading from perception, conscious and unconscious, *viâ* introjection and projection to conscious understanding may last but the fraction of a second. It is difficult to imagine that it could have been adequately dealt with in less than the two hundred and fifty pages devoted to it in this book.

The author finally raises the question whether a more immediate form of understanding is possible, and suggests that this was once in fact the case; that the introjection-projection process is a later development; that originally all psychological understanding was primarily direct apprehension of the nature and direction of the other's instinctual tendencies. Psychology only became *needed* when secondary tendencies developed giving rise to individual differentiation. The earlier power is still retained in the unconscious, which remains an incorruptible organ of psychological perception, but we cannot make direct use of it. Here we find the single element of truth underlying the claim of everyman to be his own psychologist.

There inevitably follows a chapter on the 'dialogue of the unconscious' which is more interesting than conclusive. The last two chapters of the book deal in a no less interesting way with problems relative to training and the personal qualities to be required of those who would undertake analyses. These three chapters incidentally will probably attract most of the attention of the critic.

Reik does not claim that there is anything new in what he says, but only that it is new to say it. Actually the effect is rather of daylight let in on a room previously shrouded in a semi-darkness; some of the objects in it were more or less clearly outlined, others only dimly perceived and others again were not visible at all. That a few shadows should still remain here and there was only to be expected. On the question of the evidence, the author informs us that he could have made this more convincing, but in the interests of discretion and simplicity felt obliged to limit himself in this respect. It is perhaps of no great moment, since in the particular field which has been chosen for investigation more than anywhere else, the analyst will have to look to his own experience to enable him to pass judgement on the theories advanced.

Some reference should be made to the many excellencies of style

revealed in the book which is in no way behind its predecessors in this respect. It is something of a relief at the present time to find the German language used as a vehicle for the expression of thought instead of being exploited to cover up a complete absence of thought. The book also manages to be extremely witty at times and throughout makes enjoyable reading, notwithstanding the rather austere nature of its subject-matter. Perhaps these formal qualities will unduly prejudice the reader, but we may be sure that the book will leave him with the impression that it constitutes one of the most notable contributions of recent years to the literature of psycho-analysis.

H. Mayor.

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The Dream in Primitive Cultures. By Jackson Steward Lincoln, with an Introduction by Professor C. G. Seligman. (The Cresset Press, London, 1935. Pp. 359. Price 18*s.* net.)

This is a very valuable psycho-analytic study of the part played by dreams in primitive cultures and also of the dreams of present-day *primitive* peoples. Professor Seligman, in his Preface, states that the author has been psycho-analysed and has had the advantage of both anthropological and psychological training.

The first part of the book is an interesting historical review of dream interpretation. The second part, the most important part of the book, deals with the structure and function of dreams in primitive cultures, the forms of primitive dreams, and the characteristic complexes thereby revealed. Part III is a personal contribution of material gathered by the author among American Indians.

The book will rank as an original and solid contribution to psycho-analytical literature.

E. J.

*

Die Geschlechtskälte der Frau, ihr Wesen und ihre Behandlung. By Eduard Hitschmann and Edmund Bergler. (Verlag ' Ars Medici ', Vienna, 1934. Pp. 88.)

We have placed this monograph on frigidity in the hands of a medical rather than a psycho-analytical firm of publishers, in the hope that we may bring to the notice of the large circle of medical men who still stand outside the psycho-analytical movement the fact of the origin of this pathological inhibition in unconscious mental processes. Our belief is that the clinical material we cite will substantiate this view, while our experience justifies an attitude of optimism in the prognosis of a large majority of cases.

In this book, moreover, readers versed in psycho-analysis will find the

first attempt made to characterize and differentiate the varieties of frigidity and to explain their pathogenesis. This is the more important because the prognosis differs with the different varieties. In most instances examples are given (though in an abridged form) and the full course of two successful analyses is described.

Our account of the analytical theory of female sexual development follows strictly the lines laid down by Freud. We do not, however, underestimate the importance of individual problems which still await discussion.

Author's Abstract.

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Sexual Life in Ancient Rome. By Otto Kiefer. Translated from *Kulturgeschichte Roms unter Besonderer Berücksichtigung der Römischen Sitten* by Gilbert and Helen Highet. (George Routledge & Sons, Ltd. London, 1934. Pp. 379. Price 25*s.* net.)

This is a comprehensive survey, not so much of characteristic sexual activities in the narrow sense, but of the relationship between sexual attitudes of the general cultural history of Rome. The chapter headings are as follows :—

Introduction : The Ideals of Rome.

I. Woman in Roman Life.
II. The Romans and Cruelty.
III. Roman Religion and Philosophy in Relation to Sexual Life.
  (*a*) Religion.
  (*b*) Philosophy.
IV. Physical Life.
  (*a*) Dress and Ornament.
  (*b*) The Toilet.
  (*c*) Dancing and the Theatre.
V. Love in Roman Poetry.
VI. Men and Women of the Imperial Age.
VII. The Fall of Rome and its Causes.

The author considers the varying status of marriage and the varying degree of emancipation of Roman women. Naturally much stress is laid on the prominent part played by cruelty. In an interesting final chapter the author offers a penetrating, though condensed, discussion of causes leading to the fall of Rome. In it he expresses considerable scepticism about the common belief that moral degeneration played any important part.

The translation is really excellent and the authors have taken meticulous care about the rendering of Roman verses.

E. J.

*

The Sex Life of the Unmarried Adult. An Enquiry into and an Interpretation of current Sex Practices. Edited by Ira S. Wile, M.D. (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London. Pp. xxii + 320. Price 7*s.* 6*d.* net.)

Nothing is more difficult to disclose than the secrets which Everyman knows and Everywoman is talking about. It has required the services of professors of anthropology, biology, psychology, economics, philosophy, a couple of physicians, a lawyer, and a professor of English to draw the curtain on this open secret: the unmarried of both sexes in civilized societies have a sexual life. Dr. Wile, the well-known New York child specialist, recognizing that procreation is not the sole function of sex, claims that another function, by giving pleasure, is at the root of all positive relationship between human beings. All the contributors, dealing with the United States, maintain that there is much greater sexual freedom among the unmarried than a generation ago. 'Gone are bundling, husking bees and post office; sex play is too frank to require specious excuses for its existence. Investigations by several physicians have discovered a wide variety of sexual experiences among the unmarried. Hamilton finds that 47 per cent. of the women and 59 per cent. of the men had had coitus before marriage; Katherine B. Davis, investigating the sex life of 1,200 college women, reported that 61 per cent. admitted masturbation (the figures have been given in this JOURNAL—Vol. XIII, p. 381 and Vol. XV, p. 95); lesbianism was fairly common, as were also heterosexual relationships.' These statistics are apparently regarded as of extreme importance, for they are given three times over by different contributors. The facts are few, and inferences not many, so that the contributors simply repeat one another. It cannot be said that the many specialists throw much light upon the subject from the angle of their particular profession. The sociologist might have written the psychological chapter and the psychologist might have written the chapter on biology. The Editor, Dr. Robert L. Dickinson, and Margaret Mead, the anthropologist, have some information which they convey lucidly and exactly. The other professorial writers have really nothing to add and they lose themselves in turgid phrase-making.

There is general agreement that marriage remains as the desired goal for the majority of the unmarried men and women in the United States, and, except for the economist, the writers are also agreed that economic factors play but a minor part in preventing marriage; both conditions remain even when the sexual life of the unmarried man or woman is not unsatisfactory. Margaret Mead points out that 'while primitive societies vary in the degree to which they explicitly emphasize the point to be socially mature is to be among other things married'. None of the contributors seem curious about the psychological significance of marriage. But Professor Groves, the psychologist, who is apparently ambivalent as

regards unconscious motivation, is as little curious as the biologist or the sociologist; he remarks (p. 102): 'There is no need of a Freud to demonstrate that personality is saturated with sex from the early days of childhood to the very end of life. Its expression is inevitable but cumulative' (whatever that word means here). On p. 101 he writes: 'A great part of the sex life of the unmarried is beneath the surface, and if it rises to consciousness, it is in such form that the source from which the influences flow escapes attention.' It would seem then that it did require some demonstrating. The authors of the chapters I have mentioned are well worth reading; the others may be skipped.

M. D. Eder.

*

The Origins of Love and Hate. By Ian D. Suttie, M.D. (Kegan Paul, Trench Trübner & Co., 1935. Pp. xvi + 275.)

This book is a preliminary exposition—to be followed by a more detailed work—of Dr. Suttie's divergence from Freud. The essential features of this divergence may be summed up very shortly: While Freud presents his discoveries in terms of a dualism of Eros and Ananke (tenderness being described as aim-inhibited libido), Dr. Suttie prefers a dualism of Eros and Tenderness (hate being regarded as a reaction to frustration). Three questions at once arise: How far are these differences verbal, or better, how far are they differences of classification which may vary in convenience but not in truth? How far are they real? And how far are they due to differences in emotional bias?

In practice the question of whether hate is an independent impulse or a reaction to frustration is unimportant—*provided* we agree, on the one hand, that frustration is inevitable, and, on the other, that hate is increased by the vicious circle of projection and introjection, and reduced when these mechanisms are fully understood. If the theoretical question is worth pursuing further, a clear definition of what we mean by an independent as opposed to a dependent impulse will be required. In the meantime temperament, whether optimistic or pessimistic, will help decide the point. Dr. Suttie likes to feel that the hate in him and about him is merely a perverted form of love, and I must confess to some sympathy with his view. At least this much may be conceded—that 'a pure culture of death impulse' is a psycho-analytical abstraction never found in practice.

Dr. Suttie's views on love seem less defensible. There is no reason, I think, why we should not distinguish as many impulses as there are primary bodily needs—*provided* we remember that psychological molecules, not elements, are found in life, and that every molecule seems to contain an element of sex. But when Dr. Suttie distinguishes tenderness from sexual appetite, he denies the sexual nature of the infant's relation to his mother.

How would he explain early fantasies of oral penetration ? As exhibitions of frustrated but non-sexual tenderness ? Or as projections into the past of later fantasies ? But if we once accept the facts, a plausible explanation is not far to seek. Copulating is phylogenetically an older impulse than sucking so that it would not be surprising if the latter had borrowed something from the former. For impulses, like organs, may surely be developed for one purpose and adapted for another.

Having denied the sexual element in the infant's relation to his mother, Dr. Suttie has no difficulty in denying the universality of the Œdipus Complex, which he thinks is peculiar to patriarchal cultures. On the other hand, his complaint that the Mother Goddess, as opposed to the Father God, has been relatively neglected by psycho-analytic writers on Religion seems just. The recent advance in child analysis will probably enable this gap to be filled.

To sum up : Dr. Suttie's book will be well received by all who wish to under-estimate the extent of infantile sexuality and aggression ; at the same time, psycho-analytical theory is admittedly tentative in many ways, and his criticisms are near enough the mark to stimulate research.

Roger Money-Kyrle.

*

Understanding Yourself. The Mental Hygiene of Personality. By Ernest R. Groves. (George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London, 1935. Pp. 278. Price 7*s.* 6*d.* net.)

The reader of this book, beguiled into buying it in virtue of its title, will find very little in it that can help him to ' understand himself '. On the one hand, it purports to explain some of the physiological functions that take place in the body, but these explanations are too meagre to be really useful. On the other hand, there is an attempt to explain mental functioning, but this explanation consists merely of a confused account of many views which tend only to mystify rather than enlighten the reader.

D. B.

*

Het kind en de adolescent in de psychoanalyse. By Hil Deman. (' De Sikkel ', Antwerp, 1934. Pp. 151.)

This intelligent, sympathetic and unpretentious little book gives a straightforward account of mental development in childhood and adolescence from a psycho-analytic point of view. The author is perhaps at his best when describing the various characteristic reactions and preoccupations of childhood. On the other hand he has clearly misunderstood certain aspects of analytic theory and others again have been stated in a misleading way. The illustrative material quoted from writers such as Tolstoy, Gorki, D. H. Lawrence, etc., has been very interestingly chosen.

H. Mayor.

CLINICAL PRIZE ESSAY

The attention of Members and Associate Members is drawn to the following notice concerning the Clinical Essay, for which a prize not exceeding £20 is offered.

Requirements in the Essay

The essay shall consist of a clinical record of a case investigated by psycho-analytical methods. It shall clearly illustrate the events and changes in the mental life of the patient and their relation to external environment. In awarding the prize, the Judges will pay attention to acuity of observation and the clearness with which the facts are stated. If the writer wishes to draw theoretical conclusions, he must bear in mind the necessity of making the evidence for such conclusions carry conviction. It is recommended that the length of the essay should not exceed twenty thousand words.

Date of Sending in Essays; Language; Format, etc.

Essays must be submitted on or before the thirty-first day of March in any year, in the English language. They must be typescript on quarto paper with ample left-hand margin. They must be in triplicate and be sent to the Hon. Secretary of the Institute. All copies of essays submitted become *ipso facto* the property of the Institute (or its successor) while it has the appointment of the Trustees.

No Award

If no essay is submitted of merit worthy of a prize in any year, no award shall be made for that year.

Joint Award

In the event of the Judges regarding the essays of two or more competitors of equal merit, they may divide the prize-money available for distribution as aforesaid into equal parts and award it to such competitors jointly.

Eligibility

Any person of either sex, who is not a member or a past-member of the Board of the Institute, shall be eligible for the competition.

Tenure

The prize shall be given to the writer of the best essay in the opinion of the Judges submitted in any year, but the prize may be

awarded to the same person twice, provided that he submits a second essay of sufficient merit in a later competition, and that the prize shall not be awarded more than twice to the same person.

Title

The competitor to whom the prize is awarded in any year may be called the Clinical Prizeman for that year.

Copyright

The copyright of any essay to which a prize is awarded shall become the property of the Institute. Should the author wish to quote it in whole or in part, the Institute shall not unreasonably withhold its consent. The Institute shall not publish such essay in whole or in part in English or in translation in England or abroad without the author's written consent given during his life-time. Other persons who may wish to quote extracts from any prize essay shall obtain the written consent of the Institute or its successor, and of the author given during his life-time.

S. M. Payne,
Business Secretary,
Institute of Psycho-Analysis.

BULLETIN OF THE INTERNATIONAL PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL ASSOCIATION

EDITED BY
EDWARD GLOVER, GENERAL SECRETARY

I. International Training Commission

It was found necessary to cancel the meeting of the I.T.C. fixed for the beginning of August, owing to lack of support.

Dr. S. Rado has resigned his position as Secretary of the I.T.C. Dr. Eitingon has requested Dr. E. Bibring of Vienna to undertake the duties of Secretary pending an election by the Congress.

Edward Glover.

II. Reports of Proceedings of Societies

CHICAGO PSYCHO-ANALYTIC SOCIETY

Mr. Alfred K. Stern, whose name appeared in the recent list of members as a non-therapeutic member, should have been entitled " Honorary Member."

GERMAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

Second Quarter, 1935

April 17, 1935. Müller-Braunschweig, Kemper and Frau Buder-Schenk reported on the Eighth General Medical Congress for Psychotherapy, held at Bad Nauheim, March 27–30, 1935.

May 8, 1935. Dr. Hans Christoffel, Bâle (guest of the Society) : ' Manifestations of the Urethral-erotic Impulse, with special reference to Enuresis, Urophilia and Uropolemy '.

May 15, 1935. Dr. Kamm : ' Character-Analysis of a Schizoid Patient '.

June 12, 1935. Dr. Herold : ' Character- and Transference-Resistances '.

June 26, 1935. Dr. Kluge : ' Semitic Mourning and Funeral Customs '.

Dr. Carl Müller-Braunschweig,
Berlin.

Stuttgart Study Group of the German Psycho-Analytical Society

Since the spring of 1933 the Study Group has continued to meet regularly once a month. At the suggestion of the Leader, a meeting was held at Bâle on June 30, 1935, to which the Swiss Society was invited, and at which Dr. Boehm also was present. At the monthly meetings members took it in turn to report on cases from their own practice. The communications of Gundert, Schottländer and Graber deserve special

mention. Of those members residing outside Stuttgart, Steinfeld (Mannheim) spoke twice and Muthmann (Freiburg) once. At the Bâle Conference the following papers were read :

(1) Schottländer : ' The Super-Ego and the Sense of Inferiority '.

(2) Zulliger : ' Five Typical Reactions to the Infantile Sense of Guilt '.

M. Graber,
Leader of the Stuttgart Study Group.

RUSSIAN PSYCHO-ANALYTICAL SOCIETY

The following list was omitted from the membership lists in the last number of the JOURNAL :

(*a*) *Members*

Dr. R. A. Awerbuch, Moscow, Sadowo-Kudrinskaj.
Dr. A. N. Bruk, Moscow, M. Kakowinskij 5.
Dr. A. Chaletzki, Odessa, Institute of Psychiatry.
Dr. B. D. Friedmann, Moscow, Sadowo-Triumphalnaja 8, W.7.
Dr. L. S. Geschelina, Moscow, Kammerherrskij, 4.
Dr. E. P. Goltz, Moscow, Mansurowskij Per 7.
Prof. J. W. Kannabich, Moscow, B. Rjewskij 8, W.14 (*President*).
Dr. M. Kogan, Odessa, Institute of Psychiatry.
Dr. Liosner-Kannabich, Moscow, B. Rjewskij 8, W.14.
Dr. Angela Rohr, Moscow, Marx-Engelsstr. 3.
Wilhelm Rohr, Moscow, Marx-Engelsstr. 3.
J. M. Schaffir, Moscow, Ostoschenka 5, W.38.
Prof. Otto Schmidt, Moscow, Granowsky-Str. 3, W.92.
Vera Schmidt, Moscow, Granowsky-Str. 3, W.92 (*Secretary*).
Dr. T. P. Simson, Moscow, Psychiatric Clinic, 1 Universität.
Dr. Sabina Spielrein, Rostow a. Don, Puschkinskaja 97.
G. P. Weisberg, Simferopol.

Associate Members

Frau Dr. T. I. Goldowskaja, Moscow, Arbat 30, W.59.
Dr. E. D. Goldowsky, Kieff, Military Hospital.
Dr. M. E. Lurje, Moscow, Pokrowskoje-Streschenewo Sanatorium.
Dr. A. Salkind, Kieff, Nikolsko-Botanitscheskaja 3/9.
Dr. W. A. Wnukow, Moscow, Skatertnij per 22, W.8.

WASHINGTON-BALTIMORE PSYCHO-ANALYTIC SOCIETY

Second Quarter, 1935

April 13, 1935. Dr. Ernest E. Hadley : ' Hostility : its Exploitation in the Beginning of Analysis '.

May 11, 1935. Dr. Gregory Zilboorg (guest of the Society) : ' Clinical Inference in the Psychology of the Only Child '.

Bernard S. Robbins, M.D.,
Secretary-Treasurer.